Management Alert -
CBP Spends Millions
Conducting Polygraph
Examinations on
Unsuitable Applicants
August 4, 2017
OIG-17-99-MA
DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS
Management Alert – CBP Spends Millions Conducting
Polygraph Examinations on Unsuitable Applicants
August , 2017
Why We
Did
This Audit
This report is part of an
ongoing, department-
wide
audit about polygraphs.
Because of planned
increases in
U.S. Customs
and Border Protection
(CBP) staffing, we believe
it
is important to
identify and
describe current
inefficiencies in CBP’s
hiring process to promote
improvements and as a
precursor to our main
report.
What We
Recommend
We recommend CBP
improve its screening by
establishing an in-person
pre-security interview
process, requiring
examiners to use the on-
call adjudication process,
and discontinue testing of
unsuitable applicants.
For Further Information:
Contact our Office of Public Affairs at
(202) 254-4100, or email us at
DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov
What We Found
CBP administered polygraph examinations to applicants who
previously provided disqualifying information on employment
documents or during the pre-test interview. This occurred
because CBP’s process did not stop, and is not sufficient to
prevent, unsuitable applicants from continuing through the
polygraph examination. As a result, we estimated that
between fiscal years 2013 and 2016 CBP spent about $5.1
million completing more than 2,300 polygraphs for
applicants with significant pre-test admissions of
wrongdoing.
If CBP implemented a security interview and improved
utilization of the adjudicative process, it could put its funds
to better use by focusing on applicants with the best chance
of making it through the hiring process. Not doing so slows
the process for qualified applicants; wastes polygraph
resources on unsuitable applicants; and will make it more
difficult for CBP to achieve its hiring goals.
CBP Response
CBP concurred with both recommendations and agreed that
conducting the in-person pre-security interview prior to the
polygraph examination is a best practice. However, CBP
proposed its Office of Professional Responsibility take nearly
18 months to conduct and review a study to determine the
feasibility of incorporating a pre-security interview prior to
the polygraph examination. CBP has already conducted a
study, which recommended the pre-security interview, and
CBP has recognized it as a best practice. We believe that
CPB’s timeline is unreasonably long and will not assist CBP
in meeting its hiring goals.
CBP implemented recommendation 2 by issuing a policy
requiring polygraph examiners to use the on-call-
adjudication process.
www.oig.dhs.gov OIG-17-99-MA
OFFICE
OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department
of
Homeland
Security
Washington,
DC
20528
/
www.oig.dhs.gov
August
4,
2017
MEMORANDUM FOR: Kevin
K.
McAleenan
Acting
Commissioner
U.S.
Customs
and
Border
Protection
FROM:
John
Roth
\.-nk
'"\(o~
Q
.....
Inspector
General
SUBJECT
:
Management
Alert
- CBP
Spends
Millions Conducting
Polygraph
Examinations
on
Unsuitable
Applicants
For
your
action
is
our
final
report,
Management
Alert
- CBP
Spends
Millions
Conducting
Polygraph
Examinations
on
Unsuitable
Applicants.
We
incorporated
the
formal
comments
provided
by
your
office.
The
report
contains
two
recommendations
aimed
at
improving
CBP's
hiring
process.
Your
office
concurred
with
both
recommendations.
Based
on
information
provided
in
your
response
to
the
draft
report,
we
consider
recommendation
1
unresolved
and
open
and
recommendation
2
resolved
and
closed.
As
prescribed
by
the
Department
of
Homeland
Security
Directive
077-01,
Follow-Up
and
Resolution
for
Office
of
Inspector
General
Report
Recommendations,
within
90
days
of
the
date
of
this
memorandum,
please
provide
our
office
with
a
written
response
that
includes
your
(
1)
agreement
or
disagreement,
(2)
corrective
action
plan,
and
(3)
target
completion
date
for
each
recommendation.
