S.2 of the Solicitors Act 1843 stated that “No person shall act as an attorney or
solicitor…unless such person shall after the passing of this act be admitted and enrolled and
otherwise duly qualified as an attorney or solicitor.”
If the use of the word “person” was not sufficiently gender-neutral, it was combined with
s.48, which provided that “every word importing masculine gender only shall extend and be
applied to a female as well as male…unless in any of the cases aforesaid it be otherwise
specially provided.”
Despite this, in its judgment in Bebb v Law Society
, the Court of Appeal, describing Bebb (accurately,
though perhaps unnecessarily) as “a spinster”, refused her appeal, holding that women were unable
to become lawyers at the date of the passing of the Solicitors Act 1843 and that it conferred no fresh
and independent right upon them to do so, because it did not destroy a pre-existing disability.
Of slight comfort, Cozens-Hardy MR added “We have been asked to hold, what I for one quite assent
to, that, in point of intelligence and education and competency women—and in particular the
applicant here, who is a distinguished Oxford student—are at least equal to a great many, and,
probably, far better than many, of the candidates who will come up for examination, but that is
really not for us to consider. Our duty is to consider and, so far as we can, to ascertain what the law
is, and I disclaim absolutely any right to legislate in a matter of this kind. In my opinion that is for
Parliament, and not for this Court.”
Of less comfort was Phillimore LJ’s statement that “A difficulty—I only mention it incidentally—at
once arises if a woman is to be admitted an attorney or a solicitor, because it is clear that married
women, not having an absolute liberty to enter into binding contracts, binding themselves personally,
would be unfitted either for entering into articles or for contracting with their clients. Well, it is true
that that difficulty does not apply to single women, but every woman can be married at some time in
her life, and it would be a serious inconvenience if, in the middle of her articles, or in the middle of
conducting a piece of litigation, a woman was suddenly to be disqualified from contracting by reason
of her marriage.”
This statement of Phillimore LJ was curious given that the Married Women’s Property Act 1883
permitted a married woman to enter into contracts to the extent of her separate property (that is,
the property she held separately to her husband – the same Act providing that a married woman
was capable of acquiring, holding and disposing of property as her separate property).