REFLECTIONS ON ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW AND

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

REFLECTIONS ON ANIMALS, PROPERTY,

AND THE LAW AND RAIN WITHOUT

THUNDER

GARY L. FRANCIONE*

NTRODUCTION

In my 1995 book, Animals, Property, and the Law, I argue that animal-

welfare laws do not provide any significant protection to nonhuman animals

because nonhumans are the property of humans.

Animals are things that we

own and that have only extrinsic or conditional value as means to our ends. We

may as a matter of personal choice attach a higher value to our companion

animals, such as dogs and cats, but as far as the law is concerned, even these

animals are nothing more than commodities. As a general matter, we do not

regard animals as having any intrinsic value and we protect animal interests

only to the extent that it benefits us to do so.

We claim to take animal interests seriously from both a moral and legal

perspective, which is why we have anticruelty and other animal-welfare laws in

the first place. We purport to balance human and animal interests, but because

animals are property, there can be no meaningful balance. Animal interests will

almost always be regarded as less important than human interests, even when

the human interest at stake is relatively trivial and the animal interest at stake is

significant. The result of any supposed balancing of human and nonhuman

interests required by animal-welfare laws is predetermined from the outset by

the property status of the nonhuman as a “food animal,” “experimental

animal,” “game animal,” et cetera.

This article is also available at http://law.duke.edu/journals/lcp.

* Distinguished Professor of Law and Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Scholar of Law and Philosophy

at Rutgers University School of Law–Newark. I would like to thank Anna E. Charlton not only for her

comments on this article but for her assistance over the years helping me to develop my thoughts on the

human–nonhuman relationship. I am also grateful to Professor William Reppy, who served as the

editor for this essay, and to Darian Ibrahim and the other participants at the Animal Law Conference

at Duke University School of Law, April 7, 2006, for comments. Many thanks to Kelly Smith, Sr.

Production Assistant at Duke Law School, for her assistance with the preparation of the manuscript. I

acknowledge research assistance from Suzanna Polhamus and support from the Dean’s Research Fund

of the Rutgers University School of Law–Newark.

1. G

ARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW (1995). Throughout this article, I

use “nonhuman” and “animal” interchangeably, but it should not be forgotten that humans are animals

as well. In addition, I use “animal who” rather than “animal that” to emphasize that nonhumans are not

objects, as implied by our reference to them as “it.”

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

10 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

Although we supposedly prohibit the infliction on animals of “unnecessary”

suffering, we do not ask whether particular animal uses are necessary even

though most of the suffering that we impose on animals cannot be characterized

as necessary in any meaningful sense.

Rather, we ask only whether particular

treatment is necessary given uses that are per se not necessary. We look to the

customs and practices of the various institutions of exploitation and we assume

that those involved in the activity would not inflict more pain and suffering than

required for the particular purpose because it would be irrational to do so, just

as it would be for the owner of a car to dent her vehicle for no reason.

For example, although it is not necessary for humans to eat meat or dairy

products and these foods may well be detrimental to human health and the

environment, we do not ask about the necessity per se of using animals for food.

We ask only whether the pain and suffering imposed on animals used for food

go beyond what is regarded as acceptable according to the customs and

practices of animal agriculture. To the extent it is customary for farmers to

castrate or brand farm animals, both very painful activities, we regard such

actions as “necessary” because we assume that farmers would not mutilate

animals for no reason.

The result of this framework is that the level of care required by animal-

welfare laws rarely rises above that which a rational property owner would

provide in order to exploit the animal in an economically efficient way. Because

animals are property, we consider as “humane” treatment that we would regard

as torture if it were inflicted on humans.

In my 1996 book, Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of the Animal Rights

Movement,

I argue that there are important theoretical and practical

differences between the animal-rights- and animal-welfare positions and that

welfarist regulation intended to make animal treatment more “humane” will,

for the most part, do nothing but make animal exploitation more efficient.

Welfarist regulation, I maintain, does not recognize or protect the inherent

value of animals and will not lead in some incremental way to the abolition of

2. For a discussion of the necessity of animal use, see GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO

ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG? 1–49 (2000). Courts have explicitly recognized that

prohibitions against “unnecessary” suffering or “needless” killing must be interpreted by reference to

institutional uses that are per se not necessary:

The flesh of animals is not necessary for the subsistence of man, at least in this country, and by

some people it is not so used. Yet it would not be denied that the killing of oxen for food is

lawful. Fish are not necessary to any one, nor are various wild animals which are killed, and

sold in market; yet their capture and killing are regulated by law. The words “needlessly” and

“unnecessarily” must have a reasonable, not an absolute and literal, meaning attached to

them.

State v. Bogardus, 4 Mo. App. 215, 216–17 (1877). Courts have also recognized that practices that are

regarded as “cruel” as we normally use that term in ordinary discourse are permitted within the

meaning of anticruelty laws. See F

RANCIONE, supra note 1, at 146; FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 58–63;

see also infra notes 174–78 and accompanying text (discussing anticruelty laws).

3. See G

ARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE ANIMAL

RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1996).

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 11

animal exploitation. For example, the federal Humane Slaughter Act,

which

supposedly requires the “humane” slaughter of nonhumans for food purposes,

prohibits suffering only to the extent that it ensures worker safety, reduces

carcass damage, and provides other economic benefits for humans.

It would,

however, be an absurd use of the word to characterize any slaughterhouse as

“humane.”

To the extent that animal advocates seek protection for animals that

exceeds what is necessary to exploit them for a particular purpose, the property

status of nonhumans and the political compromise that is required invariably

result in regulations that do little—if anything—to affect adversely the interests

of human property owners or to improve the treatment of nonhumans. The

primary effect of these measures is to make the public feel better about animal

exploitation, which actually may result in a net increase of animal suffering

through increased use. A central thesis of Rain Without Thunder, as well as my

later work,

is that, if animal interests are to be morally significant, we must

accord to nonhumans the basic right not to be treated as property, and this

requires that we seek to abolish, and not merely to regulate, institutionalized

animal exploitation.

A number of my critics have argued that, although we do treat animals

badly, there is nothing inherent in the property status of animals that would

prevent us from changing the law to require that animals be accorded better

treatment and so animal advocates ought to pursue incremental improvements

in animal welfare.

Although I maintain that we cannot justify the property

4. Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-765, 72 Stat. 862, (codified at 7

U.S.C. §§ 1901–1907 (2000)). Usually referred to as the “Humane Slaughter Act,” the Act originally

applied to animals slaughtered for sale to the federal government, but was reauthorized in 1978 and

covers animals slaughtered in federally inspected plants. For a discussion of the considerations that

motivated the Humane Slaughter Act, see F

RANCIONE, supra note 3, at 95–102. See also infra notes

107–09 and accompanying text (discussing failure to enforce the Humane Slaughter Act).

5. See F

RANCIONE, supra note 3, at 95–102. The “[f]indings and declarations of policy” of the

Humane Slaughter Act make clear the importance of economic considerations in assessing matters of

animal welfare:

The Congress finds that the use of humane methods in the slaughter of livestock prevents

needless suffering; results in safer and better working conditions for persons engaged in the

slaughtering industry; brings about improvement of products and economies in slaughtering

operations; and produces other benefits for producers, processors, and consumers which tend

to expedite an orderly flow of livestock and livestock products in interstate and foreign

commerce.

7 U.S.C. § 1901 (2000).

6. See generally F

RANCIONE, supra note 2; Gary L. Francione, Animals—Property or Persons?, in

NIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 108 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C.

Nussbaum eds., 2004).

7. See, e.g., R

OBERT GARNER, ANIMALS, POLITICS AND MORALITY (2d ed. 2004); MIKE

RADFORD, ANIMAL WELFARE LAW IN BRITAIN: REGULATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 102–04, 394–95

(2001); David Favre, Integrating Animal Interests into Our Legal System, 10 A

NIMAL L. 87 (2004);

Robert Garner, Political Ideology and the Legal Status of Animals, 8 A

NIMAL L. 77 (2002); Jerrold

Tannenbaum, Animals and the Law: Property, Cruelty, Rights, 62 S

OC. RES. 539 (1995); Cass R.

Sunstein, Slaughterhouse Jive, N

EW REPUBLIC, Jan. 29, 2001, at 40 (reviewing GARY L. FRANCIONE,

INTRODUCTION TO ANIMAL RIGHTS: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG? (2000)); Steven M. Wise, Thunder

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

12 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

status of nonhumans irrespective of how “humanely” we may treat them—just

as we cannot justify human slavery even if it is “humane”—I certainly agree

that we could treat animals better than we do and stated so explicitly in

Animals, Property, and the Law.

The status of nonhumans as property,

however, militates strongly against significant improvement in our treatment of

animals, and animal welfare will do little more than make animal exploitation

more economically efficient and socially acceptable.

There can be no doubt that the animal-protection community in the United

States—and, indeed, throughout the world—has in the years since I wrote these

books achieved a greater degree of economic power and social prominence than

at any point in history. Therefore, if my critics are correct, and the property

status of nonhumans is not as significant an obstacle as I have claimed, it would

seem that there should be some evidence of progress that does not fit the model

that I have described. That is, there should be evidence of animal protection

that goes beyond what is required for efficient exploitation, reflecting at least a

nascent recognition of the inherent value of animals as opposed to their

exclusively extrinsic value as property. Instead, the events of the past decade or

so reinforce the view that the property status of nonhumans is a greater obstacle

than my critics and the animal-protection movement have recognized or

appreciated.

Part II of this article examines whether animal welfare in the United States

has moved us closer to recognizing the inherent value of nonhumans and

concludes that it has not. This is not a complete survey of federal and state law

or of changes that have occurred through the voluntary action of animal users;

rather, it focuses on those developments that animal advocates appear to regard

as most significant. Part III discusses some general reasons why the property

paradigm militates against better treatment of nonhumans. These remarks are

made primarily in the context of responding to criticisms of my views made by

Cass Sunstein.

Part IV discusses the false dichotomy promoted by my critics

that we must either pursue traditional welfarist regulation or sacrifice

nonhumans to the “utopian” goal of abolition that will not be achieved for

many years, if ever. Part V offers some observations on the field of “animal

Without Rain: A Review/Commentary of Gary L. Francione’s Rain Without Thunder: The Ideology of

the Animal Rights Movement, 3 A

NIMAL L. 45 (1997).

8. In the Introduction to Animals, Property, and the Law, I state:

I do not maintain that characterizing sentient beings as property necessarily means that those

beings will be treated exactly the same as inanimate objects or that property can never have

rights as a matter of formal jurisprudential theory. For example, although slaves were, for

some purposes, considered “persons” who technically held certain rights, those rights were not

particularly effective in providing any real protection for slaves. We could decide to grant

certain rights to animals while continuing to regard them as property. The problem is that as

long as property is, as a matter of legal theory, regarded as that which cannot have interests or

cannot have interests that transcend the rights of property owners to use their property, then

there will probably always be a gap between what the law permits people to do with animals

and what any acceptable moral theory and basic decency tell us is appropriate.

RANCIONE, supra note 1, at 14.

9. See Sunstein, supra note 7.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 13

law” as it has emerged in the past decade. Part VI addresses the view advanced

by some in the legal community that we ought to treat certain animals, such as

great apes, in a different manner based on their cognitive similarities to

humans.

HE FAILURE OF ANIMAL WELFARE

In the years since I first proposed the thesis about the property status of

animals, and despite claims by my critics that the property paradigm is

consistent with recognizing the inherent value of animal interests, there have

been no significant improvements in animal welfare or animal-welfare laws in

the United States,

and almost all changes have been linked explicitly to

making animal use more efficient. That is, welfare changes are based on such

considerations as increasing productivity or reducing labor costs and do not

recognize that animals have inherent value requiring that we respect their

interests even when there is no benefit to us. These developments serve to

confirm my views about animals as property and of the generally ineffective and

often counterproductive nature of alleged advances in animal welfare. This part

discusses several examples of the “victories” proclaimed by animal advocates

during this time.

10. Peter Singer claims as one of the general “successes” of the animal-rights movement that the

numbers of animals used in experiments in Britain has fallen to less than half of what it was in 1970.

Peter Singer, Animal Liberation at 30, N.Y.

REV. BOOKS, May 15, 2003, at 25. Singer does not mention,

however, that the number of animals used in Britain has increased in recent years. For example, in

2003, there were 2.8 million experiments involving animals in Britain, which was the largest number

since 1994 and followed an increase of four percent from the previous year. Moreover, there have been

significant increases in experiments involving physical trauma, psychological trauma, thermal injury,

and aversive training. See B

RITISH UNION FOR THE ABOLITION OF VIVISECTION, UK ANIMAL

EXPERIMENTS STATISTICS 2003, available at http://www.buav.org/pdf/Stats2003.pdf (discussing report

by the Home Office of the United Kingdom).

Robert Garner states that “[i]n many European countries . . . factory farming is much nearer to

being phased out by state action” than it is in the United States. Garner, supra note 7, at 90. Garner’s

statement is certainly not accurate in that intensive agriculture is still very much the norm in Europe. In

any event, there cannot be any real doubt that nonhumans in Europe are, despite any differences, still

treated very badly. Moreover, there have been difficulties with domestic legislation to implement

certain E.U. animal-welfare measures and the effect of free-trade agreements and other globalization

efforts on domestic animal-welfare measures, many of which do not take effect until after 2010, remains

to be seen. As a general matter, whenever human interests are implicated, nonhuman interests are

ignored. For example, fear over the H5N1 virus, which is commonly called the “bird flu,” has resulted

in producers of free-range chickens returning to more intensive methods. See, e.g., Brian Brady and

Richard Gray, Jabs for Poultry Workers as Bird Flu Fears Grow, S

COTLAND ON SUNDAY, Feb. 26,

2006, at 11. Finally, European animal-welfare measures are often based on consideration of economic

efficiency and have nothing to do with recognizing the inherent value of nonhumans.

Another comparative example offered frequently involves the fact that some nations, such as

Britain, Sweden, and New Zealand, have laws or policies that afford more protection to great apes

based on their similarity to humans. For the most part, there had been very little use of great apes in

those countries, and restrictions were both easier to enact and less meaningful. Differential treatment

of great apes also serves to reinforce speciesist hierarchies rather than to erode them. See infra notes

181–86 and accompanying text (discussing “similar-minds” theory).

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14 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

A. Farm Animals and Industry Self-Regulation: A “[R]ay of [H]ope”?

Peter Singer, author of Animal Liberation

and a defender of animal-

welfare regulation, cites as an example of a “successful American campaign[]”

efforts by animal advocates and organizations, such as People for the Ethical

Treatment of Animals (PETA), that led to agreement by McDonald’s to “set

and enforce higher standards for the slaughterhouses that supply it with meat”

and to provide increased space to hens confined in egg batteries.

Singer claims

that these actions by McDonald’s, which were followed by Wendy’s and Burger

King, are a “ray of hope” and “the first hopeful signs for American farm

animals since the modern animal movement began.”

PETA claims that

“‘[t]here’s been a real change in consciousness’”

concerning the treatment of

animals used for food and praises McDonald’s as “‘leading the way’ in

reforming the practices of fast-food suppliers, in the treatment and killing of its

beef and poultry.”

To the contrary, however, this supposed “change in consciousness” is, for

the most part, no different from the concerns for increasing the efficiency of

animal exploitation that motivated the passage in 1958 of the Humane

Slaughter Act and does not reflect any recognition that animals have interests

that should be protected even if there are no economic advantages to humans.

The slaughterhouse standards praised by Singer and PETA were developed by

Temple Grandin, who designs “humane” slaughter and handling systems and

who is discussed at length in Rain Without Thunder.

Grandin’s guidelines,

which involve techniques for moving animals through the slaughtering process

and stunning them, are based explicitly on economic concerns. According to

Grandin:

Once livestock—cattle, pigs and sheep—arrive at packing plants, proper handling

procedures are not only important for the animal’s well-being, they can also mean the

11. PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION (2d ed. 1990).

12. Singer, supra note 10, at 26.

13. Id.

14. Stephanie Simon, Killing Them Softly; Voluntary Reforms in the Livestock Industry Have

Changed the Way Animals Are Slaughtered, L.A. T

IMES, Apr. 29, 2003, at A1 (quoting Bruce Friedrich

of PETA).

15. David Shaw, Matters of Taste; Animal Rights and Wrongs; When It Comes to Defending

Livestock, Some Activists Are Going to Extremes, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2005, at F2 (quoting Lisa Lange

of PETA).

16. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 107–09 and accompanying text

(discussing enforcement of the Humane Slaughter Act).