Also,
please
include
responsible
parties
and
any
other
supporting
documentation
necessary
to
inform
us
about
the
current
status
of
the
recommendation.
Until
your
response
is
received
and
evaluated,
the
recommendations
will
be
considered
open
and
unresolved.
Please
send
your
response
or
closure
request
to
.
Consistent
with
our
responsibility
under
the
Inspector
General
Act,
we
will
provide
copies
of
our
report
to
congressional
committees
with
oversight
and
appropriation
responsibility
over
the
Department
of
Homeland
Security.
We will
post
the
report
on
our
website
for
public
dissemination.
Please
call
me
with
any
questions,
or
your
staff
may
contact
Don
Bumgardner,
Deputy
Assistant
Inspector
General
for
Audits,
at
(202)
254-4100
.
www.oig.dhs.gov
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Background
The Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010 requires U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) law enforcement applicants to receive a polygraph
examination before they are hired.
1
CBP uses the polygraph examination as a
tool to identify potential suitability and national security issues. CBP’s
Credibility Assessment Division oversees the polygraph phase of the hiring
process. The polygraph consists of three phases:
x Pre-test Interview — examiners provide an explanation of the polygraph
instruments and exam; ensure the equipment is working properly; obtain
a waiver; and review the polygraph questions with the applicant.
x Polygraph Examination — examiners ask applicants questions in two
categories: suitability and national security. The suitability questions
probe issues such as illegal drug use, involvement in serious crimes, and
falsification of a job application. National security questions seek
answers related to terrorist activity, unauthorized contact with foreign
nationals, and the mishandling of classified information.
x Post-test Interview — examiners review the polygraph exam results
with the applicants.
During the pre- or post-test interviews, an applicant may provide information
or admit to behavior that may disqualify him or her from employment
eligibility, regardless of the results of the polygraph exam. For example, during
a pre-test interview an applicant might admit to using illegal drugs or having
committed other criminal activities. These admissions may disqualify the
candidate, regardless of the results of the polygraph examination.
Polygraph examiners do not make the final decision on suitability for
employment. Instead, they forward polygraph test results and admissions to
Personnel Security Division adjudicators, who use the information to determine
suitability. The polygraph is one of several factors the adjudicators consider on
suitability. CBP began an on-call adjudicator process in March 2015, which
gives polygraph examiners direct access to adjudicators who can determine the
suitability of an applicant’s admission instantaneously.
1
Pub. L. No. 111-376. This requirement was recently waived for veterans who the
Commissioner determines is suitable for employment, have a current/active Top Secret
clearance and are able to access sensitive compartmented information, a current single scope
background investigation, and who were not granted any previous waivers to obtain the
clearance. See Pub. L. No. 114-328, § 1049.
www.oig.dhs.gov 2 OIG-17-99-MA
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
According to CBP, between fiscal years 2013 and 2016, it spent about $72.3
million on the polygraph program and administered polygraph examinations to
32,847 applicants.
This polygraph report is part of a series of reports on DHS hiring and an
ongoing, department-wide audit to determine whether DHS components have
effective controls over the polygraph and complaint processes. A recent DHS
Office of Inspector General (OIG) inspection report (OIG-17-05) noted CBP
continues to have significant delays in hiring law enforcement personnel.
2
CBP’s hiring process took over 220 days in FY 2015. As part of the hiring
process, polygraph examinations contribute to this delay. During the audit, the
President issued an executive order calling for CBP to hire 5,000 additional
agents. Given this mandate, we believe it important to identify and describe
inefficiency in CBP’s hiring process to promote improvements and as a
precursor to our main report.
Results of Audit
CBP administered polygraph examinations to applicants who previously
provided disqualifying information on employment documents or during the
pre-test interview. This occurred because CBP’s process did not stop, and is
not sufficient to prevent, unsuitable applicants from continuing through the
polygraph examination. As a result, we estimated CBP spent about $5.1 million
completing more than 2,300 polygraphs for applicants with significant pre-test
admissions.
