Section One — Most Serious Problems
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The IRS’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs Discourage Voluntary Compliance by
Those Who Inadvertently Failed to Report Foreign Accounts
Legislative
Recommendations
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Problems
Most Litigated
Issues
Case Advocacy Appendices
MSP #8
MSP
#8
The IRS’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs Discourage
Voluntary Compliance by Those Who Inadvertently Failed to
Report Foreign Accounts
RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS
Steven T. Miller, Deputy Commissioner, Services and Enforcement
Faris Fink, Commissioner, Small Business/Self-Employed Division
Heather C. Maloy, Commissioner, Large Business and International Division
Peggy Bogadi, Commissioner, Wage and Investment Division
William J. Wilkins, Chief Counsel
DEFINITION OF PROBLEM
The Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) requires U.S. citizens and residents to report foreign accounts
on Form TD F 90–22.1, Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR) so the
government can better detect “bad actors” engaged in tax evasion, terrorism, and money
laundering.
1
Beginning in 2009, the IRS initiated a series of offshore voluntary disclosure
(OVD) programs to settle with taxpayers who had failed to report offshore income and file
any related information return such as the FBAR: the 2009 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure
Program (OVDP), 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative (OVDI), and the open-end-
ed 2012 OVDP.
2
As discussed in prior reports, these programs applied a resource-intensive,
burdensome, punitive, one-size-fits-all approach designed for “bad actors” to “benign actors”
who inadvertently violated the rules.
3
While an estimated five to seven million U.S. citizens reside abroad, and many more U.S.
residents have FBAR filing requirements,
4
the IRS received only 741,249 FBAR filings in
2011, and as of September 29, 2012, it had received fewer than 28,000 OVD submissions
from FBAR violators.
5
Thus, significant FBAR filing compliance problems likely remain
unaddressed.
1
See generally 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5); 31 C.F.R. § 1010.350; Internal Revenue Manual (IRM) 4.26.16 (July 1, 2008); Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT),
JCS-5-05, General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in the 108th Cong. 377-78 (May 2005).
2
IRS, Voluntary Disclosure: Questions and Answers, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Voluntary-Disclosure:-Questions-and-Answers (first posted May 6, 2009) [here-
inafter “2009 OVDP FAQ”]; IRS, 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/
International-Businesses/2011-Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Initiative-Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers (first posted Feb. 8, 2011) [hereinafter
“2011 OVDI FAQ”]; IRS, Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program Frequently Asked Questions and Answers, http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-
Taxpayers/Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions-and-Answers (first posted June 26, 2012) [hereinafter “2012 OVDP FAQ,” or
collectively the “OVD programs”].
3
National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to Congress 191-205; Id. at 206-72; National Taxpayer Advocate 2013 Objectives Report to Congress 7-8;
Id. at 21-29. See also Taxpayer Advocate Directive 2011-1 (Aug. 16, 2011).
4
National Taxpayer Advocate 2009 Annual Report to Congress 144.
5
IRS response to TAS information request (July 27, 2012); IRS response to TAS information request (Sept. 23, 2012).
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Legislative
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Case AdvocacyAppendices
Most Serious Problem
In addition to problems identified in prior reports, the National Taxpayer Advocate is
concerned that the IRS has:
Increased the cost and burden of correcting past violations, as well as the IRS resources
required to process these corrections, by continuing to require benign actors to opt in
and opt out of OVD programs — even though processing times are longer for those
who opt out, averaging nearly 550 days for the 2009 program;
Increased the burden of reporting foreign accounts in the future by requiring duplica-
tive reporting on the FBAR and Form 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial
Assets; and
Discontinued pilot programs to send information about the foreign account reporting
requirements to people with foreign accounts.
However the IRS recently reduced the burden of correcting errors somewhat. It clarified
that some taxpayers could opt out of the OVD programs without penalty. A new initiative
also allows some nonresidents to correct errors outside of the OVD programs.
As the IRS receives an increasing amount of information from foreign financial institutions
that will enable it to identify more FBAR noncompliance, however, it may need to devote
more enforcement resources to address this noncompliance; expand its outreach and
self-correction options for benign actors; or ignore the noncompliance altogether. The IRS
should promote voluntary compliance by reducing compliance burdens and expanding its
targeted outreach and self-correction options for benign actors.
ANALYSIS OF PROBLEM
IRS OVD programs discouraged taxpayers from self-correcting errors, burdening
taxpayers and draining IRS resources.
Taxpayers may normally correct their own inadvertent violations without significant
penalties or burdens.
The maximum civil penalty applicable to a bad actor for “willfully” failing to report foreign
accounts on an FBAR is severe — the greater of 50 percent of the account or $100,000 per
year.
6
However, the IRS does not generally apply a significant penalty to benign actors who
inadvertently fail to report accounts, particularly if they voluntarily correct the violation(s)
before the IRS contacts them.
7
6
31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C).
7
See, e.g., IRM 4.26.16.4.7 (July 1, 2008). Unlike citizens of most other countries, U.S. citizens with income above certain thresholds are required to file
returns with the IRS even if they reside abroad and have no net U.S. tax liability. See, e.g., IRC § 6012(a)(flush) and (c). The FBAR and the new Form
8938 may help the government to detect potentially unreported income deposited in foreign accounts.
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In addition, those who failed to report income could normally avoid accuracy-related penal-
ties by filing “qualified amended returns” before being contacted by the IRS.
8
Thus, in the
absence of any special IRS program, a taxpayer could correct a failure to report a foreign
account and income from the account while avoiding most penalties by simply filing three
(or six) years worth of returns (or amended returns) and FBARs.
9
This approach encour-
ages voluntary compliance and self-correction, which is the IRS’s stated goal.
10
The IRS OVD programs discourage self-correction.
The IRS “strongly encouraged” everyone with an FBAR violation and unreported income
(including benign actors) to participate in its OVD programs and initially discouraged them
from opting out.
11
For example, IRS FAQs indicated:
Those taxpayers making “quiet” disclosures should be aware of the risk of being exam-
ined and potentially criminally prosecuted for all applicable years. 2009 OVDP FAQ
#10; 2011 OVDI FAQ #15; 2012 OVDP FAQ #15.
***
Taxpayers who do not submit a voluntary disclosure run the risk of detection by the
IRS and the imposition of substantial penalties, including the fraud penalty and for-
eign information return penalties, and an increased risk of criminal prosecution. 2009
OVDP FAQ #3; 2011 OVDI FAQ #4; 2012 OVDP FAQ #4.
***
Failing to file an FBAR subjects a person to a prison term of up to ten years and
criminal penalties of up to $500,000. 2009 OVDP FAQ #14; 2011 OVDI FAQ #6; 2012
OVDP FAQ #6.
***
[For those who opt out of the 2009 OVDP] All relevant years and issues will be subject
to a complete examination. At the conclusion of the examination, all applicable penal-
ties (including information return and FBAR penalties) will be imposed. Those penal-
ties could be substantially greater than the 20 percent penalty. 2009 OVDP FAQ #34.
***
8
See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-2. Certain deductions and credits may be denied if returns from individuals who are not U.S. residents or citizens are more than
16 months late or if returns from foreign corporations are more than 18 months late, provided the taxpayer does not demonstrate reasonable cause for the
delay. See IRC §§ 874(a) (applicable to individuals) and 882(c)(2) (applicable to corporations); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.874-1 and 1.882-4.
