Sample Literature Review of One Paper
Literature Review
Student's Name
Paper Citation: Johnson, William R. and Jonathan Skinner (1986) Labor Supply and Martial Separation, The
American Economic Review, 76(3) (June): 455-469.
[Note the Format of the Citation: Author Names (Year) "Paper Title," Journal Title, Volume(Number) (Month):
page numbers. More examples of reference citation are at the end of this document.]
This paper examines the relationship between women's labor supply and divorce. The authors find that women
who divorce had increased their labor supply during the three years prior, raising questions as to the cause-
effect relationship between women's labor supply and marital dissolution. In other words, they try to
disentangle the question of whether women's increasing labor force participation contributes to increased
divorce or whether women who anticipate divorce increase their labor force participation as a result of that
anticipation.
[Note: This first paragraph is an overview or abstract of the paper]
Johnson and Skinner (1986) analyzed data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which
allowed them to estimate predicted divorce probabilities based on actual divorce. They then used this predicted
probability of divorce and actual divorce in estimates of female LFP, and though both variables had positive
coefficients, they were statistically insignificant.
Johnson and Skinner (1986) included residence in a state with no-fault divorce legislation in their predicted
labor supply equations. They concluded that living in a state with a no-fault divorce law has a negative impact
on womens labor supply. However, Johnson and Skinners (1986) analysis used PSID data from 1972, when
only a few states had changed their divorce laws to no-fault; this created a small comparison group and a
limited amount of time for the laws' effects to occur.
Though Johnson and Skinner’s (1986) analysis suggested that no-fault divorce had a negative impact on
married women’s LFP, later research has consistently found that married women living in states with no-fault
divorce laws are more likely to work, but the effects are small.
[Note: These paragraphs summarize details of the paper's methodology and data that are relevant to the paper
this student is trying to write]
[Note: The in-text citation style is Author (Year)]
Sample full-fledged Literature Review for a research paper. This combines the summaries of each of the
previous papers reviewed in a coherent way that relates to the topic and empirical methods at hand.
PREVIOUS RESEARCH: DIVORCE, FERTILITY, AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION
There is a substantial amount of research on the LFP decisions of women and the impacts of divorce and
fertility on these decisions. Also relevant to this paper is previous work examining the relationship between
fertility and divorce. The existing literature on divorce and labor force participation, labor force participation
and fertility, and fertility and divorce are reviewed in this chapter.
Divorce and Labor Force Participation
As noted above and shown in Figure 1, a simultaneous rise in divorce rates and female LFP rates
occurred during the post-World War II era. As noted by Becker, et al. (1977), one possible explanation for
these trends is that wage increases and greater earnings ability among females increased the opportunity costs of
being married. In addition, wives working outside the home may invest less in marriage-specific capital than
their non-working counterparts, reducing the gains from marriage for both men and women. This interpretation
of Figure 1 suggests that the increase in LFP among women was a causal factor that led to the increased divorce
rate. However, it is also possible that the causality moves in the other direction. If a woman becomes divorced,
she may need to enter the workforce to support herself and her family. The number of divorced women
working would naturally increase as divorce rates increase, thus raising the female LFPR. As more women
observe the incidence and impacts of divorce among their mothers and peers, they may adjust their own
expectations regarding divorce risk upward, and subsequently increase their own LFP while married to insure
financial independence. Becker, et al. (1977, pg. 1181) state, ...the secular growth in wages, which contributed
significantly to the growth in the labor force participation of women, especially married women, probably also
contributed significantly to the growth in divorce rates. Again causation probably flows both ways: divorced
women (and women who anticipate divorce) have higher wages because they spend more time in the labor
force. To examine the relationship empirically, Michael (1985) included lagged divorce rates and lagged LFP
rates as independent variables in time-series equations explaining subsequent divorce and LFP rates. He found
that lagged divorce rates were positively correlated with subsequent LFP rates, but there was no significant
relationship between lagged LFP rates and subsequent divorce rates.
Johnson and Skinner (1986) analyzed data from the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID),
which allowed them to estimate predicted divorce probabilities based on actual divorce. They then used this
predicted probability of divorce and actual divorce in estimates of female LFP, and though both variables had
positive coefficients, they were statistically insignificant. Green and Quester (1982) utilized U.S. Census
Survey of Economic Opportunity data to generate a predicted divorce probability based on the demographic
characteristics of married women. They found married womens labor supply increases with divorce risk. In
addition, although it is often hypothesized that working could increase marital instability for married women,
this relationship was found to be statistically insignificant in both papers (Becker, et al. 1977).
Haurin (1989) used a dynamic model to estimate the labor market reactions of women who experience a
deviation in husbands actual work hours from the expected amount of work hours, as would occur when a
husband loses his job, falls ill, passes away, or when a couple separates. He concluded that there is a significant
increase in a woman’s LFP following a divorce or separation. He also confirmed Johnson and Skinners (1986)
finding that increases in the likelihood of divorce lead to increases in married womens labor force activity.