Disqualifying Admissions during the Pre-test Interview
As part of our ongoing audit, we are analyzing a statistical sample of 380
polygraph exams administered from FY 2013 to FY 2016. Of the 380 polygraph
examinations under our review, 71 applicants (19 percent) made disqualifying
admissions during the pre-test interview. For the purpose of this report, we
focused on these 71 cases with unsuitable pre-test admissions.
3
According to
CBP’s data, about 2,300 applicants made unsuitable pre-test admissions and
still completed the polygraph examination between FYs 2013 and 2016. CBP
administered the polygraph examination — sometimes multiple examinations
— to applicants who made unsuitable admissions. For example, applicants
admitted to illegal drug use, drug smuggling, human trafficking, and to having
close personal relationships with people who commit these crimes.
2
DHS is Slow to Hire Law Enforcement Personnel, DHS OIG-17-05.
3
At the time of this report, the analysis of the full statistical sample is not complete. Therefore,
we selected and analyzed a judgmental sample of cases (the 71 of 380) with pre-test
admissions. The complete analysis will be part of a future report.
www.oig.dhs.gov 3 OIG-17-99-MA
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
In addition, CBP provided information for an applicant who, during the pre-test
interview, admitted to participating in the gang rape of an intoxicated and
unconscious woman. The examiner obtained a written statement in the pre-test
yet continued with the exam for 5 hours after the admission and did not use
CBP’s on-call adjudicative process.
Disqualifying Admissions Do Not Prevent a Polygraph Examination
CBP’s processes do not always remove applicants who provided disqualifying
information on either their employment application or during the pre-test
interview. Consequently, for example, CBP administered polygraph
examinations to individuals who have admitted to such things as using illegal
drugs within the last 2 years or committing serious crimes. Either of those
actions would prevent someone from being eligible for employment as a CBP
law enforcement officer. More thoroughly reviewing the application for
disqualifying behavior before the polygraph test would prevent the waste of
scarce polygraph resources.
On-Call Adjudication Process
Only an adjudicator can officially determine if an applicant is unsuitable. Prior
to March 2015, when CBP began its on-call adjudicator process, examiners did
not have an official method to confirm that an applicant’s pre-test admissions
were in fact unsuitable and a basis for ending the exam. Rather, an examiner
relied on the Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAC) to determine whether to
discontinue testing based on an admission, which was later sent to
adjudicators. The new process allowed polygraph examiners access to
adjudicators who could determine the suitability of an applicant’s admission
instantly; however, the ASAC or Quality Control division still approved the
decision to end the examination.
We found even with the on-call adjudication process, polygraph examiners 1)
did not always use this resource; 2) continued the exam after an adjudicator
determined the applicant was unsuitable; or 3) requested but did not receive
an immediate suitability determination from an adjudicator, and the examiner
continued to expend time and resources conducting additional polygraph
examinations.
Of the 71 polygraph exams we judgmentally selected to review, 43 (60 percent)
occurred prior to March 2015. Examiners in the remaining 28 cases —
ignored the on-call adjudicator process or the adjudicator’s
determination (17); or
www.oig.dhs.gov 4 OIG-17-99-MA
x
x
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
followed the process and either stopped the polygraph on applicants with
disqualifying admissions or continued because the adjudicator did not
deem the admission disqualifying (11).
In an example of the latter category, an examiner contacted the on-call
adjudicator after the applicant admitted to anger issues that led to recurring
child abuse, one instance of domestic violence, and repeated vandalism.
According to CBP, these crimes were disqualifying; however, the adjudicator
did not make an unsuitable determination. As a result, CBP brought the
applicant back the next day. The examiner presented the adjudicator with
additional drug admissions and the adjudicator deemed the applicant
unsuitable.
In 2015, CBP’s Office of Administration conducted an assessment on CBP’s
Pre-Employment Polygraph process.