9
The statutory period for assessing additional tax is generally limited to three or six years from the date the return is filed. See IRC § 6501.
10
IRS Policy Statement 6-11 (Nov. 4, 1977) (“[A]dministrative procedures and forms will be designed to promote voluntary compliance.”); IRS Policy State-
ment 20-1 (June 29, 2004); H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-386 at 661 (1989) (“the IRS should develop a policy statement emphasizing that civil tax penalties
exist for the purpose of encouraging voluntary compliance.”).
11
2009 OVDP FAQ #10; 2011 OVDI FAQ #15; 2012 OVDI FAQ #12.
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[Q] Is the IRS really going to prosecute someone who filed an amended return and
correctly reported all their income? … [A] When criminal behavior is evident and
the disclosure does not meet the requirements of a voluntary disclosure under IRM
9.5.11.9, the IRS may recommend criminal prosecution to the Department of Justice.
2009 OVDP FAQ #49.
Because of these threats, many taxpayers were concerned that the IRS would always seek
the maximum FBAR penalties, regardless of the situation. As described in prior reports,
some benign actors were so fearful of opting out that they accepted the IRS settlement
and paid more than they owed.
12
Moreover, since the Deputy Commissioner partially
rescinded a Taxpayer Advocate Directive (TAD) aimed at assisting these taxpayers, and the
IRS Commissioner responded to the National Taxpayer Advocate’s concerns with deafening
silence, TAS has observed less flexibility among IRS examiners and OVD program manag-
ers in dealing with benign actors.
13
Under these circumstances, some taxpayers are likely
to ignore their problems until the IRS offers them a reasonable way to correct inadvertent
errors.
14
IRS OVD programs were burdensome for benign actors and drained IRS resources.
The OVD programs require benign actors to opt in and then opt out. OVD program partici-
pants must file (or amend) eight years of returns; wait for the IRS to process the applica-
tions; and then either (1) pay various penalties plus an “offshore” penalty equal to 20, 25, or
27.5 percent of their unreported offshore assets;
15
or (2) “opt for an examination” by “opting
out” and risk unreasonably large FBAR penalties.
16
As shown below, OVD program processing times are longer for benign actors who opt out,
averaging nearly 550 days for those opting out of the 2009 OVDP.
12
See, e.g., National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to Congress 238-41.
13
See Memorandum for National Taxpayer Advocate from Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, Taxpayer Advocate Directive 2011-1 (Oct. 14,
2011); Memorandum for Commissioner of Internal Revenue from National Taxpayer Advocate, Recommendations Regarding Taxpayer Advocate Directive
2011-1 (Sept. 26, 2011). For further discussion of this issue, see National Taxpayer Advocate Fiscal Year 2013 Objectives Report to Congress 8-9.
14
See e.g., Alison Bennett, Tax Evasion: Taxpayers Fear Disclosing Offshore Assets As Deadline Approaches, Practitioners Say, 157 DTR GG-1, 2011 (Aug. 15,
2011); Robert Wood, Should You File FBAR for the First Time?, Forbes (June 14, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2011/06/14/should-
you-file-fbar-for-the-first-time/; Steven Mopsick, Tax Justice for Americans Abroad: No Penalties for Prospective Compliance, 136 Tax Notes 189 (July 9,
2012).
15
Certain taxpayers could qualify for an offshore penalty rate of 5 percent or 12.5 percent. 2011 OVDI FAQ #52 and #53; 2012 OVDP FAQ #52 and #53.
16
See 2011 OVDI FAQ #42; 2012 OVDP FAQ #42; 2009 OVDP FAQ #34. But see Memorandum from Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement,
Guidance for Opt Out and Removal of Taxpayers from the Civil Settlement Structure of the 2009 OVDP and the 2011 OVDI (June 1, 2011) (“the taxpayer
should not be treated in a negative fashion merely because he or she chooses to opt out . . .”; 2012 OVDP FAQ #51 (same).
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TABLE 1.8.1, OVD Program Applications, Dispositions, and Processing Time as of September 29, 2012
17
2009 OVDP 2011 OVDI 2012 OVDP
Number
Average
Processing Time
(closed cases) Number
Average
Processing Time
(closed cases) Number
Total applicants
18
11,161 11,941 4,095
Closed after certification 10,723 307.3 days 1,463 116.6 days 0
Open certification 63 10,417 4,095
Opted out 280 30 0
Closed after opt out 235 548.4 days 8 176.5 days 0
Open after opt out 38 647.4 days 22 173.4 days 0
Removed 105 0 0
Closed after removal 79 583.9 days 0 n/a 0
Open after removal 24 711.1 days 0 n/a 0
Although the IRS has not closed very many opt-out cases, the average civil FBAR penalty
assessed against those opting out of the 2009 OVDP is only $15,737.
19
Moreover, the IRS
has not initiated any criminal prosecutions against those who opted out.
20
In other words,
the IRS required benign actors with minor FBAR violations to spend the time to apply to
the 2009 OVDP, incur significant fees for representation, and wait for about a year and a
half for the IRS to process their cases (on average), all in an effort to collect very little FBAR
penalty revenue.
While benign actors would normally have made “quiet” corrections, rather than participate
in the OVD programs, the IRS warned them not to do so. This approach left the taxpay-
ers with no good options — and discouraged voluntary compliance — while committing
the IRS to use limited enforcement resources to process a potentially large number of
submissions.
21
People with Canadian retirement plans faced additional burdens.
People with certain Canadian retirement plans who wanted to file late or amended U.S. tax
returns, as required for participation in an OVD program, faced additional burdens. The
IRS issued conflicting guidance about how to make a late election to exclude undistributed
17
IRS response to TAS information request (Oct. 23, 2012).
18
The number shown for the 2009 OVDP and the 2011 OVDI counts an application from a husband and wife as one application, but the number shown for
the 2012 OVDP counts them as two.
19
IRS response to TAS information request (Oct. 23, 2012) (noting that $1,255,567 in willful and nonwillful penalties plus $1,671,518 in negligence penal-
ties were assessed against taxpayers who opted out of the 2009 OVDP in 186 closed cases). Moreover, a small number of taxpayers could account for
most of these penalties.
20
Id.
21
Although the IRS has not processed very many opt out requests, the average civil FBAR penalty assessed against those opting out of the 2009 OVDP is
only $15,737 ($1,255,567 in willful and nonwillful penalties plus $1,671,518 in negligence penalties, divided by 186 closed cases). IRS response to
TAS information request (Oct. 23, 2012). Moreover, the IRS has not initiated any criminal prosecutions against those who opted out. Id.
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income from those plans.
22
Under Revenue Procedure 2002-23, if taxpayers do not make
these elections by attaching them to a timely-filed U.S. income tax return, they are late,
and the IRS will not accept late elections unless the taxpayer obtains a private letter ruling
(PLR).
23
Some taxpayers spent significant time and resources to obtain a PLR, as shown
below.
24
TABLE 1.8.2, PLR Requests Under Section 4.06 of Rev. Proc. 2002–23, FY 2009–2012
25
Fiscal Year 2009 2010 2011 2012
Total Requests 18 6 134 35
Average User Fee $4,500 $1,083 $728 $1,489
Average Processing Time
26
149 days 133 days 165 days 120 days
Number Issued 18 6 17 4
Number Denied/Returned
27
1 0 0 0
Number Withdrawn 0 0 0 0
Number Open
28
0 0 117 31
However, the IRM suggested that the IRS would simply process late elections without a
PLR.