17. See F

RANCIONE, supra note 3, at 99–100, 199–202. Grandin, who claims that her autism enables

her to understand the emotions of cows and other nonhumans, was the subject of a 1998 documentary,

Stairway to Heaven, by filmmaker Errol Morris. The title of the film is based on a ramp designed by

Grandin that is supposed to lead cows more calmly from the holding pen to their slaughter. Grandin

maintains that “[p]roperly performed, ‘slaughter is more humane than nature.’” O

LIVER SACKS, AN

ANTHROPOLOGIST ON MARS 268 (1995) (quoting Temple Grandin). Grandin ignores that cows would

not die in “nature” as they would not exist if we did not cause them to come into being for the purpose

of eating them. See also T

EMPLE GRANDIN & CATHERINE JOHNSON, ANIMALS IN TRANSLATION:

USING THE MYSTERIES OF AUTISM TO DECODE ANIMAL BEHAVIOR (2005) (discussing the ways in

which Grandin’s autism supposedly provides her with insight about animal cognition).

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 15

difference between profit and loss. Research clearly demonstrates that many meat

quality benefits can be obtained with careful, quiet animal handling. . . . Properly

handled animals are not only an important ethical goal, they also keep the meat

industry running safely, efficiently and profitably.

In talking about stunning animals before slaughter, Grandin states:

Stunning an animal correctly will provide better meat quality. Improper electric

stunning will cause bloodspots in the meat and bone fractures. Good stunning

practices are also required so that a plant will be in compliance with the Humane

Slaughter Act and for animal welfare. When stunning is done correctly, the animal

feels no pain and it becomes instantly unconscious. An animal that is stunned properly

will produce a still carcass that is safe for plant workers to work on.

She maintains that “[g]entle handling in well-designed facilities will minimize

stress levels, improve efficiency and maintain good meat quality. Rough

handling or poorly designed equipment is detrimental to both animal welfare

and meat quality.”

In discussing as a general matter the slaughter and battery-cage

improvements to which Singer refers, McDonald’s states:

Animal welfare is also an important part of quality assurance. For high-quality food

products at the counter, you need high quality coming from the farm. Animals that are

well cared for are less prone to illness, injury, and stress, which all have the same

negative impact on the condition of livestock as they do on people. Proper animal

welfare practices also benefit producers. Complying with our animal welfare

guidelines helps ensure efficient production and reduces waste and loss. This enables

our suppliers to be highly competitive.

Wendy’s also emphasizes the efficiency of its animal-welfare program:

“Studies have shown that humane animal handling methods not only prevent

needless suffering, but can result in a safer working environment for workers

involved in the farm and livestock industry.”

In a report about voluntary

reforms in the livestock industry, the Los Angeles Times stated that “[i]n part,

the reforms are driven by self-interest. When an animal is bruised, its flesh turns

mushy and must be discarded. Even stress, especially right before slaughter, can

affect the quality of meat.”

In short, the producers of animal products—working with prominent animal

advocates—are becoming better at exploiting animals in an economically

efficient manner by adopting measures that improve meat quality and worker

safety. But this has absolutely nothing to do with any recognition that animals

18. TEMPLE GRANDIN, RECOMMENDED ANIMAL HANDLING GUIDELINES AND AUDIT GUIDE 6

(2005), available at http://www.animalhandling.org/guidelines/2005RecAnimalHandlingGuidelines.pdf.

19. Temple Grandin, Humane Slaughter: Recommended Stunning Practices,

http://www.grandin.com/humane/rec.slaughter.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).

20. Temple Grandin, Stress and Meat Quality: Lowering Stress to Improve Meat Quality and

Animal Welfare, http://www.grandin.com/meat/meat.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).

21. Bruce Feinberg & Terry Williams, Animal Welfare Update: North America,

http://www.mcdonalds.com/content/corp/values/report/archive/progress_report/north_america.html

(last visited Mar. 19, 2007).

22. Wendy’s, Wendy’s Animal Welfare Program, http://www.wendys.com/community/animal_

welfare.jsp (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).

23. Simon, supra note 14.

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16 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

have inherent value or that they have interests that should be respected even

when it is not economically beneficial for humans to do so. Any supposed

improvements in animal welfare are limited to and justified by economic

benefits for institutional exploiters. Moreover, there is serious doubt whether

these changes actually provide any significant improvement in animal

treatment. A slaughterhouse that follows Grandin’s guidelines for stunning,

prod use, and other aspects of the killing process is still an unspeakably horrible

place and it is misleading for Singer, PETA, or anyone else to suggest

otherwise. Battery hens that supply some of the major fast-food chains may now

live in an area equivalent to a square of approximately 8.5 inches rather than

the average industry standard—a square of approximately 7.8 inches—but it

would be nonsense to claim that the existence of a battery hen in the larger cage

is anything but miserable. Indeed, “cage-free” hens are often packed together

so tightly in sheds that they are crushed and have very limited movement.

To the extent that McDonald’s and others are incurring any costs

whatsoever in making these changes, they are surely outweighed significantly by

the fact that these corporations can now point to the praise of animal advocates

such as Singer and PETA for their supposedly “humane” treatment of

nonhuman animals. PETA presented its 2004 Visionary of the Year Award to

Grandin, who is a consultant to McDonald’s and other fast-food chains, for her

“innovative improvements” in slaughtering processes.

Some welfarists, such as

Paul Waldau, director of the Center for Animals and Public Policy at Tufts

University, proclaim that these supposed improvements in animal agriculture

indicate that “‘[a] certain segment of the population is beginning to consume

with conscience.’”

This is precisely the sort of comment that encourages the

public to believe that it is now more acceptable to eat animal products because

animals are being treated more “humanely,” and that demonstrates the

generally counterproductive nature of animal welfare.

B. Legislation

A cursory review of federal and state animal-welfare legislation in the past

dozen years provides several notable examples of the sort of legislation

described in Rain Without Thunder as providing a greater benefit to animal-

advocacy organizations, which need legislative “victories” to raise funds, than to

nonhuman animals.

24. PETA, http://www.peta.org/MC/NewsItem.asp?id=5667&pf=true (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).

25. Patricia Leigh Brown, Is Luxury Cruel? The Foie Gras Divide, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 6, 2004, at F10

(quoting Paul Waldau). See also infra notes 137–41 (discussing the idea that we can be “conscientious

omnivores”).

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 17

1. Federal Legislation: The Chimpanzee Health Improvement,

Maintenance, and Protection (CHIMP) Act

The CHIMP Act of 2000 was enthusiastically supported by many national

animal-advocacy organizations and by primatologist Jane Goodall, and many

animal advocates regard the CHIMP Act as the most significant piece of federal

legislation since the 1985 amendments to the federal Animal Welfare Act,

itself an extremely modest law. The stated purpose of the CHIMP Act is to

establish a national sanctuary system for chimpanzees that are designated by

the Secretary of Health and Human Services (the Secretary) as no longer

needed for research conducted or supported by federal agencies.

Chimpanzees

not owned by the federal government may also be accepted into the sanctuary

program if the owner transfers title and other conditions are met.

The

sanctuary system is to be operated by a nonprofit private entity chosen by the

Secretary, and costs are to be shared, with the nonprofit entity paying not less

than ten percent of costs to establish the sanctuary and twenty-five percent of

the costs of operation.

Although the Act purports to express a moral concern about chimpanzees

used in research, it is clear from the legislative history that Congress was at least

equally as concerned about the high costs of warehousing these nonhumans in

laboratories and regarded the sanctuary system as being a cost-effective

solution that would be financed in part through private funds.

The CHIMP

Act was described as “fiscally sound legislation that will better serve the

taxpayers as well as the animals.”

Animal advocates also promoted the

legislation as cost-efficient.

26. 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a (2000) (establishing a sanctuary system for surplus chimpanzees).

27. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159 (2000). For a discussion of the Animal Welfare Act, see F

RANCIONE,

supra note 1, at 185–249. See also infra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (discussing exclusion of

animals from coverage under the Act).

28. 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a(a), (b).

29. Id. § 287a-3a(c), (d)(4).

30. Id. § 287a-3a(e)(4)(A), (B).

31. See 146 C

ONG. REC. S11654-55 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000). Senator Smith stated: “It costs $8-$15

per day per animal to care for chimpanzees in a sanctuary, where they live in groups in a naturalized

setting. That is compared to the $20-$30 per day per animal that the federal government is now

spending to maintain the chimpanzees in laboratory cages.” Id. at 11654. Senator Durbin added: “And

this legislation creates a public-private partnership, to generate non-federal dollars that will help pay

for the care of these chimpanzees. Right now, their care is financed strictly through taxpayer dollars.

Under the bill, the private sector will cover 10 percent of the start-up costs and 25 percent of the

operating costs of the sanctuary system.” Id. For further discussion on the legislative rationale for the

CHIMP Act, see S.

REP. NO. 106-494, at 3 (2000) (“The CHIMP Act provides a cost-effective solution

to the long term care needs of these chimpanzees. Sanctuary care for animals requires less intensive

management than animals in research facilities, and therefore entails lower daily costs.”)

32. 146 C

ONG. REC. S11655 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of Senator Durbin).

33. See, e.g., Chimpanzee Health Improvement, Maintenance, and Protection Act: Hearing on H.R.

3514 Before the Subcomm. on Health and Environment of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 106th Cong. 34

(2000). Tina Nelson, Executive Director of the American Anti-Vivisection Society, stated: “I wish to

emphasize the cost effectiveness of this solution. Sanctuaries offer considerable savings compared to

the cost of housing chimpanzees in laboratories.” Nelson’s statement was offered on behalf of her own

organization as well as the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the National

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18 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

Moreover, the CHIMP Act was explicitly proposed as a way of ensuring that

research involving chimpanzees can continue. Senate sponsor Robert Smith (R-

NH) stated that the CHIMP Act was “basically a cost of doing business. If the

federal government wants to keep using chimpanzees for medical research, it

has to assume the responsibility for their care after the research is done.”

Euthanizing the animals was not an option:

“Some of the best and most caring members of the support staff, such as veterinarians

and technicians would, for personal and emotional reasons, find it impossible to

function effectively in an atmosphere in which euthanasia is a general policy, and

might resign. A facility that adopted such a policy could expect to lose some of its best

employees.”

According to Senator Smith, “because chimpanzees and humans are so similar,

those who work directly in chimpanzee research would find it untenable to

continue using these animals if they were to be killed at the conclusion of the

research.”

Senate co-sponsor Richard Durbin (D-Ill) stated that “if the

Federal government is to keep using chimpanzees to advance human health

research goals, long-term care of the animals is a pre-requisite.”

Like the

supposed improvements in farm-animal welfare discussed in the previous

section, the CHIMP Act provides yet another, and a particularly relevant,

illustration of a point made continually in my work: Animal-welfare measures,

which are regarded as a “cost of doing business,” may very well facilitate

continued animal exploitation by making it more acceptable.

Although the CHIMP Act purports to prohibit further invasive research on

“retired” chimpanzees in the sanctuary system, the Act has two important

exceptions. First, sanctuary chimpanzees can be used for

noninvasive behavioral studies or medical studies based on information collected

during the course of normal veterinary care that is provided for the benefit of the

chimpanzee, provided that any such study involves minimal physical and mental harm,

pain, distress, and disturbance to the chimpanzee and the social group in which the

chimpanzee lives.

Second, the Act permits invasive research on a “retired” chimpanzee if the

Secretary finds that the research “is essential to address an important public

health need”;

a sanctuary chimpanzee is needed because there is no other

chimpanzee “reasonably available” outside the sanctuary system with a similar

Anti-Vivisection Society, Society for Animal Protective Legislation, and The Humane Society of the

United States.

34. 146 CONG. REC. S11655 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of Senator Smith).

35. Id. (quoting N

ATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CHIMPANZEES IN RESEARCH: STRATEGIES

FOR

THEIR ETHICAL CARE, MANAGEMENT, AND USE 39 (1997)).

36. Id. (statement of Senator Smith).

37. Id. (statement of Senator Durbin).

38. See generally FRANCIONE, supra note 3 (arguing that animal-welfare regulations do not lead to

the abolition of animal exploitation and, indeed, make exploitation more acceptable as a general

matter).

39. 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(i) (2000).

40. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(ii)(III).

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 19

medical history and prior research protocol;

and that there are “technological

or medical advancements that were not available at the time the chimpanzee

entered the sanctuary system, and that such advancements can and will be used

in the research.”

The exception for invasive research also requires that “the

design of the research involves minimal pain and physical harm to the

chimpanzee, and otherwise minimizes mental harm, distress, and disturbance to

the chimpanzee and the social group in which the chimpanzee lives (including

with respect to removal of the chimpanzee from the sanctuary facility

involved).”

The exception for noninvasive behavioral studies or medical studies is not

qualified, and it appears as though this research may be done without

limitation. Although the exception for invasive research appears to be carefully

qualified, it is easy to satisfy. If the government and researchers want to do

research, it is, by definition, to address an “important public health need.” No

two chimpanzees will have the exact same medical history even if they were

involved in the same research protocol, so this exception leaves the door wide

open for researchers to claim that a sanctuary chimpanzee is in some way or

other unique. Technological and medical advances occur every day and there is

no qualification as to what is required. The requirement that the design of any

invasive research involve “minimal” pain and harm is, in my view, as

meaningless as a requirement that we not impose “unnecessary” suffering on

animals.

Furthermore, whether the proposed design for invasive research satisfies the

exception is to be evaluated by the board of directors of the entity operating the

sanctuary system, and the Secretary must accept those findings unless he or she

finds them to be arbitrary or capricious.

There is a notice-and-comment

requirement for research on sanctuary chimpanzees,

and no one who has been

previously “fined for, or signed a consent decree for, any violation of the

Animal Welfare Act” can use a sanctuary chimpanzee for any research.

There

is no review or approval mechanism specified in the Act for noninvasive

behavioral studies or medical studies.

Animal advocates who supported the CHIMP Act either failed to

appreciate that such a sanctuary system controlled by the government would

facilitate, and not inhibit, research on “retired” chimpanzees, or they ignored

that fact.

Before the CHIMP Act, many chimps were being warehoused in

41. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(ii)(I).

42. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(ii)(II).

43. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(ii)(IV).

44. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(B)(ii). The requirements for invasive research do not apply to noninvasive

behavioral studies or medical studies. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(A)(i).

45. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(B)(iii).

46. Id. § 287a-3a(d)(3)(C). This provision appears to apply to both noninvasive and invasive

research.

47. Some organizations that initially supported the CHIMP Act claimed to withdraw support when

the bill was amended to allow continued invasive research on sanctuary chimpanzees. This withdrawal

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

20 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

laboratories, and record keeping was spotty at best. A vivisector trying to find

chimpanzees for particular experiments faced considerable opportunity costs in

locating suitable animals. The creation of a national sanctuary system under the

effective control of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

considerably reduces those opportunity costs through a centralized information

bank that makes the location and medical histories accessible to the research

community. This system allows vivisectors to locate supposedly unique

chimpanzees whose use in experiments will arguably satisfy the “public health

need” requirement.

Supporters of the CHIMP Act claimed that the exception for invasive

research was needed to get support for the bill by the National Institutes of

Health (NIH)—and that is precisely the problem. NIH was not willing to drop

its opposition unless sanctuary chimpanzees continued to be available for

research, which suggests that NIH regards these supposedly retired

chimpanzees as being more on a leave of absence. Many advocates pointed to

statements by legislators that invasive research on these chimpanzees “would

rarely, if ever, take place.”

It must be remembered, however, that in the matter

of the “Silver Spring monkeys,” who were removed from a federally funded

laboratory after authorities determined that the animals were being treated in a

cruel manner, NIH made an explicit written representation to Congress that the

primates would never be used in experiments once they were transferred to the

Delta Regional Primate Center.

Despite its commitment to Congress, NIH

allowed further experiments because the monkeys were claimed to be unique in

light of their previous medical histories. Congress complained strenuously but

NIH ignored the protest, claiming scientific need. It is unclear why any animal

advocate believes that the CHIMP Act sanctuary situation will not involve a

repeat of what occurred with the Silver Spring monkeys.

In the face of concerns expressed by myself and others about the CHIMP

Act before its enactment, animal advocates who supported the Act argued that

of support was often done quietly. For example, the American Anti-Vivisection Society, which actively

supported the bill, see supra note 33, claimed to withdraw support after the bill was amended, but this

withdrawal consisted only of a withdrawal of active support and not any public opposition to the bill.

See Letter from Tina Nelson, Executive Director of the American Anti-Vivisection Society, to Hon.

James Greenwood (Oct. 23, 2000) (on file with the author). I was unable to find any indication that

organizations that supported the Act objected at any point to the exception for noninvasive behavioral

research or medical studies, even though these may involve some level of harm, pain, distress, and

disturbance.

The National Institutes of Health proposed regulations to implement the CHIMP Act. See

Standards of Care for Chimpanzees Held in the Federally Supported Chimpanzee Sanctuary System, 70

Fed. Reg. 1843 (Jan. 11, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 9). A coalition of animal-protection

organizations commented on the proposed regulations and argued that there should be no further

research on animals in the “sanctuary” system. See Center for Great Apes, et al., Comment on

Proposed Rules for Chimpanzees Held in the Federally Supported Chimpanzee Sanctuary System,

(Mar. 14, 2005), http://www.neavs.org/downloads/programs/campaigns/Comments_on_Proposed_

Rules.pdf. As of the time that this essay went to press, the regulations were not available.