4
Its report acknowledged similar concerns
and stated that, overall, the process is not efficient and examiners scheduled
timeslots for unsuitable applicants to continue through the hiring process. The
report also noted that 21 percent of applicants in the polygraph phase made
disqualifying admissions during the pre-test interview.
The report recommended that CBP address these inefficiencies by establishing
an in-person security interview about 3 weeks prior to the polygraph
examination. Other components and agencies use a security interview, or
something similar, before the polygraph examination. The security interview
uses a series of questions to determine whether an applicant meets the
suitability requirements to continue through the hiring process. According to
the report, a security interview would allow greater opportunity to screen out
applicants who make unsuitable admissions and is the most cost-effective
option. CBP did not implement this recommendation. Had CBP implemented
the recommendation, it could have avoided testing unsuitable applicants, and
potentially reduced the time it takes to hire.
Process Improvements
A recent DHS OIG inspection report (OIG-17-05) noted CBP’s FY 2015 hiring
process for law enforcement personnel took over 220 days. With limited
polygraph resources, CBP should focus on improving efficiency by removing
unsuitable applicants from the process as soon as possible.
Shortly after notification of our audit findings for this report, CBP formalized its
on-call adjudication practice with a temporary (6 month) policy, effective May
1, 2017. The new policy applies to a new polygraph format that CBP is
exploring. The process now requires examiners to contact adjudicators when
4
CBP’s Pre-Employment Polygraph Assessment, Final Report, September 2015
www.oig.dhs.gov 5 OIG-17-99-MA
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
an applicant provides potentially disqualifying information. Nevertheless, the
new policy does not require the polygraph exam to stop immediately after the
adjudicator’s determination, rather it continues for a series of questions.
Although this new policy is an improvement, it continues the practice of testing
an unsuitable applicant longer than necessary, which wastes time and
resources on an applicant who CBP already knows is unsuitable. CBP also has
not addressed the Office of Administration recommendation to establish an in-
person security interview prior to the polygraph examination. Doing so would
further allow CBP to focus its limited polygraph resources on viable candidates
and potentially reduce the time it takes to hire.
Conclusion
CBP administered polygraph examinations to unsuitable applicants. This
occurred because CBP’s process did not stop, and is not sufficient to prevent,
unsuitable applicants from continuing through the polygraph examination.
Specifically, CBP 1) does not have a step, such as the security interview, to
identify and remove applicants who provide disqualifying information well
before they are scheduled to appear for a polygraph examination; 2) did not
require examiners to consistently use the on-call adjudicator process until May
2017; and 3) does not end the exam immediately after an unsuitable
determination. As a result, CBP administered polygraph examinations to
individuals who provided disqualifying information during the polygraph pre-
test interview. We estimated CBP spent about $5.1 million completing more
than 2,300 polygraphs to applicants with significant pre-test admissions of
wrongdoing between FYs 2013 and 2016.
5
CBP could not hire these applicants
regardless of their polygraph results.
Subjecting unsuitable applicants to the polygraph examination has a direct
impact on the high failure rate of the polygraph program and limits CBP’s
capability to address its short- and long-term hiring needs. Given that DHS has
committed to increase staffing, CBP should put its funds to better use by
focusing its polygraph resources on applicants with the best chance of making
it through the hiring process. Not doing so slows the process for qualified
applicants, wastes polygraph resources on unsuitable applicants, and will
make it more difficult to achieve its hiring goal.
5
This figure could be higher because applicants make unsuitable admissions during the pre-
test, post-test, or both interviews. For the purposes of this alert, we only included pre-test
admissions because we could not separate the “both” category. We will include this information
in our final audit report.
www.oig.dhs.gov 6 OIG-17-99-MA
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Recommendations
Recommendation 1: We recommend that the Acting Commissioner of CBP
establish an in-person pre-security interview well before the polygraph
examination.