29
Thus, the IRS treated similarly-situated taxpayers differently.
Pursuant to 2012 OVDP FAQ #54, the IRS recently provided entirely different instructions
for making late elections. Although FAQ #54 may reduce burden for some, it will confuse
others, as the IRS has issued three conflicting statements about how to make a late elec-
tion. This confusion is compounded by the fact that neither the taxpayer-friendly IRM nor
FAQ #54 represent formal guidance. Moreover, those who have already paid to prepare a
PLR submission may incur additional fees to make a different submission pursuant to FAQ
#54.
30
22
See Form 8891, U.S. Information Return for Beneficiaries of Certain Canadian Registered Retirement Plans.
23
Rev. Proc. 2002-23, 2002-1 C.B. 744.
24
To put these figures in context, a Westlaw search revealed the IRS issued only 1,487 PLRs in 2011.
25
IRS response to TAS information request (July 25, 2012).
26
Processing time reflects the days in inventory for rulings issued during the year.
27
One PLR request was returned because it was not necessary.
28
The open cases were suspended pending resolution of consistent treatment under the OVDI program. We understand the IRS is returning the user fees.
29
Rev. Proc. 2002-23, §§ 4.01 and 4.06, 2002-1 C.B. 744; Treas. Reg. §§ 301.9100-1 and -3; IRM 21.5.3.4.9.1 (Aug. 4, 2009) (“For retroactive elec-
tions… Process the amended return as normal.”). The IRS does not track the number of Form 8891 submissions or the number processed late. IRS
response to TAS information request (July 27, 2012).
30
See Marie Sapirie, Frustration Grows for Canadians in OVDI, 2012 Tax NoTes Today 169-1 (Aug. 29, 2012).
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The IRS has recently reduced the burden of correcting errors for some taxpayers.
The IRS issued a “fact sheet,” clarifying that nonresidents who opt out of the OVD
programs will not always face penalties.
In December 2011, the IRS clarified that, for nonresidents, it would not always impose
FBAR penalties if the taxpayer could establish a “reasonable cause.”
31
While this clarifica-
tion was helpful, it provided little comfort to many with inadvertent violations, because
establishing reasonable cause is sometimes difficult. For example, it is difficult to establish
reasonable cause for failure to file an income tax return because the law assumes nearly
every U.S. citizen knows about the obligation to file an income tax return.
32
By contrast, the
FBAR filing requirement was relatively unknown until recently, but the IRS fact sheet does
not explicitly make it easier for taxpayers to establish reasonable cause for failure to file an
FBAR. For example, the taxpayer does not necessarily have reasonable cause if tax prepa-
ration software or a tax preparer failed to ask the taxpayer about foreign accounts.
33
The
government expects the taxpayer to review the tax return that references FBAR reporting,
expects this review to cause the taxpayer to file an FBAR, and may even assume that any
failure to file an FBAR is thus due to willful blindness.
34
Even if a preparer affirmatively
advised the taxpayer not to report a foreign account or the income from it, the taxpayer is
likely to have difficulty getting the preparer to sign a statement acknowledging the inaccu-
rate advice.
35
However, the IRS may require such a signed statement before it will make a
reasonable cause determination. Thus, some people with inadvertent violations may not be
able to establish reasonable cause.
The IRS recently established a process to allow nonresidents to make self-corrections
outside of the OVD programs.
Under a new program, beginning September 1, 2012, nonresident nonfilers have the option
of filing three years of delinquent returns (and six years of FBARs) without triggering
penalties (the “Streamlined Nonresident Filing Initiative”).
36
If each return reports less than
$1,500 in additional tax due and the IRS deems them “simple,” absent “high risk factors,”
the returns will be classified “low risk” and will not be examined. Participants are ineligible
for the 2012 OVDP.
31
IRS, FS-2011-13, Information for U.S. Citizens or Dual Citizens Residing Outside the U.S. (Dec. 2011), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Information-for-U.S.-Citi-
zens-or-Dual-Citizens-Residing-Outside-the-U.S.
32
See, e.g., United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985).
33
“Factors that might weigh in favor of a determination that an FBAR violation was due to reasonable cause include reliance upon the advice of a profession-
al tax advisor who was informed of the existence of the foreign financial account, that the unreported account was established for a legitimate purpose
and there were no indications of efforts taken to intentionally conceal the reporting of income or assets, and that there was no tax deficiency (or there
was a tax deficiency but the amount was de minimis) related to the unreported foreign account.” IRS, FS-2011-13, Information for U.S. Citizens or Dual
Citizens Residing Outside the U.S. (Dec. 2011) [emphasis added]; Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (reliance on tax advisor not reasonable if the taxpayer “fails to
disclose a fact that it knows, or reasonably should know, to be relevant to the proper tax treatment of an item”).
34
IRM 4.26.16.4.5.3 (July 1, 2008).
35
A benign actor with nothing to hide might have been less likely to question a preparer’s advice or ask for a contemporaneous written opinion about the
FBAR filing requirement.
36
IRS, New Filing Compliance Procedures for Non-Resident U.S. Taxpayers (first posted June 28, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpay-
ers/New-Filing-Compliance-Procedures-for-Non-Resident-U.S.-Taxpayers.
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Because the IRS has provided little guidance about what makes a return “high risk,” partici-
pants may still be subject to a full examination and potentially severe penalties, making the
new program less attractive. Moreover, the IRS has not provided any similar self-service
options for benign actors who are U.S. residents or owe more than $1,500.
37
The IRS
should increase the threshold and allow U.S. residents to participate.
38
Nonetheless, this
program is likely to reduce the burden on many nonresidents as well as on the IRS.
New duplicative reporting requirements make compliance more burdensome, and
“stack” penalties.
Beginning in 2012, those with certain foreign financial assets in excess of $50,000 must re-
port foreign account information (and certain other foreign financial asset information) on
IRS Form 8938, Statement of Specified Foreign Financial Assets.
39
Form 8938 is sometimes
called the “Tax FBAR” or “Super FBAR” because, as the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) has observed, it duplicates much of the information required on the FBAR, though
it is due with the return rather than on June 30, the due date for the FBAR.
40
In addition,
a taxpayer who fails to report a single account on both forms could face two sets of penal-
ties — the FBAR penalty under Title 31 and the Super FBAR penalty under Title 26.
Many benign actors still have not filed FBARs.
The IRS should be reducing (rather than increasing) the burden of correcting prior non-
compliance and the burden of reporting foreign accounts in the future, given the existing
compliance problem. While an estimated five to seven million U.S. citizens reside abroad
and many U.S. residents also have FBAR filing requirements,
41
the IRS received only
741,249 FBAR filings in 2011.
42
In the face of what may be a serious FBAR compliance
37
For a description of some benign actors who are U.S. residents, see for example, Steve Mopsick, Tax Justice II: No FBAR Penalties For Otherwise Compliant
Recent Immigrants to the United States (Aug. 2, 2012), http://mopsicktaxlaw.blogspot.com/2012/08/tax-justie-ii-no-fbar-penalties-for.html.