48. 146 C

ONG. REC. S11654 (daily ed. Dec. 6, 2000) (statement of Senator Smith).

49. For a discussion of the Silver Spring monkey case, including NIH representations to Congress,

see F

RANCIONE, supra note 1, at 72–78, 86–89.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 21

the solution to the problem presented by the exception allowing invasive

research was to support the Act and then to challenge in court any

determination to use sanctuary chimpanzees in further research.

The problem

is that, for all intents and purposes, it is virtually impossible to challenge the

discretionary decisions of an administrative agency.

First, it is not even clear that animal advocates would have legal standing to

bring a judicial challenge to a decision by the Secretary to allow use of a

“retired” chimpanzee in further research. That is, the court may very well

dismiss the challenge without considering the merits of the Secretary’s decision.

Second, and more important, even if animal advocates were found to have

standing, the applicable standard of judicial review would effectively insulate

these decisions from challenge. The CHIMP Act provides two levels of

protection to administrative decisions to perform experiments on sanctuary

chimpanzees. Under the Act, the sanctuary system is to be operated by a non-

profit organization that is awarded a contract by the Department of Health and

Human Services (HHS), or that is established by HHS.

The board of directors

of the sanctuary is given the power to determine whether the design of invasive

research complies with the requirement to minimize pain and harm, and,

assuming that the Secretary determines that the other conditions are satisfied

(that is, that an exemption should be granted), the Secretary is bound by the

board’s determination unless it is arbitrary or capricious. In addition, the

Secretary’s determination about the board’s determination, as well as the

Secretary’s own determination about whether an exemption should be granted,

will be insulated from challenge unless it is can be demonstrated to be arbitrary

or capricious. Finally, the “retired” chimpanzees can be used without limit for

noninvasive behavioral studies or certain medical studies as long as only

“minimal physical and mental harm, pain, distress, and disturbance” are

involved, and there is no mechanism in the Act for review of this research.

In September 2002, the National Center for Research Resources of NIH

awarded the contract for the sanctuary to Chimp Haven, Inc., the board of

which includes several members who either are presently or who have been

involved with the use of nonhumans, including nonhuman primates, in

experiments.

The board of Chimp Haven will determine whether the design of

a proposed experiment on a “retired” chimpanzee minimizes physical and

50. See, e.g., Statement of GAP [The Great Ape Project], Nov. 29, 2000 (on file with author):

“Some major supporters of GAP choose to support the amended bill (Jane Goodall, Marc Bekoff,

Steve Wise), arguing that the sanctuary should be created and then we should fight with all our might if

someone attempts to remove a ‘retired’ chimpanzee.” I was unable to find any discussion of concern

about noninvasive behavioral research or medical studies.

51. 42 U.S.C. § 287a-3a(e).

52. For the announcement by the National Center on Research Resources of the award of the

contract to Chimp Haven, Inc., see http://www.ncrr.nih.gov/compmed/cm_chimp.asp (last visited Mar.

19, 2007). For information about Chimp Haven, Inc., including its board of directors, see

http://www.chimphaven.org/about-board.cfm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). Chimp Haven is apparently

facing financial difficulties. Melody Brumble, Chimp Haven Faces Money Problems, T

HE TIMES

(Shreveport, La.), Feb. 23, 2006, at 1A.

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22 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

mental harm, and that decision must be accorded deference by the Secretary

whose own decision about whether the board has acted properly, and whether

the research should be done at all, must also be accorded deference. In short,

decisions by the Secretary to allow invasive research on sanctuary chimpanzees

will be immune from any meaningful legal challenge, even if animal advocates

have standing to bring such a challenge. Although the Act contains a notice-

and-comment provision so the public can comment about proposed

experiments on chimpanzees in the sanctuary system, federal agencies are

notorious for ignoring the often considerable public objection to animal use in

experiments.

In sum, the CHIMP Act recognized that a “sanctuary” system—particularly

one financed in part by and effectively approved by animal advocates—is a

much cheaper way to house these animals and makes continued use of

chimpanzees in research more acceptable to the public. The system lowers the

cost for researchers of identifying the existence of animals with particular

medical histories, and “retired” animals can still be used for certain noninvasive

behavioral or medical studies, and for invasive research if there is a “public

health need.” The Act fits perfectly the model of welfarist legislation that I have

described in that it has nothing to do with recognizing the inherent value of

nonhumans and everything to do with economics and perpetuating animal use.

The Act did not move any distance at all from the property paradigm; indeed, it

reinforced the notion that chimpanzees are commodities and that animal-

welfare standards should be linked to the economically efficient exploitation of

those commodities.

2. State Legislation: Florida’s “Ban” on Gestation Crates

Many animal advocates see state law as a more fertile ground for welfarist

change than federal, but the results over the past years do not support that

view. Peter Singer characterizes the amendment in 2002 of the Florida

Constitution to “ban the keeping of pregnant sows in crates so narrow that they

cannot even turn around” as “[a]n even greater triumph” than the voluntary

changes in the handling and slaughter of animals used for food.

Animal

advocates, led by The Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), Farm

Sanctuary, and others, succeeded in getting nearly 700,000 signatures to put on

the ballot a proposal to ban what are known as “gestation crates.” Florida

voters approved the proposal, and the Florida Constitution now makes it a

53. Singer, supra note 10, at 26. In response to the question, “In your opinion, what has been the

most important victory for the animal movement?,” Singer responded that in addition to a campaign

against vivisection by the late animal-welfare advocate Henry Spira, he would:

also put the recent referendum victory on sow crates [gestation crates] in Florida very near the

top, because that was the first time that a major form of factory farming has been banned in

any state in America, and it showed that the public is on our side, when they have a chance to

vote on the kind of confinement that is standard in factory farms.

COK Talks with Peter Singer, C

OMPASSION OVER KILLING, http://www.cok.net/abol/15/06.php (last

visited Mar. 19, 2007).

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 23

misdemeanor to confine a pregnant pig in “an enclosure,” or to tether a

pregnant pig “in such a way that she is prevented from turning around freely.”

For a number of reasons, characterization of the Florida amendment as a

“triumph” demonstrates that the bar of progress is ridiculously low where

animal welfare measures are concerned. First, the campaign against gestation

crates, which began in Florida but is now being conducted in other states, is

based explicitly on economic considerations. Animal advocates promoted the

amendment as a way to keep larger, intensive hog operations out of Florida,

and thereby protect property values and tourism.

These advocates maintain, as

a general matter, that alternatives to the gestation crate, such as group housing,

will reduce production costs and increase productivity.

Second, there were

only two hog farmers in the state of Florida who were affected by the

amendment, and there was almost no opposition to the amendment.

On the

other hand, large animal-advocacy organizations spent well more than $1

million on the campaign.

Third, the amendment defines “enclosure” as “any

cage, crate or other enclosure in which a pig is kept for all or the majority of any

day,”

and this would presumably mean that the use of a gestation crate for less

than the majority of a day would not be prohibited. Fourth, the amendment

explicitly allows the use of the gestation crate for “prebirthing period,” which is

54. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 21(a). The amendment takes effect in 2008. See id. § 21(g) (effective six

years after approval by voters).

55. According to Floridians for Humane Farms, the Amendment “will prevent mega hog factories

from moving into Florida as they have in North Carolina. We don’t want Florida to follow North

Carolina’s experience where the environment has been damaged, property values have gone down, and

the tourist industry has suffered.” Floridians for Humane Farms, http://www.bancruelfarms.org/

faq_print.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).

56. The Humane Society of the United States, which, with Farm Sanctuary, is promoting the

prohibition of gestation crates in other states, focuses heavily on the economic argument, and maintains

that European studies demonstrate that sows raised in group housing with electronic sow feeding are

generally more healthy, sow productivity is higher, and production costs are lower. T

HE HUMANE

SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, AN HSUS REPORT: THE ECONOMICS OF ADOPTING

ALTERNATIVE PRODUCTION SYSTEMS TO GESTATION CRATES (2006) [hereinafter HSUS REPORT:

GESTATION CRATES], available at http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/farm/econ_gestation.pdf. A

similar proposal on crates for sows, also applicable to calves, was passed in Arizona in November 2006,

and Smithfield Foods stated in January 2007 that it would phase out gestation crates over a ten-year

period. See The Humane Society of the United States Praises Smithfield Move to End Confinement of

Pigs in Gestation Crates, U.S.

NEWSWIRE, Jan. 25, 2007, http://news.corporate.findlaw.com/prnewswire/

20070125/25jan20071000.html. Time constraints and editorial deadlines made it impossible to discuss

these developments in this article, but they do not in any way affect my view that welfare reforms are

generally linked to the efficient exploitation of animals.

57. The only two Florida hog farms that used gestation crates sent their animals to slaughter and

closed their hog operations. Both could be eligible for state grants of up to $275,000. Allison North

Jones, State Hog Farmers Receive a Bailout from Lawmakers, T

AMPA TRIB., May 14, 2005, at Metro 1.

58. Curtis Krueger, 1.2-Million Greases Path of Pig Proposal, S

T. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 13,

2002, at 1B. The Florida Elections Commission charged Farm Sanctuary and its president, Gene

Bauston, with 210 violations of Florida law for collecting “thousands of dollars in donations and

funnel[ing] them to the amendment campaign, violating a law that requires that the names of all

contributors be disclosed.” See Lucy Morgan, Panel Says Pig Proposal Backers Broke Election Law, S

PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 30, 2002, at 5B.

59. F

LA. CONST. art. X, § 21(c)(1). This is significant because some producers are moving toward a

modified system in which pregnant sows will be confined for part of the day.

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24 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

defined as “the seven day period prior to a pig’s expected date of giving birth,”

and allows for the use of crates for “veterinary purposes” for a period “not

longer than reasonably necessary.”

Like the “unnecessary suffering” language

discussed earlier, any legal standard concerning nonhumans that allows an

action to be done if, or as long as, “reasonably necessary” is an invitation to

ignore relevant animal interests. Fifth, although advocates suggested that the

amendment would likely result in any affected pigs being raised in group

housing systems,

the amendment provides only that the pig must be able to

turn around “without having to touch any side of the pig’s enclosure”

and not

that the pig must be kept in group housing. Sixth, the amendment served as the

“poster child” for a successful campaign to require a supermajority to amend

the Florida Constitution and thereby restrict such initiatives in the future.

The Florida amendment may have been a fund-raising “triumph” for animal

organizations that claim it as a victory. But the amendment and similar efforts

do little to help animals and, indeed, are counterproductive. HSUS claims that

farmers who adopt alternatives to the gestation crates can not only increase

productivity and decrease production costs, but can “increase demand for their

products or earn a market premium.”

Making exploitation more efficient and

increasing demand for meat have nothing to do with recognizing the inherent

value of animals or doing anything other than treating animals strictly as

economic commodities.

3. State Legislation: California’s Foie Gras “Ban”

The state law that has elicited the most enthusiastic response from animal

advocates, however, was passed in California. In 2004, Governor

Schwarzenegger signed into law Senate Bill 1520, which nominally prohibits the

force feeding of birds to produce foie gras

and the sale of products that are the

“result of force feeding a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird’s liver

beyond normal size.”

Senate Bill 1520, characterized as “an ‘unprecedented

60. Id. § 21(b)(2), (c)(6).

61. Id. § 21(b)(1).

62. See, e.g., Ban Cruel Farms, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.bancruelfarms.org/

faq_print.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2007) (“In European countries where similar legislation has been

enacted, pig farmers have generally gone to a group housing system where the sows are kept together

in more spacious conditions.”).

63. F

LA. CONST. art. X, § 21(c)(5).

64. Etan Horowitz, Amending Constitution Polarizes Sides, O

RLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 4, 2006, at

B1. Supporters of the amendment offered as “[t]heir poster child: a $1.6 million campaign by animal-

rights groups in 2002 that won passage of an amendment preventing the caging of pregnant pigs, an

amendment that affected only two farmers in the state.” Id. The supermajority amendment was

approved by voters on November 7, 2006. Howard Troxler, Stop Us Before We Amend Again!, S

PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 8, 2006, at 8A. The first line of the article reads: “It must have been the

pregnant pigs that did it.” Id.

65. HSUS

REPORT: GESTATION CRATES, supra note 56, at 2.

66. C

AL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25980–84. (Deering 2005).

67. Id. § 25982. Some animal advocates have claimed that consumption of foie gras in California

will be prohibited after July 1, 2012. This claim is unwarranted. Californians will still be able to

purchase foie gras from sellers outside of California for personal use but may not resell it within the

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 25

victory for animals,’”

was supported by most of the large animal-advocacy

groups and by numerous celebrities.

The California law is one of the few instances in which animal welfare is not

linked explicitly to economic concerns. That is, the law does not seek to make

exploitation more “humane” incidental to making it more beneficial

economically through lowering costs or increasing productivity. Although foie

gras certainly involves the barbarous treatment of animals, so does most of our

other animal food. Foie gras is unusual because it is not part of domestic food

culture; indeed, it is associated with France, toward which many Americans are

hostile as the result of various political differences. It is produced in the United

States by only two companies, and is consumed by the relatively few people

who can afford it and regard it as a desirable luxury. Foie gras is analogous in

certain respects to bullfighting, which is no more barbaric than rodeos or some

other, more traditionally American, forms of animal “entertainment,” but,

because fois gras is a “foreign” form of exploitation, can inspire passionate

opposition.

Although Senate Bill 1520 may arguably be said to recognize that at least

some animals have more than extrinsic or conditional value, there are a number

of reasons why the law is more properly characterized as a victory for

California’s only foie gras producer, Sonoma Foie Gras. First, the law does not

take effect until July 1, 2012, and it explicitly provides that this date reflects “the

express intention of the Legislature . . . to allow a seven and one-half year

period for persons or entities engaged in agricultural practices that include

raising and selling force fed birds to modify their business practices.”

transmitting the signed bill to the Senate, Governor Schwarzenegger stated:

This bill provides [seven] and one half years for agricultural husbandry practices to evolve

and perfect a humane way for a duck to consume grain to increase the size of its liver

through natural processes. If agricultural producers are successful in this endeavor, the ban

on foie gras sales and production in California will not occur.

state. Restaurants may be able to continue to serve foie gras if it is served as a “chef’s gift” with a meal

and is not sold. The legislation has no effect on the production, marketing, or consumption of liver from

birds who have not been force fed.

68. 2004 Legislative Review, 11

ANIMAL L. 325, 360 (2005) (quoting HSUS sources).

69. Andrew Gumbel & John Lichfield, An Ending Made in Hollywood for an Epic Fight Over Foie

Gras; The Headlines Proclaim That Arnold Schwarzenegger Has Saved the Geese, T

HE INDEPENDENT

(LONDON), Oct. 1, 2004, at 12.

70. See, e.g., Justin Berton, When All Else Fails, Throw Your Muleta at the Bull and Run, S.F.

CHRON., June 18, 2006, at A1 (describing the experience of Americans at a bullfighting school in

California). Another example of this phenomenon involves animal sacrifices. Practitioners of a

Caribbean religion known as Santeria—usually immigrants and people of color—have been prosecuted

for conducting ritual animal sacrifice as part of their religion. Animal sacrifice, although quite horrific,

is really no different from what goes on at a federally regulated slaughterhouse. See F

RANCIONE, supra

note 2, at 163–64 (discussing prohibitions of particular practices associated with other cultures or

certain socioeconomic groups).

71. C

AL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25984(a), (c) (Deering 2005).

72. Governor’s Message to the California State Senate on Signing Cal. S.B. 1520 (Sept. 29, 2004),

available at LEXIS, 2003 Legis. Bill Hist. CA S.B. 1520.

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26 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

Second, the law explicitly provides that Sonoma Foie Gras is immunized

until July 1, 2012, from civil or criminal lawsuits concerning the practice of force

feeding or sale of products resulting from that practice, and that any pending

civil action against Sonoma concerning the practice of force feeding shall not

proceed.

This immunity has the practical effect of legalizing force feeding until

2012, although the status of that practice was in question at the time the law was

passed.

Third, the owner of Sonoma Foie Gras, Guillermo Gonzalez, actually

supported the law and lobbied for its passage. He stated that “‘[w]e will go on

with our business’” and “‘[w]e supported this bill and thank the governor and

the legislature for their very serious consideration and deliberation.’”

Gonzalez “professed to welcome the measure, which grants him immunity from

lawsuits, and gives him seven and a half years, in the governor’s words, ‘for

animal husbandry practices to evolve’ and to ‘perfect a humane way for a duck

to consume grain to increase the size of its liver through natural processes.’”

