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Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP Recent Trends in U.S. Term Loan B
basis, and inside or outside the credit facility itself. These various
types of flexibility have developed independently and in different
forms, and the combination of them has resulted, in many cases, in
overlapping or inconsistent standards within TLB agreements, and
little uniformity across the industry. However, they speak to the
ongoing trend of viewing credit facilities as flexible documents
designed to survive significant corporate transactions, in this case
debt incurrence, subject to maintaining a certain leverage profile.
There are three primary instances of flexibility that borrowers have
been able to achieve in some transactions that owe their origins to
HY Bonds.
First, a limited number of TLB now permit debt incurrence subject
to satisfaction of a FCCR or interest coverage ratio (usually of
2.00x or greater). While in a low interest rate environment this
creates significant flexibility, there are several mitigants that have
survived in the TLB market. First, even where a FCCR test for debt
incurrence applies, secured debt is only permitted subject to
satisfaction of a leverage ratio. This can be contrasted with secured
HY Bonds which frequently contain no ratio test for junior lien debt
(although they do for pari passu or senior secured debt). Second,
TLB typically still include more stringent parameters around the
terms of pari passu/junior lien debt (including limitations on final
maturity, weighted average life, prepayments and, sometimes, more
restrictive terms), although it must be noted that many of these
requirements are currently under pressure from borrowers.
Second, the ability to “reclassify” debt incurred under fixed dollar
baskets to ratio debt baskets is now included in a limited number of
TLB. The rationales for resisting this are that a borrower that could
not meet the ratio debt test at the time of incurrence should not be
“rewarded” for later improving performance. And, that lenders
should not be subject to what might be an unrepresentative “high-
water mark” of EBITDA performance over the life of the loan as the
point for recharacterising basket debt as ratio debt, and resetting the
starting point for using such fixed dollar baskets. But to a borrower,
these arguments contain echoes of a maintenance-covenant
construct: the debt is “stuck” in the basket under which it was
incurred. Borrowers argue (with varying degrees of success) that,
with the market’s new, relatively relaxed attitude toward
deleveraging, if borrowers can satisfy the debt incurrence ratio at
the time of reclassification, lenders are not harmed by such
reclassification.
Third, another concept appearing occasionally in TLB is
“contribution indebtedness”, which allows the borrower to incur
debt equal to 100% (or occasionally up to 200%) of equity proceeds
it receives from investors. This originated as a HY Bond concept
and is permitted on the theory that if investors are willing to further
capitalise an issuer on a 50% or 33% equity basis, bond lenders
should be satisfied.
Restricted Payments
TLB covenants still tend to differentiate between investments,
equity payments (usually called restricted payments in that market)
and prepayments of junior debt, while HY Bonds treat these items
as part of a single “restricted payments” covenant. However, as
available amount builder baskets and maximum ratio conditions in
TLB are increasingly applied across all three classes of payments or
transactions, this distinction has become more form than substance,
and has been eliminated in a minority of TLB deals.
In HY Bonds, restricted payments may be made in the amount of a
builder basket equal to 50% of consolidated net income (“CNI”),
100% of equity proceeds and certain other builder components,
subject to compliance with FCCR greater than 2.00x. TLB more
often include an “available amount” or “cumulative credit” basket
that builds based on excess cash flow and other components and
may only be used subject to satisfying certain leverage levels. More
recently, however, the TLB cumulative credit concept has trended
closer to the HY Bond standard by building based on 50% of CNI
(or in a small number of deals, the greater of retained ECF and 50%
of CNI) and replacing the leverage ratio condition with a coverage
ratio.
Another common feature of TLB deals is that the leverage ratio
and/or absence of default conditions to the use of the builder basket
is often limited to the making of equity payments (as opposed to
investments), with the effect of establishing a more lenient set of
conditions than HY Bonds, where the FCCR condition applies to all
uses of the builder basket. Relatedly, some recent deals have also
seen the advent of an unlimited ability to make restricted payments
and investments and prepay junior secured debt, subject to the
satisfaction of a leverage ratio. This may be driven, in part, by the
desire to hard-wire dividend recapitalisation capacity into TLB as
an alternative to a sale given the recent relatively anemic M&A
activity.
Finally, in most HY Bond issuances, the issuer is not limited in the
amount of investments it can make in restricted subsidiaries
(whether or not guarantors), whereas TLB typically limit
investments by the borrower and guarantors in non-guarantor
subsidiaries. However, in recent months, a few TLB deals have
eliminated even this distinction, particularly where a U.S. borrower
has significant non-U.S. operations or a non-U.S. growth strategy.
This change has a number of important implications, including
greatly facilitating acquisitions of entities that cannot or do not
intend to become guarantors of the credit. From the borrower’s
perspective, these features may seem essential to the realization of
international strategies and increasingly complex global corporate
structures that may evolve during the life of the loan. Limitations
on cross-border transfers that are second-nature to a creditor may
seem unduly constricting to a borrower.
Flexibility to Make Acquisitions
One useful case study in the continuing march towards maximum
flexibility in loan documentations is the trends in 2013 relating to
borrowers’ ability to make acquisitions. This is particularly driven
by sponsors who frequently view their portfolio companies if not as
an acquisition platform, at least as a business that should be
positioned to grow opportunistically over time. This manifests
itself in several ways. First, it is now common to allow incremental
facilities to be utilised on a “funds certain” basis. Though it takes
a number of forms, some more aggressive than others, the theme is
consistent: if an incremental facility will be utilised to finance an
acquisition, then the conditions precedent to incurring such
incremental indebtedness should match as closely as possible the
conditions precedent to a limited “SunGard” conditionality.
Second, negative covenants frequently permit indebtedness to be
incurred to finance an acquisition subject to either satisfaction of an
agreed ratio or – borrowing from HY Bonds again – if the leverage
ratio giving pro forma effect to the acquisition is not worse than it
was immediately before. Third, call protection in TLB now often
have an exception for material acquisitions, with the result that if
the borrower is forced to refinance its existing debt in order to
consummate an acquisition, it will not be penalised by having to
pay a prepayment premium to the existing lenders. HY Bonds are
not so generous. Finally, permitted acquisition baskets are typically
not only uncapped (except with respect to acquisitions of non-
guarantor entities) but also not subject to pro forma compliance
with a leverage ratio. Taken together with negative covenant