38
The National Taxpayer Advocate previously recommended increasing the $1,500 threshold to the “substantial understatement” threshold. National Taxpayer
Advocate 2013 Objectives Report to Congress 24. Individuals who owe less than the greater of 10 percent of the tax required to be shown on the return
or $ 5,000 may not have a “substantial understatement,” and thus, may not be subject to an accuracy-related penalty, particularly if a negligence penalty
does not apply. IRC § 6662(d). When the substantial understatement penalty applies due to an undisclosed foreign financial asset, the penalty rate in-
creases from 20 to 40 percent. See IRC § 6662(j). Thus, there is precedent for using the combination of a substantial understatement and nondisclosure
to distinguish minor omissions from those that may warrant more significant sanctions. Of course, we would still need to consider how to handle those who
had not filed returns, as they would not have a substantial understatement.
39
IRC §§ 6038D and 1298(f); Notice 2011-55, 2011-29 I.R.B. 53 (July 18, 2011). An FBAR is due on June 30 if the aggregate value of the foreign ac-
counts exceeded $10,000 during the prior calendar year. 31 C.F.R. § 1010.306(c).
40
GAO, GAO-12-403, Reporting Foreign Accounts to the IRS, Extent of Duplication Not Currently Known, but Requirements Can Be Clarified 2, 18 (Feb.
2012). Although the IRS met with GAO and provided technical information, neither the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen) nor the IRS
responded to GAO’s recommendation to revise the Form 8938 and FBAR to address duplicative reporting. Id. at 3.
41
IRS website, Reaching Out to Americans Abroad (Apr. 2009), http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Reaching-Out-to-Americans-Abroad; W&I Research Study Re-
port, Understanding the International Taxpayer Experience: Service Awareness, Use, Preferences, and Filing Behaviors (Feb. 2010) (citing U.S. Department
of State data). This number does not include U.S. troops stationed abroad. Moreover, the tax gap associated with offshore accounts could be significant.
See, e.g., James Henry, Tax Justice Network, The Price of Offshore Revisited 5 (July 2012), http://www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/Price_of_Offshore_
Revisited_120722.pdf (“at least $21 to $32 trillion” may be “invested virtually tax-free through . . . more than 80 ‘offshore’ secrecy jurisdictions”).
42
IRS response to TAS information request (July 27, 2012).
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problem, the government opened only 3,220 civil FBAR examinations and 18 criminal
investigations in calendar year (CY) 2011.
43
While the OVD programs attracted over 27,000 applications (perhaps less than one percent
of those who did not file FBARs) and collected almost $5.5 billion, a more effective initia-
tive could prompt significantly more taxpayers to come into compliance voluntarily.
44
The
OVD programs may be prompting them to renounce U.S. citizenship instead. The number
of people renouncing citizenship has risen to an all-time high — nearly quadrupling over a
four-year period — from 470 in 2007 to 1,788 in 2011.
45
The IRS stopped sending letters to educate those with foreign accounts about the
foreign account reporting requirements.
IRS officials generated significant publicity about the FBAR reporting requirements by
giving speeches and posting information to the IRS website.
46
Perhaps as a result, FBAR
filings have more than doubled between 2008 and 2011 — from 349,667 in 2008 to 741,249
in 2011.
47
However, as noted above, this may still be only a fraction of the filings the IRS
should receive.
In addition, the IRS has not conducted in-person presentations about the FBAR filing
requirements in foreign countries, even in countries where it has a tax attaché and a signifi-
cant number of residents are required to file.
48
This approach sends the message that the
IRS will spend resources to punish, but not to educate, U.S. citizens abroad.
The IRS has also discontinued an FBAR Compliance Initiative Project to educate those with
foreign bank accounts who are most likely to have FBAR violations.
49
While the Postal
Service returned 22 percent of the project’s letters as undeliverable, address research could
help to reduce that problem.
50
In addition, the IRS has stopped work on an initiative to
develop the FBAR Stop Filer Program.
51
The Stop Filer Program would send letters to
43
Id. This figure does not include OVD “certifications,” but it does include “examinations” resulting from OVD submissions.
44
Id. (reporting the dollar amount); IRS response to TAS information request (Sept. 23, 2012) (reporting the number of applications).
45
The figures above reflect the number of names of expatriates published in the Federal Register.
46
IRS response to TAS information request (July 27, 2012). The IRS also recently reorganized materials on its website.
47
Id. For a graphic representation of the dramatic rise in Internet searches for the term “FBAR” after 2009, see http://www.google.com/trends/?q=FBAR
(last visited, Sept. 21, 2012).
48
IRS response to TAS information request (Aug. 17, 2012). Nor does it plan to do so. IRS response to TAS information request (July 27, 2012). For ad-
ditional discussion of this issue, see Most Serious Problem: Challenges Persist for International Taxpayers as the IRS Moves Slowly to Address Their Needs,
supra/infra; National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to Congress 137-272 (Most Serious Problems: Foreign Taxpayers Face Challenges in Fulfilling
U.S. Tax Obligations), 166-75 (Most Serious Problem: Small Businesses Involved in International Economic Activity Need Targeted IRS Assistance).
49
U.S. Department of the Treasury, A Report to Congress in Accordance With § 361(B) of The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate
Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 5 (CY 2009) (“the project remains viable . . . [but] is currently closed.”). Many foreign
accounts are reflected in the Web-CBRS database. Id. at 5.
50
In response to 117 letters, 26 were returned as undeliverable, but the IRS received 73 responses and 15 FBAR filings. IRS response to TAS information
request (Nov. 2, 2012). For suggestions to reduce undeliverable mail, see Status Update: Underfunding of IRS Initiatives to Modernize Its Correspondence
Systems Undermines Taxpayers’ Statutory Rights and Impedes Efficient Resource Allocation, infra.
51
IRS response to TAS information request (Aug. 8, 2012).
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taxpayers who had filed an FBAR in the prior year, but not the current year, to remind them
that they may still have a filing requirement. Thus, the IRS does not send letters to educate
those for whom the requirements are the most relevant.
As information reporting on foreign accounts expands, a combination of targeted
soft notices and expanded self-correction options could significantly improve
voluntary compliance.
Over the next few years, foreign financial institutions will begin to report more foreign
accounts to the IRS, enabling the IRS to identify many more FBAR violations.
52
New Form
8938 filings may also allow the IRS to identify more taxpayers who should have filed an
FBAR.
53
Yet, the IRS is unlikely to have additional resources to address FBAR violations us-
ing enforcement tools or its OVD programs. As a result, it will increasingly have to ignore
violations that it can detect unless it expands the self-correction options available to benign
actors. If the IRS reinstated and expanded its soft notice programs and its Streamlined
Nonresident Filing Initiative to encourage more benign actors to correct inadvertent viola-
tions without draining IRS resources, it could create a win-win situation — reducing the
burden for them while freeing up IRS enforcement resources to address bad actors.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the National Taxpayer Advocate preliminarily recommends that the IRS:
1. Expand and clarify the Streamlined Nonresident Filing Initiative to encourage all be-
nign actors (including U.S. residents and those owing more than $1,500) to correct past
noncompliance using less burdensome procedures that do not unnecessarily drain IRS
enforcement resources (e.g., expand and clarify who qualifies for it and further explain
who will be deemed to have reasonable cause for failure to file an FBAR).
2. Send “soft” notices to educate persons with foreign accounts about the FBAR and Form
8938 reporting requirements, encouraging them to self-correct inadvertent violations,
as contemplated by the FBAR Compliance Initiative Project and the FBAR Stop Filer
Program.