Recommendation 2: We recommend that the Acting Commissioner of CBP
amend the temporary (May 2017) polygraph policy and develop permanent
policy and procedures that:
1. apply to all polygraph screening methods;
2. require polygraph examiners to contact on-call adjudicators after
potentially disqualifying pre-test admissions; and
3. ensure examiners immediately stop polygraph processes when applicants
are deemed unsuitable.
Management Comments and OIG Analysis
CBP concurred with our recommendations and provided comments to the draft
report. A summary of CBP’s response and our analysis follows. We have
included a copy of the CBP’s management comments in their entirety in
appendix A. CBP also provided technical comments to our report. We made
changes to incorporate these comments, as appropriate.
CBP raised concerns regarding our cost estimate for conducting polygraph
examinations on applicants who made unsuitable admissions during the pre-
test interview. CBP said that our methodology may have resulted in an
overstatement of cases and associated costs. As stated in the report, our
estimate could have been higher because we excluded cases where applicants
made unsuitable admissions during both the pre and post-test interviews. For
purposes of this report, we only included pre-test admissions because we could
not separate the “both” category. In addition, the cost estimate of $2,200 per
polygraph is based on CBP’s budget information it provided at the time of the
alert. As a result, our cost estimate was understated rather than overstated.
CBP also noted that while there were cases in our sample that should not have
progressed to the polygraph stage, many of the cases lacked sufficient
information to make a suitability determination prior to polygraph testing when
utilizing the "whole person concept." We asked CBP to review the cases we
mentioned in the report, and adjudicators determined the applicants were
unsuitable and should not have continued with the polygraph phase. Had CBP
implemented the recommendation for an in-person pre-security interview it
could have alleviated this concern.
www.oig.dhs.gov 7 OIG-17-99-MA
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Response to Recommendation #1: Concur. CBP agreed that conducting the
in-person pre-security interview prior to the polygraph examination is a best
practice. CBP’s Office of Professional Responsibility will conduct a feasibility
review to assess the impacts of implementing an in-person pre-security
interview prior to conducting a polygraph examination. According to CBP,
adding a pre-security interview will force the restructuring of the hiring process
and add further delays. Additionally, due to the volume of applicants that CBP
receives, the feasibility review will identify resources needed to conduct this
interview and administrative support resources to integrate this step in the
hiring process. Once the feasibility review is complete, CBP will review
recommendations and determine whether, based on CBP's current hiring
process, it is feasible to implement the pre-security interview.
OIG Analysis: CBP concurred but the comments and proposed actions are not
responsive to the recommendation. CBP proposed nearly 18 months to conduct
and review a study and make a determination for “the feasibility” of
incorporating a pre-security interview in the hiring process. Based on this
response, CBP did not commit to implementing our recommendation. We
believe the length of time for the feasibility study is unreasonably long and
does not help CBP achieve its hiring goals. As mentioned in the report, CBP
already conducted an assessment of the hiring process which recommended
the pre-security interview occur before the polygraph.
As CBP noted, the pre-security interview is a best practice. Other law
enforcement agencies we spoke with conduct a pre-security interview to obtain
and review additional information about applicants prior to polygraph. CBP
polygraph officials we spoke with also considered the pre-security interview an
integral and missing step in the hiring process. During our review we found
multiple examples of applicants with disqualifying information on their
application documents. CBP could have removed these applicants had it
conducted a thorough pre-security interview. We recognize this adds an
additional step in the hiring process; however, it allows CBP’s polygraph
program to focus on the best applicants and can ultimately reduce the overall
time and cost to hire.
The recommendation will remain unresolved and open until CBP provides
milestones for incorporating the pre-security interview into the hiring process.