More recent studies on divorce suggest that divorce risk may not be as influential on female labor supply
as the earlier studies suggested. Sen (2000) compared responses to divorce risk among 1944-1954 and 1957-
1964 birth-cohorts using sub-samples from the National Longitudinal Surveys (NLS). The panel structure of
this data allowed Sen to proxy current divorce risk using actual divorce in the future, which was then included
in an LFP regression. Age at the time of marriage was also used in the LFP estimation as an instrument for
divorce risk because research suggests that divorce risk decreases with age at the time of marriage. The results
indicated that the impact of divorce risk on labor supply is significantly smaller for the younger cohort than the
older group. Though divorce had a positive effect on both cohorts by each measure, divorce risk had a
substantial impact on LFP for the older cohort while having a small (yet still significant) effect on the young
cohort. Because having a female child is associated with higher divorce risk, Bedard and Deschenes (2003)
used sex of first born child as an instrumental variable for divorce risk when testing for labor market outcomes
of divorce. Though the estimates of person-adjusted household income without this variable indicated that the
economic well-being of divorced women is lower than married womens economic well-being, the instrumental
variable results refute this. They found that ever-divorced mothers have higher levels of income than never-
divorced mothers and they concluded that divorce does not affect the decision to participate in the labor force,
but does increase the hours and weeks worked by mothers.
As noted in the introduction, the potential endogeneity of using actual divorce or divorce rates to
measure divorce risk makes research based on these variables somewhat suspect. In response, researchers have
used exogenous changes in divorce law to examine the relationships between divorce and female LFP.
1
Johnson and Skinner (1986) included residence in a state with no-fault divorce legislation in their
predicted labor supply equations. They concluded that living in a state with a no-fault divorce law has a
negative impact on womens labor supply. However, Johnson and Skinners (1986) analysis used PSID data
from 1972, when only a few states had changed their divorce laws to no-fault; this created a small comparison
group and a limited amount of time for the laws' effects to occur. Alternatively, Peters (1986), using 1979 CPS
data, found a higher probability of women participating in the labor force in no-fault states.
Parkman (1992) also used the 1979 CPS and a similar methodology to Peters (1986) to estimate the
effect of no-fault divorce legislation on married womens labor supply. Consistent with Peters (1986), he also
found about 2 percent higher rates of married women’s LFP in no-fault states. However, he attributed this
difference to lower compensation for womens marriage-specific investments in states with no-fault divorce
law. In particular, he used differences in property division laws to illustrate that married womens LFP is
greater in states with no-fault divorce because at the time of divorce, womens human capital losses from not
engaging in market work are compensated at lower rates than in mutual consent states. In later research using
1
Such research, of course, hinges on a direct relationship between divorce laws and subsequent divorce outcomes, which was
documented in Chapter 2.
the Time Use Longitudinal Panel Study, 1975-1981, Parkman (1998) again concluded that no-fault divorce laws
were associated with a greater number of hours worked among married women. He suggested that women
work to protect themselves from the potential costs of divorce.
Gray (1998) utilized Census and CPS data, and he tested for the effect of no-fault divorce law in 1980
across states. His results indicated that the probability that a married woman participates in the labor force is
1.6 percent higher in states with no-fault divorce law. He then used data from 1960 to 1980 to measure the
change in married womens LFP in states with and without no-fault divorce laws. The results from this analysis
found a small and insignificant impact of no-fault divorce law and Gray suggested that without considering the
marital property laws of a state, “divorce legislation has no significant impact on married women’s increasing
labor-force participation rates during the 1970’s” (Gray 1998, pg. 634). Gray (1998) categorized states into
three types of property law: common property, community property and equitable distribution. With the
enactment of no-fault divorce laws, common property favors the wife in divorce settlements, community
property tends to lead to redistribution of assets to the husband, and equitable distribution gives the court
discretion on property division and thus does not favor either party. The property laws were accounted for in
Gray’s (1998) analysis by interacting them with the no-fault variable. Consequently, the results from analyses
using the Census, CPS and PSID all indicated that the adoption of a no-fault divorce law in a common property
states is associated with decreases in married womens LFP. In addition, married women in states with
community property laws had significant increases in LFP after no-fault legislation was enacted.
Chiappori, et al. (2002) used PSID data from 1988 to test the effect of divorce and property legislation
on married women’s labor supply. They created a divorce index comprised of four attributes associated with
the favorability of each state’s divorce law towards women: no-fault divorce laws, property division laws,
support order enforcement, and the settlement value of educational degrees. This index was then used in a
regression of the hours worked by married women. In their analysis, the “divorce index” was negatively
correlated with hours worked. In other words, in states where the divorce laws are more favorable toward
women, married women are likely to work fewer hours than in states where divorce law is less favorable
towards married women.
The research presented in this subsection indicates the myriad of findings regarding the relationship
between divorce rates and female LFP. Empirical results consistently show that increases in divorce rates are
associated with increases in LFP rates for females. Though a causal relationship between female LFP and
divorce is theoretically possible, empirical research has not found strong evidence for this; increases in female
LFP do not appear to have led to increases in divorce rates. There has also been evidence suggesting that
women’s LFP response to divorce risk is not as strong for recent cohorts of women when compared to earlier
cohorts.
Research addressing the effect of divorce law changes in the United States on the LFP of married
women was also presented in this section. Though Johnson and Skinner’s (1986) analysis suggested that no-
fault divorce had a negative impact on married women’s LFP, later research has consistently found that married
women living in states with no-fault divorce laws are more likely to work, but the effects are small. Recent
research in this area has also highlighted the complexity of the LFP decision for married women because
marital property laws and other legal factors are found to be related to the effects of no-fault divorce laws on
women’s LFP. Previous research has ignored the possibility that the various laws have differential impacts
among married women with and without children. The impact of no-fault divorce law on female LFP could be
larger than suggested by previous research because the results reported were the average effect for mothers and
non-mothers. By separating married women into mothers and non-mothers, this paper allows for varying
impacts of no-fault divorce law on the two groups.
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