3. Clarify how beneficiaries of Canadian retirement plans can file late or amended returns
that elect to exclude undistributed income from those plans by issuing formal guidance
to consolidate the seemingly inconsistent guidance provided by Revenue Procedure
2002-23, 2002-1 C.B. 744 (requiring a PLR), IRM 21.5.3.4.9.1 (Aug. 4, 2009) (instructing
employees to process late elections), and 2012 OVDP FAQ #54 (requiring a submission
to an examiner) in a way that minimizes taxpayer burden.
52
Foreign financial intermediaries will soon be required to report more foreign accounts to the IRS. See generally IRC §§ 1471-1474; Regulations Relating
to Information Reporting by Foreign Financial Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign Financial Institutions and Other Foreign Entities,
77 Fed. Reg. ¶ 9022 (Feb. 15, 2012) (notice of proposed rulemaking).
53
See IRC §§ 6038D and 1298(f).
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4. Revise Forms 8938 and/or TD F 90–22.1 to reduce taxpayer burden and the duplicative
reporting identified by the GAO.
54
IRS COMMENTS
Global tax enforcement is a top priority at the IRS, and we have made significant progress
on multiple fronts, including groundbreaking international tax agreements and increased
cooperation with other governments. In addition, the IRS and Justice Department have
increased efforts involving criminal investigation of international tax evasion. This com-
bination of efforts helped support the 2009 OVDP, the 2011 OVDI, and the ongoing 2012
OVDP. The goal of these programs is to get individuals back into the U.S. tax system and
to turn the tide against offshore tax evasion. The programs have given U.S. taxpayers with
undisclosed assets or income offshore an opportunity to get compliant with the U.S. tax
system, pay their fair share, and avoid potential criminal charges. The programs have so
far resulted in the collection of more than $5.5 billion in back taxes, interest, and penalties
from approximately 38,000 applicants. In addition, the programs provided the IRS with
a wealth of information on various banks and advisors assisting people with offshore tax
evasion, which the IRS is using to continue its international enforcement efforts.
Throughout the programs, taxpayers have had the opportunity to opt out of the settlement
structure and request an examination if the taxpayer disagrees with the result provided
for under the program. The opt-out procedures and additional guidance issued on June
1, 2011, clarify that, depending on the facts and circumstances, it may be preferable for
a particular taxpayer to opt out of one of the programs. In addition, the IRS added fre-
quently asked questions to provide examples of circumstances in which taxpayers may
want to consider opting out of the civil settlement structure and examples of when it might
be a disadvantage to opt out. The IRS also advised employees working cases that taxpayers
opting out should not be treated in a negative fashion merely because he or she opted out.
The IRS has taken a number of additional steps to assist taxpayers seeking to come into
compliance. Last year, to address questions from international taxpayers, the IRS issued
a fact sheet
55
to assist U.S. citizens and dual citizens residing outside the U.S. understand
the federal tax return and FBAR filing requirements and return to compliance. More
significantly, to address additional feedback from taxpayers and stakeholders, including
practitioners and organizations representing taxpayers located overseas, the IRS provided
a new option — the Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedures — effective September 1,
2012, to help some nonresident U.S. taxpayers who have not been filing tax returns come
54
The National Taxpayer Advocate previously recommended increasing the FBAR filing threshold to make it consistent with the Form 8938 filing threshold.
See National Taxpayer Advocate Fiscal Year 2013 Objectives Report to Congress 25 (noting the government could amend regulations under 31 C.F.R. §
1010.306(c) and/or change the FBAR form). She also recommended abating the penalty for the failure to file Form 8938 during the first year. Id. at 26.
In addition, the IRS might reduce duplicative reporting by adding items reported on an FBAR to the existing list of items that taxpayers do not have to report
on Form 8938. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D–7T.
55
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Information-for-U.S.-Citizens-or-Dual-Citizens-Residing-Outside-the-U.S.
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into compliance. The option provides certain taxpayers who have resided outside of the
U.S. since January 1, 2009, with a chance to catch up with their federal tax filing obligations
if they owe little or no back taxes.
Situations of taxpayers with offshore compliance issues vary widely given the complexities
of this area of tax law. While taxpayers should consult with their professional tax advisor
to determine which option is the most appropriate given a taxpayer’s specific facts and
circumstance, the IRS did identify a number of common situations and potential solutions
on IRS.gov to assist taxpayers.
56
With regard to the recommendations in the report, the IRS notes the following.
As previously stated, in June 2012, the IRS announced new streamlined filing compliance
procedures (“streamlined procedures”), effective September 1, 2012, for certain non-resi-
dent U.S. taxpayers who have failed to timely file U.S. federal income tax returns or FBARs
but recently became aware of their filing obligations and now seek to come into compliance
with the law. Under this program, taxpayers presenting low compliance risk will undergo
an expedited review and the IRS will not assert penalties or pursue follow-up actions.
In August 2012, the IRS issued streamlined procedural guidance, including submission
instructions and a description of factors that, if present, suggest an increase in compli-
ance risk level and therefore ineligibility for streamlined examination.
57
We will continue
to evaluate the program and feedback received from taxpayers, practitioners, and other
stakeholders to determine whether additional modifications to the program or guidance are
necessary.
The IRS has taken a number of steps to educate persons with foreign accounts about the
FBAR and Form 8938 reporting requirements. For example, the IRS created a comparison
chart available on IRS.gov
58
to assist taxpayers in differentiating between FBAR and FATCA
Form 8938 requirements. This chart has been publicized through several channels reach-
ing U.S. filers located domestically and overseas, including the IRS Twitter account, commu-
nications by the IRS tax attachés located in U.S. consulates and embassies overseas with the
assistance of the State Department, and the IRS National Public Liaison’s practitioner email
distribution list. The IRS will continue to share information with the public using IRS.gov
and other communication vehicles to educate taxpayers regarding FBAR and FATCA filing
requirements and will also continue to monitor whether additional outreach is appropriate.
In response to inquiries from taxpayers participating in one of the three voluntary disclo-
sure programs with specified Canadian retirement plans, in June 2012, the IRS provided
56
http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Options-Available-to-Help-Taxpayers-With-Offshore-Interests.
57
http://www.irs.gov/uac/Instructions-for-New-Streamlined-Filing-Compliance-Procedures-for-Non-Resident-Non-Filer-US-Taxpayers.
58
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Comparison-of-Form-8938-and-FBAR-Requirements.
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instructions for how taxpayers could make the retroactive deferral of income elections.
59
In addition, the new Streamlined Procedures incorporated instructions for addressing this
issue in its submission requirements.
60
We will continue to review other available guidance
to determine if additional clarification is necessary.
With respect to the perceived duplicate reporting required on Forms 8938 and TD F 90-
22.1, it is important to recognize that there are two separate reporting requirements under
the law with different requirements. The FBAR (TD F 90-22.1) is required under Title 31
for law enforcement purposes in addition to tax administration. As a consequence, differ-
ent policy considerations apply to FBAR and other information reporting, such as the Form
8938. These are reflected in the law defining differing categories of persons required to file
Form 8938 and the FBAR, different filing thresholds for Form 8938 and FBAR reporting,
and differing assets (and accompanying information) required to be reported on each form.