But Gonzalez also “hopes to use the reprieve to prove the ducks do not suffer”

and he will “work with scientists and scholars to find ‘clear, unbiased answers

on the question of the welfare of the ducks,’ including stress tests.”

Mr.

Gonzalez claims to have already identified animal scientists who maintain that

force feeding does not cause animals to suffer.

Further,

[t]he University of California-Davis has been working behind the scenes with the

governor’s office to put a plan into place that would allow the university’s animal

science department and the veterinary medicine school to conduct research to

73. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25984(b)(1), provides that “[n]o civil or criminal cause of

action shall arise on or after January 1, 2005, nor shall a pending action commenced prior to January 1,

2005, be pursued under any provision of law against a person or entity for engaging, prior to July 1,

2012, in any act prohibited by this chapter.” Section 25984(b)(3) provides that this immunity applies

only “to persons or entities who were engaged in, or controlled by persons or entities who were

engaged in, agricultural practices that involved force feeding birds at the time of the enactment of this

chapter.” Sonoma Foie Gras was the only producer of foie gras involved in the force feeding of birds at

the time that the law was enacted. See Gumbel & Lichfield, supra note 69. “Until 2012, meanwhile,

Sonoma Foie Gras will be immune from all lawsuits—two of which had been pending before the courts

but will now be dropped.” Id.

When Governor Schwarzenegger signed Senate Bill 1520 into law, a number of animal advocacy

groups announced the signing as a victory for animals, and not one that I saw mentioned that any

pending civil action against Sonoma would be dismissed and that Sonoma was immunized from civil

and criminal action until 2012. For example, Farm Sanctuary, an organization that sponsored the

legislation, omitted any reference to these crucial facts. See NoFoieGras.org, Schwarzenegger

Terminates Form of Animal Cruelty, http://nofoiegras.org/FS_cabill_PR2.htm (last visited Apr. 1,

2007).

74. Gumbel & Lichfield, supra note 69 (quoting Guillermo Gonzalez).

75. Brown, supra note 25.

76. Gabrielle Banks, Duck Farm Is on Capitol Agenda; The Owner’s Production of Foie Gras is the

Focus of Legislation That Would Ban Force-Feeding of the Birds, Decried as Cruel, L.A.

TIMES, July 7,

2004, at B1.

77. Brown, supra note 25.

78. Id.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 27

determine whether foie gras production is humane. If the research indicates that the

process is humane, it could be used as ammunition to challenge the law.

Moreover, the California legislature may well repeal the law or modify it to

allow force feeding with specially designed equipment or accompanied by the

use of drugs that supposedly mitigate any suffering if the legislature determines

that such changes make the practice “humane.” Given that the legislature

expressed its intention to delay the effective date of the law precisely to allow

those involved in force feeding birds “to modify their business practices,” such

an outcome seems more likely than not.

Senate Bill 1520 provides an excellent example of why animal-welfare

legislation is so problematic. This law requires the dismissal of pending

litigation and effectively insulates the industry completely at least until 2012

although the prohibition is unlikely ever to come into effect in any event. In the

meantime, researchers will use animals in painful experiments in order to

determine whether force feeding is “humane” or to develop a way to get

enlarged liver through “natural processes.” If by some miracle the law does

come into effect in 2012, these birds will still be able to be raised intensively and

slaughtered. Although they may not have tubes shoved down their throats, their

livers will be enlarged in some way determined to be “natural,” or about which

there will be litigation for years, and the birds will continue to live bleak lives.

Moreover, this sort of law deludes people into thinking that animal welfare

works, that things are getting significantly better for nonhumans whom we

exploit for food, and that we can “consume with conscience.”

The California foie gras law was such a victory for Sonoma Foie Gras that

the only other domestic producer of foie gras, Hudson Valley Foie Gras, in

upstate New York, is seeking to have a similar law passed in New York that

would provide complete immunity from any criminal prosecution or civil action

through 2016 for force feeding birds.

C. Legal Standing: Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman

As far as judicial decisions are concerned, animal advocates have stated that

Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman provides broad standing to sue to

“enforce the Animal Welfare Act.”

It is, however, more accurate to

79. Carolyn Jung, Study Could Disrupt Planned Foie Gras Ban, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct.

27, 2004, at 1F.

80. See Brown, supra note 25.

81. Lawrence Downes, Face to Face With the Foie Gras Problem, N.Y.

TIMES, June 26, 2005, at 11:

“One Senate sponsor, John Bonacic, is an upstate Republican who says he has no special sympathy for

ducks or geese, despite what his bill says. He says he wants only to help a Sullivan County constituent—

Hudson Valley Foie Gras, the nation’s leading producer of fresh foie gras, which has not only lobbied

for the bill, but also helped to write it.”

82. 154 F.3d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc).

83. The Legal Status of Nonhuman Animals, 8 A

NIMAL L. 1, 3–4 (2002) (comment by David

Favre). See also Favre, supra note 7, at 95 (claiming that Glickman held that there was standing “to

question the decisions of a federal agency” concerning animals). Favre is a national officer of the

Animal Legal Defense Fund.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

28 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

characterize the case as providing a “small window for standing”

in certain

limited situations.

In Glickman, an animal advocate claimed that he suffered aesthetic injury

when he visited a game farm and saw nonhuman primates in what he regarded

as inhumane conditions. He argued that if the United States Department of

Agriculture (USDA), which enforces the Animal Welfare Act, had

promulgated appropriate regulations as required under the 1985 Amendments

to the Act,

the animals would not have been in these conditions. An en banc

D.C. Circuit held that the advocate had standing to challenge the failure of

USDA to promulgate regulations to establish minimum requirements for a

physical environment that would promote the psychological well-being of

primates.

The plaintiff did not appeal the portion of the lower-court ruling which held

that agency decisions to enforce the Animal Welfare Act were generally not

reviewable by courts as such decisions were committed to the discretion of the

agency.

The appellate court holding was limited only to whether the advocate

was standing to challenge the failure of the agency to promulgate regulations as

required under the Act. Therefore, assertions that Glickman established

standing to enforce the Act are not correct.

Moreover, the appellate court explicitly distinguished the situation of the

game farm from the use of primates or other animals in experiments because, in

the latter situation, Congress had explicitly provided for oversight in the form of

an animal-care committee with “private citizen members.”

Therefore, claims

by animal advocates that Glickman provided for standing to challenge the use

of animals in experiments are unfounded.

Finally, en banc consideration was limited to the question of the standing of

the individual advocate, and the court left for a future panel of the court review

of the trial court’s finding that the agency did violate the Act by failing to

promulgate adequate regulations. A subsequent panel of the Court of Appeals

considered the claim on the merits and held that the standards that were

promulgated by USDA, which in essence delegated the development of

standards to on-site veterinarians employed by the dealers, research facilities,

and exhibitors covered by the Act, were sufficient.

In sum, it is inaccurate to characterize Glickman as anything more than a

narrow decision based only on the aesthetic interests of the plaintiff and not the

interests of nonhumans, in a situation in which Congress had not provided other

84. Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man’s and Woman’s Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of

Companion Animals, 86 M

ARQ. L. REV. 47, 81 (2002).

85. 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a)(2)(B) (2000).

86. Glickman, 154 F.3d at 431 n.3.

87. Id. at 445.

88. Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 204 F.3d 229 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The appellate

court reversed a trial court decision, Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 943 F. Supp. 44

(D.D.C. 1996), which held that the USDA had not promulgated the regulations required by the Animal

Welfare Act.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 29

oversight mechanisms. Moreover, the subsequent litigation made clear that

regulations that provide no meaningful protection for animal interests will

suffice.

D. Additional Failures of the Welfarist Approach

The foregoing is not intended to be a complete survey of all developments

that have occurred in the past dozen years. Rather, it focuses on what most

animal advocates regard as the most significant advances during that period.

There certainly have been some minor successes, particularly at the state level.

For example, many states have now made felonies of at least some violations of

state anticruelty laws,

and a number of states have increased penalties and

closed loopholes concerning animal fighting.

But given the amount of time,

energy, and money that has been expended by the animal-protection

movement, a complete lack of success would be as shocking as what animal

advocates appear to regard as major victories. Moreover, anticruelty laws affect

a relatively small number of nonhumans, and animal fighting is one of the very

few activities that we have historically been willing to prohibit. The brutal

Hegins Pigeon Shoot, where thousands of pigeons were killed and wounded in a

carnival-like setting every Labor Day in Hegins, Pennsylvania, which had for

many years been the target of protests by animal advocates, was stopped by its

organizers, but live bird shoots continue throughout Pennsylvania.

There have been, however, no major success stories. Fur was a major target

of animal organizations throughout the 1990s. Peter Singer claims that, as the

result of efforts of animal advocates, the fur industry has been damaged and has

not recovered.

Singer’s claim is unfounded. Although fur sales in the United

States fell in the 1990s to a reported $1 billion, “[s]ince 1999, sales have climbed

steadily, reaching a record $1.8 billion in 2003.”

The sale of furs “jumped to

$11.3 billion worldwide in 2002, from $8.1 billion in 1998.”

There has been a

dramatic increase in the number of stores carrying fur and the number of

designers using fur combined with a significant drop in the average age of fur

buyers.

“In 2004, a Gallup poll found that 63 percent of respondents

89. Stephan K. Otto, State Animal Protection Laws—The Next Generation, 11 ANIMAL L. 131, 134-

38 (2005). See also F

RANCIONE, supra note 2, at 68 (discussing whether this change will make any

difference given the scope of application of anticruelty laws, the mens rea requirement, and the general

reluctance to prosecute anticruelty cases); infra notes 174–78 and accompanying text (discussing

anticruelty laws generally).

90. 2004 Legislative Review, supra note 68, at 351–54 (2005).

91. Ian Urbina, Animal Lovers See an Interstate Trade in Moving Targets, N.Y.

TIMES, June 10,

2004, at B1. For a description of the Hegins event, see F

RANCIONE, supra note 1, at xiii–xv.

92. Singer, supra note 10, at 25.

93. Julie Scelfo, Real Fur Is Fun Again, N

EWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 2004, at 48.

94. Lizette Alvarez, ‘New Fur’ Doesn’t Look as if It Ever Kept a Mink Warm, N.Y.

TIMES, Oct. 15,

2004, at A4.

95. Wendy Navratil, Fur’s Hot Again; The Animal-Rights Message Has Skipped a Generation, C

HI.

TRIB. Jan. 18, 2004, at Q1.

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30 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

pronounced the buying and wearing of clothing made with animal fur ‘morally

acceptable.’”

The failure of the anti-fur campaign presents a case study in the failure of

welfarist strategy. Even advocacy organizations that purport to oppose all fur

garments, including those made from “ranch-raised” animals, have routinely

focused on the fur of certain animals, such as dogs and cats, or seals, as

somehow morally distinguishable from the fur of other nonhumans.

This

nonsensical distinction, combined with the general failure of the movement to

confront squarely that clothing made from other animal parts, such as leather

and wool, is no less morally problematic than fur, has understandably made

many people conclude that the campaign against fur is arbitrary. Finally,

PETA’s continued use of sexist campaigns to oppose fur (and other animal

uses) has alienated many progressives and has trivialized the issue of fur in

particular and animal exploitation in general.

There have been a considerable number of instances in which animal

advocates have failed to get even modest and ostensibly uncontroversial

legislative changes. For example, attempts starting in 1975 to get a federal ban

on leghold traps, which are prohibited or seriously restricted in only a handful

of states, have been unsuccessful even though these traps are illegal in

approximately ninety countries.

Attempts to pass a federal law to provide for

the immediate and “humane” euthanasia of non-ambulatory, or “downed”

animals, have been unsuccessful.

100

Efforts by legislators to ban shooting animals

in enclosed areas, or “canned hunts,” have been unsuccessful on the federal

level, and only about half the states have laws that prohibit or regulate this

activity even though many hunting groups regard these captive “hunts” as

unsporting.

101

Despite decades of protests and boycotts by animal advocates, the

Canadian seal cull continues, and the Canadian “government announced in

2003 a three-year total allowable catch of 975,000 animals.”

102

96. Rob Walker, The Way We Live Now: Consumed; Pelt Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at 30.

97. For example, both PETA, FurIsDead.com, China's Shocking Dog and Cat Fur Trade,

http://www.furisdead.com/feat-dogcatfur.asp (last visited Mar. 19, 2007), and HSUS, Dog and Cat

Victims of the Fur Trade, http://www.hsus.org/furfree/dogs_cats/dog_and_cat_victims.html (last visited

Mar. 19, 2007), recommend that consumers purchase no fur products, but have campaigns that focus on

dog and cat fur. See infra note 102 on the seal campaign.

98. I have often discussed PETA’s use of sexism in campaigns. See, e.g., F

RANCIONE, supra note 3,

at 74–76.

99. 2003 Legislative Review, 10 A

NIMAL L. 363, 364–67 (2004).

100. Id. at 367–70.

101. 2002 Legislative Review, 9 A

NIMAL L. 331, 338–40 (2003).

102. Canadian Press, Eyes of World on Seal Hunt That Starts Tomorrow, G

UELPH MERCURY, Mar.

24, 2006, at A6. A number of animal-advocacy organizations, including HSUS, have formed a coalition,

the ProtectSeals Network, to end the seal slaughter through a boycott of Canadian seafood. The

Network urges those opposed to the seal slaughter to sign a pledge “not to buy Canadian seafood

products such as snow crab, cod, scallops, and shrimp until Canada ends its commercial seal hunt for

good.” The petition may be found at https://community.hsus.org/campaign/protectseals (last visited

Mar. 19, 2007). This suggests, of course, that sea animals have a different moral status than do seals,

and implies that it is acceptable to eat Canadian seafood as soon as the commercial seal hunt ends.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 31

This article does not discuss the myriad instances in which there were new

laws that actually have moved the animal-welfare agenda backward and have

sought to strengthen or expand animal exploitation in various respects. For

example, a number of states are strengthening protections for hunters and

preempting restrictions on hunting through amendments to make hunting a

constitutional right.

103

There are, however, two examples involving the primary

federal animal-welfare laws—the federal Animal Welfare Act and the federal

Humane Slaughter Act—that demonstrate just how ineffective animal-welfare

legislation is and thus deserve special mention.

The first example involves the application of the federal Animal Welfare

Act

104

to rats, mice, and birds—approximately ninety percent of the animals

used in laboratories. In 1970, Congress amended the Act to define “animal” to

include “any live or dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate mammal),

guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal, as the

Secretary [of Agriculture] may determine is being used, or is intended for use,

for research, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes, or as a pet.”

105

The Secretary consistently refused to determine that rats, mice, and birds were

used for research or were pets, and for thirty years, animal advocates tried in a

variety of ways to challenge this exclusion by the Secretary. In 2002, after the

Secretary agreed to a regulation that would include rats, mice, and birds,

Congress amended the Act to explicitly exclude rats, mice, and birds bred for

use in research,

106

thus ending one of the longest campaigns in the history of the

animal-protection movement and establishing that the minimal provisions of

the Act do not apply to the overwhelming percentage of nonhumans used in

biomedical research in the United States.

103. 2003 Legislative Review, supra note 99, at 378–82 (2004).

104. See supra note 27. Singer acknowledges that it is not possible to know the number of animals

used in experiments in the United States, but he claims that estimates “suggest a similar story” of

significant decline as in Britain. Singer, supra note 10, at 25. Putting aside the validity of this claim as

applied to Britain, see note 10 supra, it is unclear how Singer can make such a claim about the United

States since rats, mice, and birds, which account for over ninety percent of the nonhumans used in the

United States, are not covered by the Animal Welfare Act and their numbers are not reported.

Therefore, no one knows the number of animals used. Government statistics on the relatively small

numbers of animals covered by the Act indicate that animal use has decreased somewhat but not in the

dramatic way Singer suggests. See, e.g., USDA,

ANIMAL WELFARE REP. FISCAL YEAR 2004, at 10

(2004), available at http://www.aphis.usda.gov/ac/awreports/awreport2004.pdf.

105. Animal Welfare Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-579, 84 Stat. 1560, 1561 (codified as amended at 7

U.S.C. § 2132(g) (2000)).

106. The exclusion of rats, mice, and birds from the definition of “animal” in the Animal Welfare

Act was included as title X, subtitle D, section 10301, of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of

2002, Pub. L. No. 107–171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002). The exclusion is now codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2132(g)

(2002). All vertebrate animals used in activities conducted or supported by the Public Health Service

(PHS) are regulated in accordance with PHS policy.

See OFFICE OF LABORATORY ANIMAL WELFARE,

NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE POLICY ON HUMANE CARE AND USE

LABORATORY ANIMALS 8 (2002)

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

32 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

The second example involves the other major centerpiece of animal welfare,

the federal Humane Slaughter Act.

107

In 2001, The Washington Post published a

story exposing widespread serious violations of the Act in slaughterhouses

across the country.