Response to Recommendation #2: Concur. According to its response, CBP
implemented this recommendation by issuing a policy memorandum that
became effective on June 12, 2017, requiring all polygraph examiners to
contact an on-call adjudicator and obtain a suitability determination any time
potentially disqualifying information is obtained during a polygraph
examination. CBP directed all polygraph managers and quality control
personnel to review every polygraph examination to ensure compliance with
www.oig.dhs.gov 8 OIG-17-99-MA
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
this new policy. Additionally, CBP made changes to its polygraph database to
allow for better oversight of examiner compliance with the policy. Through
these database changes, managers can easily determine whether any
additional testing was performed following an unsuitable determination. On-
call adjudicators also make notations in the Integrated Security Management
System if an unfavorable suitability determination is made resulting from an
admission(s) made during a polygraph examination. According to CBP, since it
issued the new policy, it is not aware of any policy violations that have
occurred.
OIG Analysis: CBP concurred with our recommendation and provided the
June 12, 2017 memorandum addressing our recommendation. CBP also
provided information showing the changes it made to the polygraph database.
Since the new policy, we observed two polygraph examinations where an
applicant made unsuitable admissions during the pre-test interview. In both
cases, the examiner ended the exam after contacting an adjudicator who
determined the applicant was unsuitable. This determination occurred in less
than 10 minutes in both cases, which satisfied the intent of our
recommendation.
These efforts are responsive to the recommendation, and we consider it
resolved and closed.
Objective, Scope, and Methodology
The Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General was
established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107−296) by
amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978.
This report is part of an ongoing department-wide audit to determine whether
DHS components have effective controls over the polygraph and complaint
processes. During the audit, the President issued an executive order calling for
CBP to hire 5,000 additional agents. Given this mandate, we believe it
important to identify and describe current inefficiencies in CBP’s hiring process
to promote improvements and as a precursor to our main report.
To identify and report inefficiencies in CBP’s hiring process we relied on our
ongoing audit activities that —
x analyzed the unsuitable admissions of applicants within a statistical
sample pulled for the larger audit as well as other examples CBP
provided;
x confirmed the information by reviewing admissions, correspondence with
CBP, and examiner notes;
www.oig.dhs.gov 9 OIG-17-99-MA
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
x interviewed officials from CBP’s Credibility Assessment Division,
Personnel Security Division, Human Resource Management, and budget
offices; and
x analyzed a September 2015 internal report that CBP commissioned on
Pre-Employment Polygraph Assessments;
x used CBP’s budget information it provided at the time of the alert and
estimated it cost CBP $2,200 per polygraph. We filtered the full universe
of data to identify applicants CBP classified as having significant pre-test
admissions and removed applicants that did not complete the polygraph
examination. We identified about 2,300 applicants who proceeded with
the examination although CBP’s data indicated they made unsuitable
pretest admissions. We estimated CBP spent about $5.1 million ($2,200
multiplied by 2,300) completing polygraphs for these applicants.
We conducted the research for this Management Alert between February and
March 2017 pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and
according to generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient,
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based upon our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based
upon our audit objectives.
The Office of Audits major contributors to this report are Sean Pettersen,
Director; Priscilla Cast, Analyst In-Charge; Gary Crownover, Program Analyst;
Jeffrey Wilson, Program Analyst; Megan McNulty, Program Analyst; Robert
Williams, Program Analyst; Christopher Yablonski, Auditor; Benjamin Wing,
Auditor; Michael Redmond (Office of Investigations), Kevin Dolloson,
Communications Analyst; Ellen Gallagher, Communications Analyst; and
David DeHaven, Independent Referencer.
www.oig.dhs.gov 10 OIG-17-99-MA
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES
To view this and any of our other reports, please visit our website at: www.oig.dhs.gov.
For further information or questions, please contact Office of Inspector General Public Affairs
at: DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov. Follow us on Twitter at: @dhsoig.
OIG HOTLINE
To report fraud, waste, or abuse, visit our website at www.oig.dhs.gov and click on the red
"Hotline" tab. If you cannot access our website, call our hotline at (800) 323-8603, fax our
hotline at (202) 254-4297, or write to us at:
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