These differing policy considerations were recognized during the passage of the HIRE Act
and the enactment of section 6038D, and Congress’s intention to retain FBAR reporting
notwithstanding the enactment of section 6038D was specifically noted in the technical
explanation of the revenue provisions contained in Senate amendment 3310, The “Hiring
Incentives to Restore Employment Act,” Under Consideration by the Senate (Staff of the
Joint Comm. On Taxation, JCX-4-10 (February 23, 2010)) (Technical Explanation) accompa-
nying the HIRE Act. The Technical Explanation states that “[n]othing in this provision [sec-
tion 511 of the HIRE Act enacting section 6038D] is intended as a substitute for compliance
with the FBAR reporting requirements, which are unchanged by this provision.” (Technical
Explanation at p. 60.) The IRS is committed to ensuring that taxpayers understand the
different reporting requirements and will continue to explore whether further coordination
of the requirements is possible provided the existing legal framework.
59
See 2012 OVDP FAQ 54 at http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/International-Taxpayers/Offshore-Voluntary-Disclosure-Program-Frequently-Asked-Questions-
and-Answers.
60
See instruction 7 at http://www.irs.gov/uac/Instructions-for-New-Streamlined-Filing-Compliance-Procedures-for-Non-Resident-Non-Filer-US-Taxpayers.
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Taxpayer Advocate Service Comments
The National Taxpayer Advocate fully supports the IRS’s goal to design initiatives and offer
settlements to “get individuals back into the U.S. tax system and to turn the tide against
offshore tax evasion.” Its new Streamlined Nonresident Filing Initiative is a significant step
in the right direction. The National Taxpayer Advocate commends the IRS for addressing
tax evasion and for its web-based efforts to educate taxpayers about little-known FBAR
reporting requirements that, if overlooked, can trigger massive and disproportionate civil
penalties.
However, the combination of the FBAR statute and the way the IRS administers it creates
the potential for such draconian penalties that many taxpayers agree to pay unwarranted
amounts to avoid the possible risk of being bankrupted several times over (as described
below).
61
The IRS may believe that taxpayers have the choice to opt out of its OVD pro-
grams, but many do not feel that way.
Specifically, the FBAR statute authorizes a maximum penalty of up to 50 percent of the
maximum balance in each overseas account for each year of non-reporting (or, if greater,
$100,000 per violation).
62
Because the statute of limitations period is six years, the maxi-
mum penalty for large accounts is essentially 300 percent of the maximum account bal-
ances (assuming a relatively constant balance).
63
Example: Assume an individual with dual U.S.-Canadian citizenship who has lived his
entire life in Canada has a $1 million account in a Canadian bank. To simplify, assume
further that the balance has been $1 million for each of the past six years. Because
this individual has violated the FBAR reporting requirements by failing to file Form
TD F 90-22.1, the amount of the penalty could be as high as $3 million — three times
his total savings! The penalty may be an even greater percentage of his savings if the
account value has fallen since the end of the sixth year.
The National Taxpayer Advocate is concerned that such a disproportionate civil penalty
amount, particularly in the absence of clear limits on the situations in which it can be ap-
plied, is excessive to the point of possibly violating the U.S. Constitution.
64
In any event, it
is certainly a scary prospect for taxpayers.
61
Research suggests the IRS’s current approach may be more likely to reduce voluntary compliance and increase tax evasion. See e.g., TAS Research
Study, Factors Influencing Voluntary Compliance by Small Businesses: Preliminary Survey Results, vol. 2, infra (finding a correlation between tax compli-
ance and trust in government and the views of other members of local organizations toward the IRS and the U.S. tax system).
62
31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(C).
63
A six-year statute of limitations applies to the civil FBAR penalty. See 31 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1). Criminal penalties of up to $500,000 and 10 years in
prison may also apply. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5321(a)(5)(C) and 5322; 31 C.F.R. § 1010.840(b).
64
See Steven Toscher and Barbara Lubin, When Penalties Are Excessive — The Excessive Fines Clause as a Limitation on the Imposition of the Willful FBAR
Penalty, J. Tax Prac. & Proc. 69-74 (Jan. 2010).
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Far from allaying taxpayer concerns about this statute, the IRS OVD programs magnify
them. In general, the OVD programs attempted to entice taxpayers to make voluntary
disclosures by offering to cap the FBAR penalty and other penalties for failure to file infor-
mation returns at 20 percent (or 25 or 27.5 percent for the 2011 and 2012 OVD programs,
respectively) of the highest account value during the past six years (called the “offshore
penalty”). For taxpayers who believe the IRS can prove they deliberately violated the
disclosure statute, this is a good deal. But what about other taxpayers for whom penalties
would be negligible?
The existing FBAR statute offers such taxpayers a better deal, capping the maximum pen-
alty at $10,000 per violation if the IRS cannot prove the violation was willful and eliminat-
ing the penalty altogether if the taxpayer can show “reasonable cause” for his or her failure
to report the account(s).
65
As discussed in prior reports, 2009 OVDP FAQ #35 provided
seemingly clear assurances that “[u]nder no circumstances will a taxpayer be required to
pay a penalty greater than what he would otherwise be liable for under existing statutes.”
66
So if a taxpayer makes a voluntary disclosure under the 2009 OVDP and argues that his
failure was nonwillful or due to reasonable cause, the IRS will consider that. Right?
Not really. The IRS now says that, notwithstanding FAQ #35, those who seek to pay a
lower penalty must opt out of the OVD programs and submit to a full-blown examination.
67
That examination could yield a lesser penalty — but it also could yield a greater FBAR
penalty, potentially the maximum.
A big disconnect exists between the way the IRS and taxpayers view the decision to opt
out. From the IRS perspective, a taxpayer who believes his failure to report the account
was nonwillful or subject to the reasonable cause exception can opt for an examination
where he or she can demonstrate it. “If the taxpayer really has nothing to hide, why would
the taxpayer hesitate?” the IRS reasons.
But that is not how many taxpayers react. Because of the IRS’s aggressive statements and
enforcement measures in the foreign bank account reporting area, many taxpayers start
out scared to death about criminal prosecution and the possibility of losing 300 percent or
more of the value of their accounts. Most are distrustful of the IRS and are not confident
65
31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5)(B).
66
National Taxpayer Advocate 2011 Annual Report to Congress 191-205; Id. at 206-72; National Taxpayer Advocate 2013 Objectives Report to Congress
7-8; Id. at 21-29. See also Taxpayer Advocate Directive 2011-1 (Aug. 16, 2011).
67
IRS guidance says it will consider accepting a lower penalty inside the 2009 OVDP if “discussions concerning the assertion of an offshore penalty lower
than 20 percent have taken place with a TA, Territory Manager, Group Manager, Counsel, or member of the national team (i.e. during a case assistance
visit) and the discussions have been documented in the agents case file prior to Feb 8, 2011.” Memorandum from Director, SB/SE Examination, and
Director, International Individual Compliance, for all OVDI Examiners, Use of Discretion on 2009 OVDP Cases (Mar. 1, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-drop/ovdi_memo_use_of_discretion_3-1-11.pdf. When the IRS does consider a lower penalty under FAQ #35, however, it reverses the burden of
proof – requiring the taxpayer to prove nonwillfulness before considering the nonwillful penalty. Moreover, in TAS’s view, even when a taxpayer proves
nonwillfulness inside the 2009 OVDP, in some cases the IRS does not actually consider the facts they have presented. Rather, it asserts, without provid-
ing any explanation, that the taxpayer has not proved nonwillfulness and must opt out before the IRS will consider the facts.
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it will be reasonable.
68
The fact that the IRS seemed to say through FAQ #35 that it would
consider lesser penalties within the 2009 OVDP regime and is now backtracking increases
taxpayer concerns about whether they will get a fair shake if they opt out.