108

This report, which discussed incidents such as the skinning

and dismemberment of animals who were still alive, made clear that the Act

was doing little to alleviate the suffering of nonhumans being slaughtered and

that the USDA was not enforcing the Act. The response was a resolution

stating that it is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Agriculture should

enforce the Act and “prevent needless suffering.”

109

It is unclear which is more

disturbing—the meaningless congressional response, or the reaction of the

animal-protection community that the resolution is meaningful coupled with the

persistent belief of many animal advocates that the Humane Slaughter Act is a

significant piece of legislation in the first place.

III

ROPERTY: STRUCTURAL LIMITS ON THE PROTECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF

NONHUMANS

We could, of course, treat animals better than we do even if they retained

their status as our property. For instance, the treatment of animals in certain

European countries may be marginally better than it is in the United States,

although animals have property status in those countries as well.

110

But it is

important to understand that the property paradigm presents important

structural and practical limitations on the human–animal relationship.

Moreover, if we do accord protection to animal interests beyond what is

required to be protected in order to facilitate their exploitation in a cost-

107. See supra note 4. The United States Department of Agriculture, which enforces the Humane

Slaughter Act, interprets the Act to exclude poultry, which account for the largest number of animals

slaughtered for food. See 9 C.F.R. §§ 313.1–.90 (2006). The exclusion of poultry under the Humane

Slaughter Act parallels the exclusion of rats and mice under the Animal Welfare Act (although rats and

mice are covered under other federal laws). See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text. Animal

advocates, led by HSUS, filed a lawsuit over the USDA’s exclusion of poultry. See Elizabeth

Williamson, Humane Society to Sue Over Poultry Slaughtering; Suit Demands That Birds Be Killed or

Rendered Unconscious Before Butchering, W

ASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2005, at B02. HSUS argues that the

present system of stunning poultry in an electrified water bath causes illness in humans through fecal

contamination and increases injuries to slaughterhouse workers. The alternative proposed by HSUS is

“controlled atmospheric killing,” or gassing, of poultry. According to HSUS, this alternative “results in

cost savings and increased revenues by decreasing carcass downgrades, contamination, and

refrigeration costs; increasing meat yields, quality, and shelf life; and improving worker conditions” and

“can improve worker conditions and safety, decreasing labor costs due to production line inefficiencies,

injuries, and turnover from handling conscious birds.” T

HE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED

STATES, AN HSUS REPORT: THE ECONOMICS OF ADOPTING ALTERNATIVE PRODUCTION

PRACTICES TO ELECTRICAL STUNNING SLAUGHTER OF POULTRY 2 (2006), available at

http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/farm/econ_elecstun.pdf.

108. Joby Warrick, ‘They Die Piece by Piece’; In Overtaxed Plants, Humane Treatment of Cattle Is

Often a Battle Lost, W

ASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2001, at A01.

109. The resolution on “humane” slaughter was included as title X, subtitle D, section 10305 of the

Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002).

110. See supra note 10.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 33

effective manner, that may in a formal sense represent a diminution of the

property status of the nonhuman, but it would not necessarily represent a

recognition of the inherent value of nonhumans or be a step in the direction of

recognizing the right of a nonhuman not to be treated as the property of

humans.

111

Also, such additional protection, like animal-welfare measures

generally, may perpetuate and even increase animal exploitation by making

people feel better about supposedly more “humane” animal exploitation.

In discussing my views on animals as property, Professor Cass Sunstein

claims that there is nothing inherent in property status that limits the

protections that we can provide to animals and that property ownership is

limited in all sorts of ways. He notes:

You own your house, but you are probably not allowed to burn it down or blow it up,

or to use it as a concert hall. You own your stereo, but if you have nearby neighbors

you cannot play music as loud as you want. In most domains, the rights of “owners”

are severely qualified.

112

Sunstein argues that “the status of ‘owner’ is not incompatible, in principle, with

a firm commitment to preventing the unnecessary suffering of animals or even

with treating animals as beings with both legal rights and intrinsic value.”

113

claims that “[t]he fact of ownership even protects animals in important ways”

through the duties imposed by animal-welfare laws.

114

He argues that we should

seek to ban and to restrict “the most indefensible practices” concerning

nonhumans.

115

Sunstein’s position is problematic in several respects.

116

111. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 190–219 (discussing welfarist changes that may represent

incremental eradication of the property status of nonhumans); see also infra notes 132–55 and

accompanying text (discussing new welfarism and incremental change, including whether changes result

in change in property status).

112. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 44.

113. Id. Similarly, David Favre argues that “[i]t is an incorrect legal analysis that the interests of

animals cannot be accommodated within the legal system if they remain legal property.” Favre, supra

note 7, at 91. He states that we can accord animals “the legal respect that they deserve,” id., “by

dividing the concept of title into legal and equitable categories and then awarding the equitable title to

the animal.” Id. at n.11. Putting aside the lack of clarity of the expression “the legal respect that they

deserve,” there are at least three responses to Favre’s proposal. First, however Favre wants to

characterize it, what he is doing is proposing limits on property ownership. It is not clear why he thinks

that going about this limitation in the rather peculiar way that he proposes will be any more socially or

legally acceptable than would the conceptually more simple prohibitions on the use of animals that are

presently available and largely rejected. Second, to the extent that the rights of “equitably self-owned”

nonhumans will be shaped by anticruelty laws, as Favre proposes, nonhumans will receive little

protection because anticruelty laws provide almost no protection to animals. Third, Favre also suggests

that the human–nonhuman relationship be modeled on the parent–child relationship, which does not

address anything more than the relationship that humans have with companion animals and would have

no application to nonhumans used in other contexts.

114. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 44. Sunstein once again finds an ally in David Favre. See David Favre,

Equitable Self-Ownership for Animals, 50 D

UKE L.J. 473, 495 (2000) (“Under our present system, full

responsibility comes with ownership.”). See infra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing the

“benefit” that nonhumans receive from property status).

115. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 43.

116. For a further discussion of Sunstein’s views, see Gary L. Francione, Equal Consideration and

the Interest of Nonhuman Animals in Continued Existence: A Response to Professor Sunstein, 2006 U.

CHI. LEGAL F. 231.

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34 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

A. Animal Property and Animal Interests

Sunstein is, of course, correct to say that property ownership is qualified and

limited, but he ignores certain aspects of property theory and the distinction

between property and persons, which make his comments inapplicable to

animal property. Although there are limitations on how we use our property,

those limits are imposed to benefit other persons (natural or corporate); they

are not imposed for the benefit of the property itself. It is true that I cannot

burn my house down or blast my stereo so that it disturbs my neighbors. But

that is because we are concerned about the effect of my actions on other

persons—others who may be in or near my house when I set it ablaze or my

neighbors, who might be trying to sleep. Prohibitions on the destruction of

landmarks are not imposed for the benefit of the property involved but to

protect human interests in the enjoyment of that property.

Sunstein is also correct to note that “current law forbids people from

treating animals however they wish to treat them.”

117

But he overemphasizes the

extent to which the law regulates our treatment of animals. Although the law

requires that I provide food and shelter to my dog, there is nothing to stop me

from beating her on a regular basis to train her as a guard dog or to discipline

her, or from keeping her on a chain in the back yard and never having contact

with her, or from taking her to a veterinarian and having her “put to sleep” for

no reason other than that I no longer want her. Indeed, I can as a general

matter kill her myself as long as I do so in a “humane” way and as long as I do

not violate other laws and regulations that are not in any way concerned with

the welfare of the dog, such as local prohibitions on slaughtering animals in

multi-family dwellings or discharging firearms in particular places. I have an

obligation to provide food and water to the animals whom I keep on my farm,

but I may keep them in confined conditions and perform a number of

procedures on them that are very painful.

Sunstein also fails to appreciate the limiting principle that animates the legal

regulations that do exist. To the extent that the law applies (and many animal

uses are exempt from regulation) and recognizes that certain animal interests

must be protected, that protection is, for the most part, limited to ensuring that

the animal can be exploited for a particular purpose. In order for us to exploit

animals, we must provide some minimal protection for their interests so that

they can serve the purposes for which we are using them. The law allows me to

treat a dog that I use as a guard animal very badly, but I cannot (at least in

theory) starve her to death. I am legally obligated to provide a minimal level of

care to her, but not much more than is required to keep her alive so that she can

serve that purpose. If I do not provide minimal sustenance and veterinary care

to my cows and pigs, they will die prematurely and their corpses will not be

suited to be sold as meat. If I do not provide adequate food or water to a

laboratory animal, and the experiment does not call for starvation or

117. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 44.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 35

dehydration (as some do), then I have introduced a variable that may result in

invalid scientific data. Given that we allow researchers to conduct starvation

and dehydration experiments on nonhumans, a requirement that animals

exploited in laboratories receive food and water has nothing to do with

recognizing that animals have inherent value or that their interests have moral

significance. The standards of animal welfare are more concerned with

recognizing that if we want to exploit animals in particular ways we have no

choice but to provide at least some protection for their interests.

B. Animal Property and “Unnecessary” Suffering

Sunstein argues that the status of animals as property is not inconsistent

with a commitment to prevent “unnecessary” suffering and that we ought to

prohibit or ban “the most indefensible practices.” The problem is that Sunstein

does not—and, indeed, cannot—provide a coherent theory of what constitutes

“unnecessary” suffering and what is an “indefensible” practice. A central point

of my argument that Sunstein and other critics fail to address is that most of our

uses of animals cannot plausibly be described as “necessary” and that these uses

per se are, indeed, morally indefensible irrespective of whether we treat animals

“humanely.”

118

We do not need to eat animals, wear animals, or use animals for

entertainment purposes, and our only defense of these uses is our pleasure,

amusement, and convenience.

119

Any suffering that we impose on animals

incidental to these uses is “unnecessary” and “indefensible.”

Sunstein does not agree with my position that we should all adopt a vegan

lifestyle and stop eating or using all animal products. Rather, he argues that we

should not inflict more suffering than is necessary given the unnecessary uses of

animals. It is difficult to understand how this can mean anything more than that

we ought not to inflict gratuitous suffering on animals. But no one would

disagree with that position; indeed, generally this is all that is required under

animal-welfare laws. Sunstein appears to believe that the law presently gives

animals “rights” because it prohibits the infliction of “unnecessary” suffering

118. Robert Garner argues that the welfarist approach is

not trying to show that the use of animals is morally wrong regardless of the benefits to

humans. Rather, the movement is trying to show that most, if not all, of the cruel and harmful

techniques currently employed on animals are unnecessary in the sense that they do not

produce human benefits or that such benefits can be achieved in other ways.

Robert Garner, Animal Welfare: A Political Defense, 1 J.

ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 161, 167 (2006). Garner

claims that I accept this analysis, id., and that it is “somewhat ironic” that I do so given my criticism of

Garner’s defense of welfarism. G

ARNER, supra note 7, at 41 n.2. Garner fails to understand that my

discussion of necessity concerns animal use per se and not the treatment of animals, which, as Garner

correctly notes, is the focus of the welfarist approach. See F

RANCIONE, supra note 2, at 1–49.

119. It may be argued that the use of nonhumans in experiments to find cures for serious human

illnesses is not trivial in the same way as our other uses of animals. Necessity claims are suspect in this

context as well, and I maintain that animal use cannot be justified morally even if it is necessary in some

sense. See Gary L. Francione, The Use of Nonhuman Animals in Biomedical Research: Necessity and

Justification, 35 J.L.

MED. & ETHICS 241 (2007).

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

36 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

and requires “humane” treatment.

120

A right to “humane” treatment and to be

free from “unnecessary” suffering is no “right” at all in that it prohibits only

those actions that do not benefit humans and would, in any event, not be

committed by rational property owners.

121

To the extent that Sunstein wants to go beyond prohibiting gratuitous

suffering, which no one defends, it is difficult to understand how he can regard

suffering incidental to efficient exploitation as “unnecessary” or “indefensible.”

Indeed, animal exploiters routinely argue that the practices identified as

objectionable by welfarists actually do provide a sufficient level of animal

welfare. For example, the National Pork Producers Council maintains that

although a number of different production systems are used in the pork

industry, intensive confinement systems, such as gestation crates, are actually

beneficial to the pigs and that producers would not use them if they were not

consistent with the welfare of the animals: “Producers’ livelihoods depend on

the well being and performance of their livestock. To do anything short of

providing the best, humane care possible would be self-defeating.”

122

Those

involved in the ranch-raising of animals used to make fur coats claim that if the

animals were not properly cared for they would not produce top-quality fur.

123

Indeed, animal exploiters claim that these sorts of performance measures are

the only, or at least the primary, way of measuring welfare in an objective and

non-anthropomorphic manner. If all that Sunstein is saying is that forms of

exploitation that are not efficient should be replaced by more efficient forms of

exploitation, then he is merely promoting the traditional welfarist position that

120. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 387, 389–90 (2003). Sunstein

argues that the primary problem is a lack of standing to enforce these “rights.” Id. at 391–92.

121. British lawyer Mike Radford maintains that, at least as far as English and Scottish law are

concerned, I am wrong to maintain that when human and nonhuman interests are balanced, the animal

loses whenever the human has a commercial interest. See R

ADFORD, supra note 7, at 249. According to

Radford, Ford v. Wiley, 23 Q.B.D. 203 (1889), a case in which a British court held that dehorning older

cattle with saws violated the anticruelty law because it caused unnecessary suffering, establishes the

application of a two-stage process to determine necessity. “First, it must be shown that the animal’s

treatment was to effect an ‘adequate and reasonable object’; secondly, ‘There must be proportion

between the object and the means’.” R

ADFORD, supra note 7, at 248 (quoting 23 Q.B.D. at 210, 215). A

closer examination of Ford v. Wiley, including other painful procedures discussed approvingly by the

court, such as castration of animals and the severity used in the breaking of horses, provides a context

for the meaning of the test that Radford regards as refuting my notion about the general interpretation

of necessity. Moreover, Ford v. Wiley actually reinforces my view that suffering for economic reasons is

generally considered as necessary as long as the practice in question is commonly accepted by those

involved in animal agriculture. The opinions of both Lord Chief Justice Coleridge and Justice Hawkins

noted that the practice of the dehorning older cattle had been discontinued in England, Wales, and

most of Scotland, and was no longer an accepted agricultural practice. For a further discussion of Ford

v. Wiley and subsequent British case law holding that if an agricultural practice is commonly accepted

there is no violation of the anticruelty law even if there are less painful alternatives, see F

RANCIONE,

supra note 2, at 61–62.

122. National Pork Producers Council, Gestation Stalls: The Facts, http://www.nppc.org/public_

policy/gestation_stalls.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). Some welfarists argue that gestation crates are

not as economically beneficial as alternative production systems. See supra notes 56 and 65 and

accompanying text.

123. See, e.g., F

UR COMMISSION USA, FUR FACTS 5 (2005), available at http://www.fur

commission.com/resource/Resources/FAF.pdf.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 37

treats animals as nothing more than commodities with only extrinsic value, and

again, no animal exploiter would disagree with him.

Sunstein may be claiming that certain practices are unnecessary for the

production of animal products under a different system. He may, for instance,

be saying that intensive confinement would not be necessary if we were to raise

animals on family farms, which, of course, would cause the price of animal

products to rise dramatically. Such an alternative form of animal agriculture

may very well improve animal welfare, but animals would still suffer a great

deal and that suffering would be no more defensible or necessary given that it is

not necessary to eat animal products at all. Once we acknowledge that most of

our uses of nonhumans—however “humane” we may treat those involved—are

not necessary in any meaningful sense of that term, then the notion that we

ought to prohibit “unnecessary” suffering becomes unprincipled and reflective

only of subjective and often elitist preferences.

C. Animal Property and Inherent Value

Sunstein agrees that “sentient animals have intrinsic value, and that animal

well-being is a good in itself,”

124

but he maintains that it is possible to recognize

that intrinsic value even if animals remain the property of humans. Although we

certainly could treat animals better even if they remain our property, Sunstein

fails to recognize the limitations that exist as the result of our regarding them as

our property, as things that we own. Property has only extrinsic or conditional

value. When we say that a person has inherent or intrinsic value, what we mean

is that she has value that is not solely extrinsic and conditional. We recognize

that she has value because she values herself, even if no one else values her. We

may use other humans as means to our ends, but we cannot use them

exclusively as means to our ends.

125

As a legal matter, we do not regard animals as having any value apart from

the value we accord them. For the most part, that valuation is tied to their status

124. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 45. Owners of companion animals may regard those animals as

having more than market value, and one might say that the owner regards the animal as having

“intrinsic” or “inherent” value. That sense of intrinsic value, which concerns sentimental or

idiosyncratic valuation by particular animal owners, is, however, different from the notion of moral

value that Sunstein uses when he talks about intrinsic value.

125. See F

RANCIONE, supra note 2, at 90–98. Sunstein maintains that “[i]n many domains human

beings seem to be ‘used,’ and the relevant practices are not objectionable for that reason.” Sunstein,

supra note 7, at 45. He argues that “[w]hen you hire a plumber, a lawyer, an architect, or someone to

clean your house, you are treating them as means, not as ends.” Id. Although it is true that we use

others as means to our ends, we are not allowed to treat them exclusively as means to ends. We can, for

instance, value our plumber as a means to the end of repairing a leak. But if we do not think that the

plumber is competent, we are not allowed to treat her solely as an economic commodity all of whose

interests may be ignored if it benefits us to do so. We cannot enslave the incompetent plumber in a

forced-labor camp; we cannot use her as a nonconsenting subject in a biomedical experiment or as an

unwilling organ donor. Even if we do not value the plumber as a plumber, she still has residual value

that prevents us from valuing her fundamental interests at zero. In the book that Sunstein was

reviewing in the context of making these comments, I use the plumber example and distinguish

between treating the plumber as a means to an end and treating her exclusively as a means to an end.

See F

RANCIONE, supra note 2, at 90–91.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

38 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

as property. We treat animals exclusively as means to our ends. Sunstein may be

correct that we can do a better job of taking animal interests seriously, but that

is much easier said than done. Consider the situation of human slavery in North

America.

126

This institution was structurally identical to the institution of animal

ownership. The slave was regarded as property, and the slave owner was able to

disregard almost all of the slave’s interests if it was economically beneficial to

do so. The law generally deferred to the slave owner’s judgment as to the value

of the slave. There was no meaningful balancing of interests, as the owner’s

property interest in the slave almost always trumped any interest of the slave

who was ostensibly protected under the law. Slave-welfare laws failed to

establish any meaningful limit on the use of slaves, just as animal-welfare laws

fail to establish any meaningful limit on our use of nonhumans. There are

powerful economic, legal, political, and social forces that militate against

treating property as anything other than property. We should, of course,

provide as much animal welfare as can be economically justified; for instance,

we ought to substitute group housing for the gestation crate if that, in fact,

reduces production costs and increases productivity. But this use of “ought” is

related to economic rationality and not to any recognition of the inherent value

of animals.

Sunstein claims that “the language of property does not necessarily signify

that animals will be treated as means.”

127

It is not clear what Sunstein means by

distinguishing between the language of property discourse and the fact of

property status. In any event, we talk about animals as property because

animals are property. To the extent that Sunstein is suggesting that animal

welfare is consistent with recognizing that animals have inherent value, I do not

think that Sunstein appreciates that welfarist measures rarely, if ever, require

that we protect animal interests in the absence of an identifiable—usually

economic—human benefit, and even when they do, they are not related to

inherent value. Sunstein frequently uses the example of dogs and cats—the

nonhumans who most often serve as companions of humans—as beings to

whom we can and do accord inherent value despite their property status.

Certainly, many of us regard our nonhuman companions as having inherent

value. But those of us who do so do not really regard our nonhumans primarily

as our property or as anything remotely similar to our televisions, cars or the

like. Indeed, we regard those nonhumans as members of our families. As far as

the law is concerned, however, companion animals have no inherent value

except in an idiosyncratic sense.

128

The law protects the ability of property

owners to treat property as if it had inherent value.

126. See ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS (1989); FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 86–

90.

127. Sunstein, supra note 7, at 44.

128. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 39

D. Animal Property and Equal Consideration

Finally, the property status of animals effectively and as a very practical

matter precludes our giving serious consideration to their interests, even though

it certainly is possible, at least in theory, to do better than we presently do. It is,

however, not possible to accord nonhuman animals equal consideration if they

are the property of humans.

129

Although we do not and cannot protect humans

from all suffering, the laws of virtually every nation and customary international

law recognize that all humans have the right not to be chattel and not to suffer

at all from their use exclusively as resources of others—however “humane” that

use may be. It is not possible to accord equal consideration to animal interests if

animals are property because their very status as property means that they will

be used in ways that we would regard as inappropriate to use any humans.

I have argued elsewhere that there is a compelling argument that utilitarian

philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) rejected human slavery not only

because he thought that slavery had social disutility, but because he recognized

that the interests of slaves would never count for as much as the similar interests

of slave owners.

130

Therefore, even though Bentham rejected moral rights as a

general matter, it is certainly arguable that he recognized that every human had

to have at least a right not to be the property of others in order to be a member

of the moral community in the first place. Bentham and others who have sought

to apply the principle of equal consideration to nonhuman property have erred

in not recognizing that the same analysis applies to animals. The principle of

equal consideration cannot be applied meaningfully to animals who are

property any more than it can be applied to humans who are property.

131

short, the equal consideration of animal interests necessarily requires the

recognition that nonhumans have a right not to be treated as the property of

humans.

129. See FRANCIONE, supra note 2, at 81–102.; see also Francione, supra note 116, at 239–45

(discussing equal consideration, property status, and the interests of animals in continued existence).

130. See F

RANCIONE, supra note 2, at 130–50. Bentham, who is regarded as an act-utilitarian (one

for whom the right act is that which maximizes net welfare in the particular situation) was, at the very

least, a rule-utilitarian (one for whom the right act is that which, when followed as a general matter, will

maximize net welfare even if it does not do so in the particular situation) when it came to slavery in that

he rejected the morality of slavery as an institution.

131. See id. Both Bentham and Peter Singer seek to apply the principle of equal consideration to

animal interests. Although both reject human slavery, neither rejects the property status of animals, in

part because both believe that animals do not have an interest in their lives and only have an interest in

not suffering. As a result, neither sees a problem per se with using animals for human purposes. I argue

that sentience implies an interest in continued life and that Bentham and Singer err by linking an

interest in life with reflective self-awareness or humanlike self-consciousness. The view that animals do

not have an interest in continued existence also appears to be the basis of Sunstein’s position that

animal use per se does not raise a serious moral issue. See Francione, supra note 116.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

40 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

EW WELFARISM: A FALSE DILEMMA AND AN INCORRECT ASSUMPTION

Many animal advocates recognize that the property status of animals is

problematic, and they claim to seek, as a long-term objective at least, the

modification of the legal status of animals and perhaps even the eradication of

property status and the abolition of animal exploitation. Nevertheless, these

advocates, to whom I refer as “new welfarists,”

132

maintain that at this time we

do not really have a choice. We must pursue welfarist change or do nothing.

They maintain that the abolition of exploitation is “idealistic” or “utopian”

because it cannot be achieved immediately and that animal-welfare reform is

the only way to reduce the suffering of animals now. Moreover, many claim that

incremental welfarist change will eventually bring about the abolition of animal

exploitation. Both tenets of new welfarism are wrong.

A. The Rights Position Provides Normative Guidance

First, new welfarism establishes a false dilemma: pursue traditional animal

welfare or do nothing to help nonhumans who are suffering now. The dilemma

is false because, in addition to the general failure of traditional animal welfare

to alleviate animal suffering, the rights position does provide meaningful

normative guidance and is not “idealistic” or “utopian.” Although the rights

position is often misrepresented,

133

it does not maintain that there is any

possibility of the immediate abolition of all institutionalized exploitation or

reject incremental change as a means of achieving abolition.

134

Rather, the rights

position seeks change that incrementally eradicates the property status of

nonhumans and recognizes that nonhumans have inherent value.

132. See generally FRANCIONE, supra note 3 (discussing the phenomenon of “new welfarism” or the

view that animal rights offers no normative guidance in the short-term and animal-welfare regulation

will lead to the abolition of exploitation, or to some significant recognition of the inherent value of

nonhumans, in the long term). All of my critics promote a version of new welfarism. See supra note 7.

Modern “animal law” is also based on new welfarism and assumes that the alternative to traditional

welfare is to forsake the welfare of animals now and that welfare regulation will lead to the recognition

of the inherent value of nonhumans. See infra note 160 and accompanying text.

133. For example, Robert Garner incorrectly states that my position is “that reforms to the

treatment of animals short of abolition are not worth having.” G

ARNER, supra note 7, at 221.

134. See, e.g., Favre, supra note 7, at 90. Favre, commenting on what he understands to be my

position, states that those who criticize welfarist incremental change “possess an incorrect

understanding of property law” and that “[i]t is highly unlikely that the elimination of property status

will occur in the foreseeable future.” Favre misses the point on a number of levels. No one maintains

that property status is going to be eliminated anytime soon. The point is whether we should pursue its

elimination incrementally through regulations that diminish property rights in nonhumans rather than

pursue welfarist regulations that, for the most part, merely reinforce the property paradigm. For a

discussion of this issue, see F

RANCIONE, supra note 3, at 160–62. For a discussion about how

incremental change as steps toward an identifiable goal has worked in another context (the victims’

rights movement), and why the incremental approach that I propose is preferable to the approach

urged by others to seek change in the status of nonhumans through common-law adjudication, see

Douglas E. Beloof, Crime Victims’ Rights: Critical Concepts for Animal Rights, 7 A

NIMAL L. 19, 25–29

(2001).

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 41

The rights position provides definite normative guidance for incremental

change on an individual level, as well as on the level of social and legal

change.

135

On the individual level, rights theory prescribes incremental change in

the form of veganism.

136

Veganism is not merely a matter of diet; it is a moral

and political commitment to abolition on the individual level and extends not

only to matters of food, but to clothing and other products. Many animal

advocates claim to favor animal rights and to want to abolish animal

exploitation but continue to eat animal products. That is no different from

someone who claims to be in favor of the abolition of slavery but who continues

to own slaves. Moreover, there is no meaningful distinction between eating

meat and eating dairy or other animal products. Nonhumans exploited in the

dairy industry live longer than those used for meat, but they are treated worse

during that life, and they end up in the same slaughterhouse after which we

consume their flesh anyway. There is probably more suffering in a glass of milk

or an ice cream cone than there is in a steak.

Some animal advocates claim that veganism is a matter of personal

philosophy and should not be identified as a baseline principle of the rights

movement. But that claim is incoherent. It is not necessary in any sense to eat

meat or dairy products. If the animal-rights movement cannot take a principled

position on an activity that results in the suffering and death of billions of

animals for no reason other than that we enjoy the taste of meat and dairy, then

the movement can take no principled stand on any institutional exploitation.

Rather than embrace veganism as a clear moral baseline, the animal-

advocacy movement has instead adopted the notion that we can “consume with

conscience.” For example, Peter Singer maintains that we can be “conscientious

omnivores” and exploit animals ethically if, for example, we choose to eat only

animals who have been well-cared-for and then killed without pain or distress.

137

Singer praises purveyors of “humanely” exploited animal products, such as

Whole Foods Markets, Inc. and its CEO, John Mackey, as “ethically

responsible.”

138

Animal advocate Tom Regan featured Mackey as a keynote

speaker for a 2005 conference entitled “The Power of One,”

139

which focused on

the ability of individuals to make meaningful changes for nonhumans. PETA

gave Whole Foods an award in 2004, claiming that the company “has

135. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 147–219. Indeed, it is the welfarist position, which maintains

that we ought to pursue any measure that reduces suffering, that fails to provide normative guidance

because almost any measure can be said to reduce suffering. See id. at 156–62.

136. See, e.g., id. at 152.

137. P

ETER SINGER & JIM MASON, THE WAY WE EAT: WHY OUR FOOD CHOICES MATTER 81–

183 (2006).

138. See id. at 177–83.

139. See Promotional Brochure from The Culture and Animals Foundation and The Institute for

Animals and Society, The Power of One: The Twentieth Annual International Compassionate Living

Festival, available at http://www.animalsandsociety.org/documents/PowerofOnebrochure.pdf (last

visited Mar. 19, 2007). Regan is the author of T

HE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS (1983).

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

42 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

consistently done more for animal welfare than any retailer in the industry,

requiring that its producers adhere to strict standards.”

140

Putting aside whether these supposedly “strict standards” make any real

difference to the nonhumans involved,

141

it is, as a general matter, always better

to do less harm than more once we have decided to inflict harm. But the notion

that the animal movement actively promotes doing less harm as a morally

acceptable solution to the problem of animal exploitation is troubling. That is, if

X is going to rape Y, it is “better” that X not beat Y as well. It would, however,

be morally repugnant to maintain that we can be “conscientious rapists” by

ensuring that we not beat rape victims. Similarly, it is disturbing that animal

advocates are promoting the notion that we can be morally “conscientious

omnivores” if we eat the supposedly “humanely” produced products of Whole

Foods and other purveyors. Not only is such a position in conflict with the

notion that animal lives have moral significance, but it strongly encourages

those concerned about nonhumans to see continued consumption as a morally

acceptable alternative to adopting a vegan lifestyle.

In any event, any claim to embrace the rights or abolitionist position without

accepting that veganism is the only morally consistent way to take immediate

action to make that happen at least in one’s own life makes no sense. Veganism

represents a rejection of the commodity status of nonhumans and a recognition

of their inherent value.

On the social and legal level, there needs to be a paradigm shift as a social

matter before the legal system will respond in a meaningful way. I disagree with

those who maintain that the legal system will lead in the struggle for animal

rights or that significant legal change will occur in the absence of the

development of a political and social movement in support of animal rights and

the abolition of animal exploitation.

142

The most important form of incremental change on a social level is

education about veganism and the need to abolish, not merely to regulate, the

institutionalized exploitation of animals.

143

The animal-advocacy movement in

140. PETA, 2004 PETA Progress Awards, http://www.peta.org/feat/proggy/2004/

winners.html#retailer (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).

141. Professor Ibrahim maintains that the “strict standards” of Whole Foods do not provide much

protection for animals. See Darian M. Ibrahim, A Return to Descartes: Property, Profit, and the

Corporate Ownership of Animals, 70 L

AW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 109–11 (Winter 2007).

142. See, e.g., S

TEVEN M. WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE: TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS

(2000).

143. See, e.g., F

RANCIONE, supra note 3, at 177–89. I am bewildered by those critics who claim that I

emphasize the importance of legislation over non-legal social changes, such as education and the

activities of grassroots activists. See, e.g., Matthew Pamental, Pragmatism and Pets: Best Friends Animal

Sanctuary, Maddie’s Fund

, and No More Homeless Pets in Utah, in ANIMAL PRAGMATISM:

RETHINKING HUMAN-NONHUMAN RELATIONSHIPS 210, 211 (Erin McKenna & Andrew Light eds.,

2004) (“[B]y focusing solely on animal rights legislation Francione overlooks two crucial components in

any reconstruction of social conditions: community support and education. He therefore ignores the

successes of local, grassroots, volunteer activities in improving the treatment of animals.”). In addition

to being critical of legislation and emphasizing education as the primary means of social change, I have

also emphasized the importance of grassroots activities. See, e.g., F

RANCIONE, supra note 3, at 71–74.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 43

the United States has seriously failed to educate the public about the need for

the abolition of animal exploitation. Although there are many reasons for this

failure, a primary one is that animal-advocacy groups find it easier to promote

welfarist campaigns aimed at reducing “unnecessary” suffering that have little

practical effect and are often endorsed by the industry involved. Such

campaigns are easy for advocates to package and sell and they do not offend

anyone. It is easier to tell people that they can be morally “conscientious

omnivores” than it is to take the position that veganism is a moral baseline.

That, however, is precisely the problem. No one disagrees with the principle

that it is wrong to inflict “unnecessary” suffering and that we ought to treat

animals “humanely.” But, as 200 years of animal welfare have made plain, these

are merely platitudes in light of the property status of animals.

To the extent that national organizations promote abolition, they do so

simultaneously with promoting welfarist campaigns, and the result is a

confusing message that provides no clear direction for social change. For

example, PETA claims to promote the abolition of animal exploitation while

giving awards to various animal exploiters, such as Temple Grandin and Whole

Foods, Inc. On one hand, PETA claims to support veganism; on the other hand,

it encourages the notion that “humane” animal exploitation is morally

acceptable and praiseworthy.

Veganism and abolitionist education provide practical and incremental

strategies both in terms of reducing animal suffering now and in terms of

building a movement in the future that will be able to obtain legislation more

meaningful than regulations (mischaracterized as “bans”) on the use of

gestation crates in states that do not even have producers who use gestation

crates, or the establishment of “sanctuaries” where “retired” animals can be

used for experiments if there is a “public health need.” If, in the late 1980s—

when the animal-advocacy community in the United States decided very

deliberately to pursue a welfarist agenda—a substantial portion of movement

resources had been invested in vegan and abolitionist education, there would

likely be hundreds of thousands more vegans than there are today. This is a

very conservative estimate given the hundreds of millions of dollars that have

been expended by animal-advocacy groups to promote welfarist legislation and

initiatives. I maintain that having the increased number of vegans would reduce

suffering more by decreasing demand for animal products than all of the

welfarist “successes” put together and multiplied ten-fold.

144

Increasing the

number of vegans would also help to build a political and economic base

required for the social change that is a necessary predicate for significant legal

144. An average omnivore in the United States is responsible for at least thirty-two nonhuman

deaths per year. This number is based on an estimate of 9.5 billion animals killed in the United States

and consumed by a population of 300 million. The number of animals killed does not include fish or

other sea animals, and only reflects animal use for food and not for other purposes.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

44 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

change.