TAS has encountered some examiners who, seeking to close OVD cases, suggested that
the taxpayer would likely pay more if he or she opted out. Such statements are believable
because the OVD examiner — the very same examiner who recommended against reducing
the penalty within the OVD program — is required to make an ex parte recommendation
to the opt-out committee about how to resolve the case if the taxpayer opts out.
69
Moreover,
some taxpayers in this position come from countries with totalitarian regimes, where the
government often enforces its laws in arbitrary ways. Thus, even where taxpayers feel
strongly that their FBAR noncompliance was due to reasonable cause or was not willful,
faced with the choice of accepting the IRS’s proposed penalty (which, in our example,
comes to $200,000 or 20 percent of $1 million) or opting for a full examination — with
the hope of avoiding the penalty but with the knowledge that opting out could result in a
potential penalty of far more than their net worth ($3 million in our example) — many will
not want to risk opting out.
From a taxpayer’s perspective, this may feel like extortion. In the opinion of the National
Taxpayer Advocate, it is a significant intrusion on taxpayer rights.
More broadly, the National Taxpayer Advocate is concerned extreme penalties are some-
times enacted to combat extreme abuses, but the penalties inadvertently affect “benign
actors” whose actions technically fall within the over-broad definition of the extreme con-
duct. In 2004, for example, Congress enacted IRC § 6707A, which imposed a strict liability
penalty for failing to report participation in specified “listed transactions.”
70
The penalty
amount was $100,000 per individual per year and $200,000 per entity per year.
71
The
penalty was intended to apply to those who engaged in egregious tax shelters. However, it
soon became apparent that the penalties were affecting a range of small businesses, includ-
ing some that created insurance programs to benefit their employees and did not know the
transactions fit within the technical definition of a particular listed transaction. In some
cases, individuals operated their businesses through wholly owned Subchapter S corpora-
tions, meaning that they were subject to penalties of $300,000 per year ($100,000 at the
individual level and $200,000 at the entity level). After the National Taxpayer Advocate and
68
As the IRS’s own characterization of these taxpayers in its response suggests, it starts with the misperception that it is giving people a great deal be-
cause it assumes it is giving people “an opportunity to get compliant with the U.S. tax system, pay their fair share, and avoid potential criminal charges.”
Most taxpayers who make inadvertent mistakes would not view the IRS offer as a good deal because they would not be subject to penalties at all.
Rather, they would be alarmed by the implication that the IRS considers them potential targets of a criminal prosecution for inadvertently failing to file
an information return. As discussed above, nobody who has opted out has been subject to criminal prosecution.
69
Memorandum for Commissioner, LB&I Division and Commissioner, SB/SE Division, from Deputy Commissioner for Services and Enforcement, Guidance
for Opt Out and Removal of Taxpayers from the Civil Settlement Structure of the 2009 OVDP and the 2011 OVDI (June 1, 2011), http://www.irs.gov/
pub/newsroom/2011_ovdi_opt_out_and_removal_guide_and_memo_june_1_2011.pdf.
70
American Jobs Creation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 811(a), 118 Stat. 1418 (2004); H.R. Rep. No. 108-548, pt. 1, at 261 (2004).
71
See id.
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others raised concerns that the penalty was both disproportionate and applicable to a much
wider swath of taxpayers than intended, Congress reduced the penalty.
72
A similar situation arises here. The FBAR penalties generally are designed to apply to
taxpayers who are intentionally evading U.S. tax by hiding significant untaxed assets in
offshore accounts (the “bad actors”). But they are also affecting taxpayers with modest
account balances and/or who did not intentionally evade tax, including those with assets
in higher-tax jurisdictions where no tax evader would reasonably plan to hide assets. In
administering this law, the IRS needs to do a better job of recognizing the distinction, and a
key part of what is needed is to remove the fear of opting out of the OVD programs.
The National Taxpayer Advocate has suggested a three-category approach to improving the
OVD programs to encourage voluntary compliance among those who failed to file FBARs
and similar information returns. To encourage voluntary compliance, these taxpayers, who
are coming forward before being contacted by the IRS, should be given reasonable options
for correcting violations without having to opt out and risk disproportionate penalties.
73
Category 1. Full relief from FBAR and information reporting penalties. Taxpayers
whose underpayment is below a reasonable threshold amount — such as the IRC § 6662(d)
threshold (i.e., the greater of $5,000 or ten percent of the tax required to be shown) —
should be permitted to file delinquent returns without penalty, regardless of whether they
are residents.
74
They should not be subject to the threat of being deemed “high risk” and
potentially hit with the maximum penalties, as is the case under the new Streamlined
Nonresident Filing Initiative.
75
Category 2. Taxpayers who have reasonable cause or who acted non-willfully. Taxpayers
whose underpayment is greater than the threshold, but who believe they have reasonable
cause or who acted non-willfully should provide an explanation of their circumstances, file
delinquent returns, pay tax due, interest, accuracy-related penalties, and Title 26 informa-
tion reporting penalties. Depending on the circumstances and explanation, these taxpayers
should be required to pay either the non-willful FBAR penalty or no penalty under the
72
See National Taxpayer Advocate 2008 Annual Report to Congress, vol. 2, 24 (recommending legislation to make the penalty proportional to the
decrease in tax, establish a “reasonable cause” exception, and to eliminate the potential for stacking); National Taxpayer Advocate 2008 Annual Report
to Congress 419, 422 (same). Congress subsequently changed the law. See Creating Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-240, Title II,
§ 2041(a), 124 Stat. 2506, 2560 (2010) (limiting the penalty to 75 percent of the decrease in tax shown on the return as a result of such transac-
tion). For an analysis of continuing problems with the penalty, including the lack of a reasonable cause exception, see Toni Robinson and Mary Ferrari,
Congress Eases a Penalty, but Squanders Reform Opportunity, 2011 Tax NoTes Today 13-7 (Jan. 17, 2011).
73
See National Taxpayer Advocate Fiscal Year 2013 Objectives Report to Congress 23-25.
74
Under the 2009 OVDP FAQ #9, persons who failed to file FBARs and did not report all of their income are required to pay the offshore penalty, even if
they have no tax liability. Under 2011 OVDI FAQ #18 and FAQ #19, those with no unreported tax liability for periods before 2011 were permitted to file
corrected returns outside of the program without penalty. Under 2012 OVDP FAQ #18, those with no unreported tax liability are permitted to file cor-
rected returns outside of the program without penalty.
75
Those who owe more than $1,500 per year or are U.S. residents are ineligible for the Streamlined Nonresident Filing Initiative. IRS, Instructions for New
Streamlined Filing Compliance Procedures for Non-Resident, Non-Filer U.S. Taxpayers (Aug. 31, 2012), http://www.irs.gov/uac/Instructions-for-New-
Streamlined-Filing-Compliance-Procedures-for-Non-Resident-Non-Filer-US-Taxpayers. Moreover, those deemed “high risk” may still be subject to a full
examination and maximum penalties, even if they otherwise qualify. Id.
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Case AdvocacyAppendices
MSP #8
The IRS’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs Discourage Voluntary Compliance by
Those Who Inadvertently Failed to Report Foreign Accounts
reasonable cause exception.
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Because they are required to cooperate, the IRS should have
little difficulty evaluating their circumstances without requiring them to opt out.