145

Given limited time and limited financial resources, it is not clear how

anyone who seeks abolition as a long-term goal, or who at least accepts that the

property status of animals is a most serious impediment to any significant

change and must at least be radically modified, could believe that expansion of

traditional animal welfare is a rational and efficient choice, putting aside any

considerations about inconsistencies in moral theory.

There are “compelling reasons for animal rights advocates to spend their

limited time and resources on incremental changes achieved through various

forms of education, protest, and boycotts,” rather than legislative or

administrative regulation.

146

The primary reason is that regulation cannot

succeed unless it has at least the tacit support of institutional animal exploiters.

The price of this support is compromise that generally eviscerates the regulation

and limits it to measures that make exploitation more economically beneficial

to exploiters.

147

This is why education and social change are so important and

must precede legal change. There is simply no political base to support any

radical legal change at this time. Although many people have vague sympathies

toward animals, most eat animals and there is no abolitionist movement to

support measures that would challenge the property status of animals in any

serious way. Indeed, the leaders of the animal-advocacy movement actively

encourage the public to believe that being a “conscientious omnivore” is

morally acceptable.

If, despite these cautions, which have become more pronounced in my mind

in the past dozen years, animal advocates nevertheless want to pursue change

through legislation, administrative regulation, or litigation, those campaigns

ought to be explicitly targeted at eradicating the property status of animals in an

incremental way. On the one hand, no single incremental measure will succeed

in achieving equal consideration for nonhumans because equal consideration is

not possible as long as animals are property. On the other hand, most welfarist

measures do nothing but require that animal exploiters act in a more rational

way and do a more efficient job exploiting their animal property.

The problem is that it is tempting for animal advocates who need successful

campaigns for fundraising purposes to portray any measure that protects an

animal interest and that is arguably not required to be protected for economic

reasons as a meaningful step away from property status. For example, a

145. Robert Garner defends the welfarist strategy because he views it as earning the respect of

decisionmakers and making possible short-term improvements, although he admits they often do not

amount to much. G

ARNER, supra note 7, at 220–30. Garner apparently believes that minimal change is

all we can expect given the lack of public support for more. But he concedes defeat on the root cause of

the problem—the lack of public support for more significant change—and instead focuses on masking

its symptoms. Garner discusses the importance of unification of the movement but fails to consider that

if animal advocates were to unify behind the abolitionist position, and not the welfarist position, this

might lead to the formation of a political movement that would be able to obtain more significant

change.

146. See F

RANCIONE, supra note 3, at 163.

147. See William A. Reppy, Jr., Broad Exemptions in Animal-Cruelty Statutes Unconstitutionally

Deny Equal Protection of the Law, 70

LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255, 256–60 (Winter 2007).

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 45

proposal not based on meat quality or similar concerns to give battery hens

additional cage space may be regarded as not treating the hen exclusively as

property. But such a measure obviously does little, if anything, to relieve

suffering and any good that such a measure does is probably more than offset

by the public perception that animal use has been made more “humane” and is,

therefore, more acceptable. Moreover, such a measure does nothing to

eradicate property status in the long term in any meaningful sense and may

even reinforce that status.

In order for incremental change to be a step in the direction of abolition

rather than marching in place within the property paradigm, it is necessary to

identify measures that explicitly and progressively recognize that nonhumans

have more than extrinsic or conditional value alone. Since no one incremental

step will achieve abolition, identifying criteria for incremental steps in

diminishing the property status of nonhumans will necessarily be imprecise. In

Rain Without Thunder, I recognized this necessary lack of precision and I

presented my preliminary thoughts on five conjunctive criteria that might be

used to identify incremental measures that would necessarily fall short of

abolishing the property status of nonhumans but that would nevertheless

represent significant steps away from property status.

148

The idea was to identify

regulations that, although not abolishing property status altogether, went well

beyond the efficient exploitation of traditional welfare and rejected the status of

animals as commodities through the explicit recognition that nonhumans have

inherent value and interests that must be protected irrespective of economic

consequences. Given that these incremental measures do not abolish property

status, their primary value is as stepping stones on the path toward abolition.

Incremental measures cannot lead to more incremental measures without

reflecting a progressive recognition of the inherent value of animals.

Briefly summarized, these criteria involve prohibitions

149

of significant

institutional activities,

150

as opposed to traditional welfarist regulation requiring

“humane” treatment or relatively minor prohibitions. For example, a

prohibition on the use of any leghold trap is to be preferred over a requirement

that any trapping be done “humanely,” or with the use of a “padded” leghold

trap. A prohibition on the use of any animals in a particular type of experiment

is to be preferred over a requirement of an animal-care committee to monitor

148. See FRANCIONE, supra note 3, at 190–219. Critics who claim that I propose no incremental

legal change have apparently overlooked this aspect of my work. See, e.g., Andrew Light & Erin

McKenna, Introduction: Pragmatism and the Future of Human-Nonhuman Relationships, in A

NIMAL

PRAGMATISM, supra note 143, at 7–8. I accept, however, that this portion of Rain Without Thunder,

which I presented explicitly as a preliminary analysis, was not as clear as it could have been and I plan

to clarify my views on incremental regulatory change in future writing.

149. See F

RANCIONE, supra note 3, at 192–96 (“Criterion 1: An Incremental Change Must

Constitute a Prohibition”).

150. See id. at 196–98 (“Criterion 2: The Prohibited Activity Must Be Constitutive of the

Exploitative Institution”).

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46 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

the treatment of animals used in experiments. A prohibition on the production

of any veal is to be preferred to promoting non-crated veal.

Moreover, the incremental change must protect interests beyond those

necessary in order to exploit the animal in an efficient way (the limiting

principle of most animal welfare)

151

and should be explicitly promoted as

recognizing that nonhumans have interests that are not tradable or able to be

ignored merely because humans will benefit from doing so.

152

These criteria

together involve the recognition that animals have interests apart from those

necessary to protect in order to exploit them, and value that is not exclusively

extrinsic or conditional. Finally, animal advocates should never be in a position

of promoting an alternative, more “humane” or “better” form of exploitation,

or substituting one species for another. Any incremental legislative or

regulatory measure ought to be accompanied by an unrelenting and clear call

for the abolition of all institutionalized exploitation.

153

An example of a measure satisfying these conjunctive criteria would be a

prohibition on the use of animals for a particular sort of experiment, such as a

ban on the use of all animals in psychological experiments, based on the

recognition that animals have morally significant interests in not being used for

such experiments irrespective of human benefits. A ban on the use of one

species of animal might be acceptable if it were not based on any supposed

moral superiority of that particular species and if no other species were

proposed as an alternative. Any ban should be presented explicitly as part of an

agenda that rejects all vivisection.

A prohibition that satisfied all these criteria would not have any significant

chance of succeeding at the present time, but the process of promoting such a

prohibition would at least have the effect of educating the legal and political

system, as well as society in general, about the need for radical change.

154

In any

event, advocates are better advised to put their time and resources into

incremental change through vegan and abolitionist education and to engage in

hands-on work involving the care of individual animals. Advocates should avoid

campaigns that seek incremental change through legislation or regulation, for

any measure that might help to eradicate the property status of animals cannot

succeed as a practical matter and any campaign that can succeed will, in all

likelihood, merely reinforce the property status of animals. Advocates should

also avoid campaigns that seek to get industry to make voluntary changes as

these efforts are usually futile at best and are often counterproductive.

151. See id. at 199–203 (“Criterion 3: The Prohibition Must Recognize and Respect a

Noninstitutional Animal Interest”).

152. See id. at 203–07 (“Criterion 4: Animal interests Cannot Be Tradable”).

153. See id. at 207–11 (“Criterion 5: The Prohibition Shall Not Substitute an Alternative, and

Supposedly More ‘Humane,’ Form of Exploitation”).

154. See, e.g., id. at 187. Given that traditional welfarist regulation does little if anything to help

animals and merely reinforces the property paradigm, such regulation does not even provide a useful

educational vehicle for more sustained change.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 47

B. Welfare and Abolition

Second, new welfarism maintains that traditional incremental changes in

animal welfare will eventually lead to abolition or to a significant change in the

property status of animals, and it is neither necessary nor desirable to have a

strategy focused explicitly on veganism and eradication of that property status.

There is, however, absolutely no historical evidence for the position that

welfarist regulation today will lead to abolition or to greater protection

tomorrow. Indeed, the empirical evidence shows that the opposite is true.

Animal welfare seems to lead only to continued and increased use.

The CHIMP Act is a good example of how animal welfare facilitates animal

exploitation.

155

Those sponsoring the legislation recognized the view shared by

many that research involving chimpanzees was morally problematic and that, if

the public were to be expected to continue to support such research, it would be

necessary to create a more “humane” environment for the chimpanzees. It must

be remembered that the most significant form of animal exploitation in

history—intensive agriculture—developed during the latter part of the

twentieth century, when concern about animal welfare was at a high point.

Moreover, recent supposed reform of some aspects of intensive agriculture is

not leading toward veganism. If anything, it is encouraging the notion that

animal consumption can be a morally acceptable if we are “conscientious

omnivores” and eat animals who have been raised more “humanely.”

In any event, we have had animal welfare in most western nations for the

better part of 200 years, and we are inflicting pain, suffering, and death on more

nonhumans today than at any time in human history. There is no empirical

reason to believe that animal welfare will lead to abolition or to any significant

change in the property status of nonhumans.

HE EMERGENCE OF “ANIMAL LAW”

In the past decade, a significant number of American law schools have

begun to offer courses on “animal law.”

156

There is also a growing body of legal

scholarship focused on animals.

157

These developments, together with an

155. See supra notes 26–52 and accompanying text. An interesting example of the false dilemma of

welfarist change or no change is illustrated in this context by one animal advocate who criticizes those

who did not support the CHIMP Act. See Favre, supra note 7, at 90. Favre claims that the CHIMP Act

“provided positive alternatives for many chimpanzees” and animal advocates should support such laws

as a “next step . . . because otherwise next steps will not happen.” Id. Favre assumes not only that the

choice is between the CHIMP Act or nothing but also that the CHIMP Act is itself a desirable piece of

legislation.

156. For the most part, these courses are taught by adjunct instructors, not full-time faculty

members.

157. Much of the increase in scholarship is as the result of Animal Law, a journal that was begun by

the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF) and existed as an independent journal housed at the Lewis

and Clark Law School. The journal is now an official publication of Lewis and Clark. Given the origin

of Animal Law, many of the authors of articles in Animal Law have been officers, directors, or

employees of ALDF. It remains to be seen whether Animal Law will continue to focus on ALDF

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

48 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

increase in the number of practicing attorneys concerned with issues involving

animals, have led the media to conclude that “[a]nimal law is a specialty whose

time has come”

158

and that “animal rights law has begun to blossom into a viable

career path for a new generation of attorneys.”

159

Although there can be no doubt that animal issues have become more

prominent both in the legal academy and in law practice, it is important to

understand that, for the most part, what is meant by “animal law” has little to

do with animal rights and abolition and very much embraces the false

dichotomy that we can choose either to pursue traditional animal-welfare

measures or we can “sacrifice the welfare of existing animals.”

160

Modern animal

law, for the most part, promotes traditional welfarist change as a way of

modifying the property status of animals. “Pet custody, wrongful death cases,

veterinary malpractice suits, pet cruelty cases, and even pet trusts in which

people set aside money in their wills to care for their companion animals are

slowly reaching a critical mass in lower courts.”

161

Animal advocates claim that

these cases are “laying the legal foundation establishing that pets have intrinsic

worth” that will serve eventually to “support a ruling that animals are not

property but have rights of their own and thus legal standing.”

162

These sorts of cases and legal issues may, indeed, provide career

opportunities for lawyers, but they will also reinforce the property paradigm

rather than challenge it. For example, because nonhumans are property, the fair

market value of an animal or the actual economic value of the animal to the

owner are the predominant measures of damages used when one person

tortiously injures or kills an animal belonging to another.

163

This has effectively

prevented owners from obtaining redress for injury to their animals because

many companion animals do not have a significant market or actual economic

value.

The traditional approach is being changed by case law and statute in some

states in favor of recognizing the emotional bond between humans and their

animal property, and this is claimed by some animal advocates to be a

significant step in the direction of eroding the property status of animals.

164

Such

authors and practitioner-oriented articles. There are, however, other publications starting to appear.

For example, students at the University of Pennsylvania Law School launched an annual publication in

2006, the Journal of Animal Law and Ethics, which purports to be a more traditional law review with an

interdisciplinary focus. In addition, there is the Journal of Animal Law, produced by David Favre.

158. Zay N. Smith, She’s Raising Bar in Fight for Animal Rights, C

HI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 18, 2004, at

24.

159. Douglas Belkin, Animal Rights Gains Foothold as Law Career Harvard Hosts Court

Competition for 50 Students, B

OSTON GLOBE, Mar. 6, 2005, at 6.

160. Favre, supra note 7, at 90.

161. Belkin, supra note 159. These traditional welfarist topics are the primary focus of the casebook

used in a number of courses. See

SONIA S. WAISMAN, BRUCE A. WAGMAN, & PAMELA D. FRASCH,

ANIMAL LAW (3d ed. 2006).

162. Belkin, supra note 159.

163. See, e.g., Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster, 144 S.W.3d 554, 560 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004)

(limiting recovery to economic value of the animal).

164. See Belkin, supra note 159.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 49

a claim, however, is not justified. Courts have long recognized that there can be

instances in which fair-market value is an inadequate measure of damages for

property that does not have a market value, such as photographs and heirlooms,

and they have allowed alternative measures.

165

That some courts are analogizing

dogs to heirlooms and photographs that lack market value is, of course, a good

thing for the owners of animals just as it is a good thing for owners of otherwise

worthless heirlooms and photographs. It does not, however, amount to

change—or a step toward a change—in the legal status of the animal any more

than it means that heirlooms and photographs are regarded less as property

because courts have recognized that fair-market value may not be an adequate

measure of damages in a particular case.

Even if animal advocates persuade courts or legislatures to accept that

nonhuman companions injured or killed by another are “special property” and

similar to heirlooms, or permit damages for loss of companionship or emotional

distress, that is not going to change the legal status of the nonhumans as

property or represent a recognition that the animal has inherent or intrinsic

worth. It will recognize only that some people value their animal property more

than do others and that, in certain instances, the law will respect that valuation

and not limit the property owner to a measure of damages that does not

compensate the loss suffered.

Moreover, looking to the emotional reaction of an owner to determine the

value of a nonhuman may have anomalous results. In Fredeen v. Stride, the

owner took her injured dog, who had been shot in the right hind leg, to a

veterinarian and decided to have the dog euthanized because she could not

afford the cost of treatment.

166

The veterinarian agreed to do so but instead

nursed the animal back to health, and the dog was ultimately placed in another

home. The owner saw the dog six months later and claimed to suffer mental

anguish because she feared that her children would encounter the dog and

attempt to reunite with him. She sued the veterinarian and was awarded $500

for conversion, $4000 for mental anguish, and $700 in punitive damages, and the

Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. Fredeen involves one of the largest awards for

the emotional distress suffered by a human in connection with the treatment of

her nonhuman companion, and the damages were awarded because the human

was deprived of the death of her dog.

167

165. See, e.g., Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., Ltd., 510 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). For a

discussion of the inadequacy of the fair-market measure of damages, see F

RANCIONE, supra note 1, at

57–63.

166. 525 P.2d 166 (Or. 1974).

167. An increase in litigation against veterinarians will most likely cause malpractice insurance to

become more expensive and this will result in higher costs being charged for veterinary services.

Although health insurance is available for companion animals, it is limited, often does not apply to

older animals, and is costly. In any event, increased veterinary costs will invariably result in less

veterinary care for some nonhumans.

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50 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

Similarly, that some states now permit trusts for pets

168

is not likely to lead to

a change in the legal status of animals or to the recognition that nonhumans

have inherent value as a general matter. It is certainly desirable to allow the

owners of animals to provide for their animals after their deaths, but again, all

this amounts to as a legal matter is a recognition that property owners should be

able to decide how to devise and bequeath their property as they see fit,

including to benefit other property that they own. In many respects, allowing

pet owners to establish trusts for their pets is no different from allowing them to

establish trusts to maintain a historical building that they own. Pet trusts cannot

credibly be characterized as “a conceptual breakthrough for the United States

legal system” on the theory that “[a]nimals have been granted legal personhood

for purposes of trust enforcement” and that for probate and trust purposes

“animals are juristic persons with equal rights before the court.”

169

Some animal advocates claim that cases involving the custody of animals

indicate that “[c]ourts across the country have begun to adopt the more

enlightened view that companion animals are more than mere chattels”

170

that these cases represent “‘one way of taking down the wall’”

171

between

humans and nonhumans. Again, such a claim is unfounded, although it is clear

that at least some animal lawyers are developing lucrative practices with these

sorts of cases.