Category 3. Taxpayers not included in Category 1 or 2. Taxpayers who do not assert that
their violations were nonwillful but still voluntarily come forward to correct them should
be required to file delinquent or amended returns, and pay tax, interest, accuracy-related
penalties, and the offshore penalty, as currently required under the OVD programs.
With regard to Category Two, in order to determine whether there are valid arguments to
claim a reasonable cause exception, the facts and circumstances involving non-compliance
would have to be carefully reviewed by practitioners. Anti-abuse rules could discourage
Category Three taxpayers from self-selecting into Category Two. This reasonable three-cat-
egory approach could prevent the IRS from being viewed as extorting unjustified penalties
from innocent taxpayers and ultimately improve voluntary compliance. As the Internal
Revenue Manual acknowledges,
Examiners should consider whether the issuance of a warning letter and the securing
of delinquent FBARS, rather than the assertion of a penalty, will achieve the desired
result of improving compliance in the future... Discretion is necessary because the
total amount of penalties that can be applied under the statute can greatly exceed an
amount that would be appropriate in view of the violation.
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Having taken this important discretion away from OVD program examiners, IRS policy-
makers should consider how collecting the offshore penalty from benign actors who owe
less under existing statutes might affect future compliance.
In addition, the IRS comments do not fully address the National Taxpayer Advocate’s
preliminary recommendations.
The IRS has not stated whether it might implement the National Taxpayer
Advocate’s preliminary recommendation to expand the OVD programs and the
Streamlined Nonresident Filing Initiative to prevent its procedures from collecting
the proceeds of what many are likely to view as extortion.
The IRS has not addressed whether it will send letters to people who have likely
overlooked the information reporting requirements.
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The IRS should publish guidance to expressly define what constitutes “reasonable cause” for the purposes of FBAR and provide examples about the
difference between willful and nonwillful violations, based on the taxpayer’s background, education level, cultural concerns, etc. In developing a broader
“reasonable cause” standard to apply to FBAR violations, the Ratzlaf standard of “a voluntary intentional violation of a known legal duty” is a good
starting point. See Ratzlaf v. U.S., 510 U.S. 135 (1994) (U.S. Supreme Court case discussing Bank Secrecy Act violations; however, not dealing with
FBAR directly). The Ratzlaf analysis involves both the “knowledge of the reporting requirement” and a “specific intent,” i.e., “a purpose to disobey the
l a w.” Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141 (internal citations omitted). See also Cheek v. U.S., 498 U.S. 192 (1991) (holding that an airline pilot did not have the
requisite “willfulness” for criminal tax evasion because he had a sincere belief that his income was not taxable, no matter how unreasonable that belief
might be).
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IRM 4.26.16.4(4)-(5) (July 1, 2008).
Section One — Most Serious Problems
152
Legislative
Recommendations
Most Serious
Problems
Most Litigated
Issues
Case Advocacy Appendices
The IRS’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs Discourage Voluntary Compliance by
Those Who Inadvertently Failed to Report Foreign Accounts
MSP #8
The IRS does not dispute that it has provided and continues to provide beneficiaries
of Canadian retirement plans with conflicting information about how they can file
a late return that excludes undistributed income from the plan. As noted above,
Revenue Procedure 2002-23, 2002-1 C.B. 744 (requiring a PLR), and IRM 21.5.3.4.9.1
(Aug. 4, 2009) (instructing employees to process late elections) both remain in force
and conflict with 2012 OVDP FAQ #54 (requiring a submission to an examiner) and
the instructions to the Streamlined Nonresident Filing Initiative. Yet, the IRS does
not commit to combine or clarify this conflicting guidance.
The IRS does not dispute that it is difficult for taxpayers to determine whether
their violations are nonwillful or qualify for the reasonable cause exception, or that
taxpayers cannot rely on statements on the IRS website. Yet, it does not commit to
provide any clarifying guidance.
Finally, the IRS seems to justify its failure to minimize duplicative reporting that it is
requiring on Forms 8938 and the FBAR (TD F 90-22.1), in part, on the basis of a Technical
Explanation by Joint Committee on Taxation, which describes the new reporting require-
ment that Form 8938 seeks to implement. The IRS quotes a portion of the Technical
Explanation, which states “[n]othing in this provision is intended as a substitute for compli-
ance with the FBAR reporting requirements, which are unchanged by this provision.” This
language does not require FBAR reporting to remain unchanged, but simply explains that
the legislation itself does not change the FBAR reporting requirements. Moreover, the
Technical Explanation goes on to state that “regulatory exceptions to avoid duplicative
reporting requirements are anticipated.”
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This seems to undercut any implication that
Congress intended for Forms 8938 and TD F 90-22.1 to require duplicative reporting of
the same information, as the GAO has identified. Further, a review of the entire Technical
Explanation suggests that the reason the legislation did not eliminate FBAR reporting is
because law enforcement components outside of the IRS, which do not have ready access
to tax information, may need the information on an FBAR (TD F 90-22.1), which would not
be possible if the information were instead collected on Form 8938 — a tax form subject
to the confidentiality provisions of IRC § 6103. For its part, however, the IRS has access to
FBAR (TD F 90-22.1) information. Thus, the Technical Explanation does not prevent the
IRS from eliminating the requirement for taxpayers to report duplicative information on
Form 8938. The National Taxpayer Advocate is encouraged that the IRS has committed to
“explore whether further coordination of the [reporting] requirements is possible provided
the existing legal framework.”
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JCT, JCX-4-10, Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions Contained in Senate Amendment 3310, The “Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment
Act,” Under Consideration by the Senate 60-61 (Feb. 23, 2010).
Taxpayer Advocate Service — 2012 Annual Report to Congress — Volume One
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Legislative
Recommendations
Most Serious
Problems
Most Litigated
Issues
Case AdvocacyAppendices
MSP #8
The IRS’s Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs Discourage Voluntary Compliance by
Those Who Inadvertently Failed to Report Foreign Accounts
Recommendations
The National Taxpayer Advocate recommends the IRS take the following actions:
1. Adopt the three-category approach (described above), which does not require benign
actors to opt out of the OVD program(s). Alternatively, the IRS could significantly
expand and clarify the Streamlined Nonresident Filing Initiative to encourage all
benign actors (including U.S. residents and those owing more than $1,500) to correct
past noncompliance using less burdensome procedures (e.g., expand and clarify who
qualifies for it and further explain who will be deemed to have reasonable cause for
failure to file an FBAR).
2. Send “soft” notices to educate persons with foreign accounts about the FBAR and
Form 8938 reporting requirements, encouraging them to self-correct inadvertent
violations, as contemplated by the FBAR Compliance Initiative Project and the FBAR
Stop Filer Program.
3. Update Revenue Procedure 2002-23, 2002-1 C.B. 744 to clarify how beneficiaries
of Canadian retirement plans can file late or amended returns that elect to exclude
undistributed income from those plans.
4. Incorporate all OVD FAQs and the Streamlined Nonresident Filing Initiative (or the
three-category approach, described above) into a Revenue Procedure (or similar guid-
ance published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin) that incorporates comments from
internal and external stakeholders.
5. Revise Forms 8938 and/or TD F 90–22.1 to reduce taxpayer burden and the duplica-
tive reporting identified by the GAO.
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The IRS might reduce duplicative reporting by adding items reported on an FBAR to the existing list of items that taxpayers do not have to report on
Form 8938. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D–7T.