172

When couples separate, they often have disputes about all sorts

of property, including nonhuman animals. That a court enforces a custody

agreement involving a nonhuman is no different from the court enforcing an

agreement about the shared use of a car. Although some courts may have

focused on the “best interest” of the nonhuman involved in a custody matter,

this is not an indication of any shift—even an attenuated or indirect one—in the

property status of nonhumans. The animals involved are still chattels.

173

Moreover, the law has through anticruelty laws explicitly recognized for the

better part of 200 years that animals have interests in the way that inanimate

property does not. The problem is that this recognition has had no significant

168. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2907(B) (2006).

169. Favre, supra note 7, at 94.

170. Barbara Newell, Animal Custody Disputes: A Growing Crack in the “Legal Thinghood” of

Nonhuman Animals, 6 A

NIMAL L. 179, 180 (2000).

171. Sanjiv Bhattacharya, To Love, Honor and Belly-Scratch; Marriages Come and Go. Judging by

the Rising Number of Pet-Custody Disputes, Though, Some Passions Endure, L.A.

TIMES MAG., Jan. 9,

2005, at 20 (quoting Bruce Wagman).

172. See id. (discussing attorney Sandra Toye, who has earned “fees in excess of $100,000” doing

pet-custody cases).

173. For example, Barbara Newell cites Raymond v. Lachmann, 695 N.Y.S.2d 308 (N.Y. App. Div.

1999) as an example of a custody case in which the court recognizes a nonhuman as being more than a

chattel. Newell, supra note 170, at 180 n.6. In Raymond, the trial court awarded ownership and

possession of a cat to the plaintiff conditioned on plaintiff’s payment of certain veterinary costs. The

appellate court reversed and awarded ownership and possession to defendant claiming that was “best

for all concerned.” 695 N.Y.S.2d at 309. Although Newell supplies facts about this case from the

unpublished lower court decision, the published opinion, which is very brief, did not discuss the nature

of the dispute over the cat or any competing property interests. But most significantly, the decision did

not affect the cat’s status as property.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 51

impact on the property status of animals, and it is unclear why anyone believes

that it will have a different effect as the result of custody cases involving

animals.

Finally, many animal advocates maintain that anticruelty statutes and

prosecutions brought under those statutes will improve our treatment of

nonhuman animals and help to erode the property status of animals.

174

As I have

argued, anticruelty laws were originally at least in part a response to changing

social attitudes and a recognition that humans had moral and legal obligations

that they owed to nonhumans.

175

However, the notion of having direct moral

and legal obligations is inconsistent with the property status of nonhumans, and,

as a result, anticruelty statutes have been largely ineffective in providing

significant protection to nonhumans.

176

Many anticruelty laws contain explicit

exemptions for most forms of institutionalized exploitation. In those situations

in which they do apply, courts have interpreted the concept to prohibit only

those activities that are not customary or usual given the particular use.

177

Moreover, anticruelty laws are criminal laws and require proof of intent. Intent

is difficult to show as a general matter, and it becomes even more difficult in

anticruelty cases, in which the alleged crime occurs in a societal context in which

the killing of billions of animals is routine. Finally, violation of an anticruelty

statute has generally been a misdemeanor or summary offense and has carried

an insignificant penalty, although in recent years a considerable number of

states have made felonies of at least some violations.

178

In any event, state anticruelty laws do not even apply to the overwhelming

number of instances in which we impose suffering or death on nonhumans

either because the laws include explicit exemptions or because courts effectively

read exemptions into them. It is not accurate to say that these laws apply to

“cruel” behavior because much of what is regarded as legal animal use is

“cruel” as that term is normally used in moral discourse. It is not even accurate

174. See Belkin, supra note 159.

175. See F

RANCIONE, supra note 2, at 7–9.

176. For a discussion of the inadequacies of anticruelty laws, see F

RANCIONE, supra note 1, at 121–

60; F

RANCIONE, supra note 2, at 54–73; see also Reppy, supra note 147; Darian M. Ibrahim, The

Anticruelty Statute: A Study in Animal Welfare, 1 J.

ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 175 (2006).

177. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in applying anticruelty laws to conduct that

conforms to the customs and norms of various animal uses, see Ibrahim, supra note 176. A review of

the McDonald’s Corp. v. Steel case in Great Britain indicates that when judgments about what

constitutes “cruel” treatment or “necessary” suffering are not connected to what is customary, they

become very arbitrary and idiosyncratic and could never be used in a context involving criminal

liability. See McDonald’s Corp. v. Steel, No. 1990-M-NO. 5724 (Q.B. 1997) (summary of the judgment),

available at http://www.hmcourts-service.gov.uk/judgmentsfiles/j379/mcdonalds_190697.htm. This case,

commonly referred to as “McLibel,” is to date the most lengthy case in the history of the English legal

system. McDonald’s sued two defendants for, inter alia, allegations that McDonald’s was culpably

responsible for farming practices that the defendants characterized as cruel and inhumane. Justice Bell

refused to apply the standard of the industry to determine whether the statements were defamatory and

held that he must judge for himself, based on expert testimony, whether particular farming practices

were cruel. Justice Bell’s ad hoc analysis makes clear that such a standard could never suffice to support

a criminal conviction.

178. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.

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52 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

to say that these laws are limited to situations in which humans inflict suffering

or death on animals merely for “fun” as many forms of animal-based

“entertainment,” such as rodeos, circuses, and pigeon shoots, are legal. Rather,

anticruelty laws apply only to the miniscule portion of animal uses that fall

completely outside the considerably broad scope of permissible institutionalized

animal exploitation. And, given that animals are property, virtually any use that

generates some sort of economic benefit is permissible.

There is, however, an alternative to the dominant paradigm of “animal law,”

and it is the one that guided our work in the Rutgers Animal Rights Clinic

179

over the decade of its existence and that we owed in part to wise advice from a

mentor, the late civil rights attorney, William M. Kunstler.

180

Kunstler believed

that the primary role of a progressive lawyer was to protect the rights of those

in society who were trying to cause a paradigm shift in thinking. That is, he did

not see the lawyer as the primary engine for social change; rather, it was the

social activist, the person who sought to educate, persuade, and change

fundamental thinking about particular issues. Such activists would invariably be

vulnerable to attack by a political and legal system that was not amenable to the

change, and it was the job of the attorney to use every tool available to her to

protect that activist. Kunstler’s advice fit in with our general view that the first

task of the animal-rights movement was to educate society about why such a

movement was necessary in the first place and to shift the paradigm away from

the commodity status of nonhumans.

As a result, we concentrated our efforts on assisting animal advocates in

their efforts to educate about the need to abolish and not merely to regulate

particular instances of animal exploitation. They included students in high

schools, universities, medical schools, and veterinary schools who did not want

to vivisect or dissect any animals in their courses; those who wanted to engage

in peaceful demonstration to try to educate others about animal rights,

veganism, and abolition; prisoners who wanted vegan food; those who were

trying to develop “no kill” options to the problem of the companion animal

population; those who sought to stop the round-up and removal of wild horses

from federal lands and to prohibit the killing of deer in suburban areas; and

those who wanted to organize lawful boycotts to stop particular forms of animal

exploitation.

We advised animal advocates how to design legislation and regulations that

were abolitionist rather than regulationist. We sued to get information about

experiments at federally funded institutions, not because we wanted to achieve

179. I began to teach animal rights and the law in 1985 as part of my jurisprudence course at the

University of Pennsylvania Law School. In 1989, I moved to Rutgers University School of Law—

Newark and, with Anna E. Charlton, started the Rutgers Animal Rights Law Clinic in 1990. Students

enrolled in the Clinic received six academic credits per semester for working with us on actual animal-

rights cases while also learning animal-rights theory in a weekly seminar. We closed the Clinic in 2000,

but we continue to teach regular courses on animal rights and the law.

180. Kunstler wrote the Foreword to Animals, Property, and the Law. See F

RANCIONE, supra note

1, at ix–xii.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 53

better regulation of vivisection, but because we wanted to help to provide the

information that advocates could use to build a consensus against vivisection

and to make clear that the public was watching what went on behind the

laboratory doors. When we represented the owners of Taro, a dog that was

scheduled to be killed under New Jersey’s “dangerous dog” law, we used the

opportunity to focus attention on the irony of the worldwide response to Taro’s

plight at the same time that most of us were eating animals who were in no

morally relevant way different from Taro. And, most importantly, we spent a

good deal of our time trying to empower animal advocates by teaching them

about how they could use the law to become more effective educators about the

need for abolition. Not a single pet trust was ever drafted in our offices. But

that may have been because no client was ever charged for our services, and

because we were free of business considerations.

Modern animal law as it has developed in the past decade or so is not

focused on the efforts of the animal advocate to effect fundamental changes in

the political and social system; it is more focused on the lawyer as the primary

force for social change within the existing legal system. The past 200 years of

animal welfare are compelling proof that this latter approach will not advance

things further in the next decade than it has in the past one.

IMILAR-MINDS THEORY

Rain Without Thunder expressed concern that the animal-rights movement

was moving toward welfarism and away from rights. In the past decade, the

animal-advocacy movement in the United States has, for the most part, gone

further in the welfarist direction than even I had contemplated when I wrote

that book. The one area in which animal advocates still talk about rights is in

the context of great apes and other animals, such as dolphins, who are thought

to have human-like intelligence.

181

According to this view, if animals are

cognitively like us—if they have similar minds—then we must rethink the

human–nonhuman relationship and, perhaps, even grant certain rights to those

animals.

What I have called “similar-minds theory”

182

became popular among animal

advocates as the result of The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity in

1993.

183

Although I certainly support prohibiting any exploitation of the great

apes, dolphins, and any other nonhuman, the similar-minds theory reinforces

the very paradigm that has resulted in excluding nonhumans from the moral

181. See, e.g., The Evolving Legal Status of Chimpanzees, 9 ANIMAL L. 1 (2003) (remarks at a

symposium linking moral status with humanlike cognitive characteristics).

182. See Gary L. Francione, Our Hypocrisy, N

EW SCIENTIST, June 4-10, 2005, at 51; see also Gary L.

Francione, Taking Sentience Seriously, 1 J.

ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 1 (2006).

183. T

HE GREAT APE PROJECT: EQUALITY BEYOND HUMANITY (Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer

eds., 1993).

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54 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

community.

184

We have historically justified our exploitation of nonhumans on

the ground that there is a qualitative distinction between humans and other

animals. The latter may be sentient, but they are not intelligent, or rational, or

emotional, or self-conscious. The similar-minds approach claims that, as an

empirical matter, we may have been wrong in the past and at least some

nonhumans may have some of these cognitive characteristics. But this approach

does not question the underlying—and fundamental—moral question: Why is

anything more than sentience necessary?

185

The similar-minds approach

threatens to perpetuate a speciesist hierarchy in which we treat some animals as

“special” and continue to exploit the rest. There are at least two reasons to

reject the similar-minds theory.

186

First, the similar-minds theory is a prescription to engage in more research,

which will ironically involve a good deal of vivisection, so that we can determine

how much like humans nonhumans really are. And at the end of the day, no

matter how similar human minds are to those of nonhumans, there will always

be differences that will allow us to justify exploitation if personhood is based on

possession of these cognitive characteristics. After all, we have known about the

cognitive and genetic similarities between human and nonhuman great apes for

a long while, yet we continue to use the latter in biomedical experiments and to

imprison them in zoos.

Second, the similar-minds theory is arbitrary. We identify some

characteristic, such as humanlike self-awareness or rationality, and we maintain

that any nonhuman without the characteristic is not a member of the moral

community. There is, however, no reason to conclude that being able to do

calculus is better than being able to fly with only your wings, or to breathe

underwater with only your gills. These characteristics may be relevant for some

purposes, but they are not relevant to whether we make a being suffer or kill

that being.

This notion is clear where humans are involved. Consider two humans, one

of whom is a gifted mathematician and one who is severely mentally disabled.

Their relative cognitive capacities may be relevant for purposes of determining

184. I was a contributor to The Great Ape Project and was one of the original signers of A

Declaration on Great Apes. See Gary L. Francione, Personhood, Property and Legal Competence, in id.

at 248. In my chapter in The Great Ape Project, I argued that sentience was the only characteristic

necessary for full membership in the moral community. See id. at 253. Nevertheless, I regard The Great

Ape Project as ill-conceived and I regret my participation.

185. Although Professor Taimie Bryant rejects the similar-minds approach and does not believe that

particular humanlike cognitive characteristics are necessary for moral status or legal protection, she

also argues that arguments based on sentience alone are similarly misguided. See generally Taimie L.

Bryant, Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals Be Like Humans to Be Legally

Protected from Humans?, 70 L

AW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 207 (Winter 2007). I disagree in part with

Bryant’s analysis because I do not accept that a being that is not sentient can have interests.

186. For a further discussion of the difficulties involved in relying on similarities beyond sentience

between humans and nonhumans to justify the moral significance of nonhumans, see F

RANCIONE,

supra note 2, at 116–27. For an excellent general discussion of the moral status of nonhumans, including

the significance of their cognitive characteristics, see G

ARY STEINER, ANTHROPOCENTRISM AND ITS

DISCONTENTS: THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY (2005).

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 55

how to allocate a particular resource, such as a university scholarship. But for

the purposes of determining whether it is permissible to subject either or both

to painful experiments or to kill them to harvest their organs for the benefit of

others, nearly all of us would regard these two humans as similarly situated and

as having an equal interest in not being treated as a resource for others. Indeed,

we may regard our moral obligation to the disabled human as even greater

precisely because of her vulnerability.

VII

ONCLUSION

The property status of nonhumans remains a substantial impediment to the

meaningful protection of nonhuman interests. Although animal advocates claim

that traditional welfarist strategies can protect animal interests without any

significant modification of the property status of nonhumans, or that welfarist

strategies will lead to modification of the property status of nonhumans, the

past dozen years offers no proof of either of these claims. There have been no

notable improvements in animal welfare and most changes that have occurred

have been linked explicitly to making animal exploitation more beneficial for

humans. Making exploitation more efficient may reduce suffering in minimal

ways, but it is clear that the welfarist approach is rooted in the property

paradigm and perpetuates the view that nonhumans are commodities with only

extrinsic value.

Moreover, animal advocates have lost ground in a number of areas.

Discourse about animal welfare as connected to economic efficiency is no less

prevalent than it was a decade ago and, indeed, is arguably more prevalent. The

animal movement has drifted in a more traditional welfarist direction in that

most of the animal organizations have openly embraced a program of efficient

exploitation. PETA and Peter Singer praise McDonald’s, Wendy’s, and Burger

King for adopting slaughter standards that keep the meat industry operating

“safely, efficiently and profitably.”

187

HSUS and Farm Sanctuary campaign

against gestation crates, arguing that alternative production systems will reduce

production costs, increase productivity, and increase demand for pork.

188

HSUS

urges that gassing poultry is preferable to electrical stunning because it will

mean less carcass damage, better meat quality, and reduced labor costs.

189

187. Supra note 18; see also supra notes 11–25 and accompanying text.

188. See supra notes 56 and 65 and accompanying text.

189. See supra note 107.

02__FRANCIONE.DOC 7/20/2007 9:34 AM

56 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 70:9

Humane Farm Animal Care,

190

with its partners HSUS, American Society

for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Animal People, World Society for the

Protection of Animals, and others,

191

promotes the “Certified Humane Raised &

Handled Label,” which it describes as “a consumer certification and labeling

program” to give consumers assurance that a labeled “egg, dairy, meat or

poultry product has been produced with the welfare of the farm animal in

mind.”

192

Humane Farm Animal Care emphasizes that “[i]n ‘food animals, stress

can affect meat quality . . . and general [animal] health,’”

193

and that the label

“creates a win-win-win situation for retailers and restaurants, producers, and

consumers. For farmers, the win means they can achieve differentiation,

increase market share and increase profitability for choosing more sustainable

practices.”

194

These approaches merely reinforce the notion that animals are

commodities and that animal interests should be protected if and only if there is

an economic benefit for humans in doing so. Linking animal welfare with

efficient exploitation is inconsistent with the recognition of the inherent value

of nonhumans. Moreover, the animal movement has explicitly embraced the

notion that being a “conscientious omnivore” is a morally acceptable solution to

the problem of animal exploitation.

195

The emerging field of “animal law” has collapsed into nothing more than an

attempt to apply traditional property doctrines to nonhumans. There is no

attempt to challenge the property paradigm through laws or regulations that

recognize that animals have fundamental interests that cannot be disregarded

irrespective of human benefit.

A movement’s ends should define its means. If the goal is abolition, animal

welfare is a means not fitted to that goal either as a matter of moral theory or of

practical strategy. As a moral matter, animal welfare assumes and reinforces the

notion that animals are commodities with only extrinsic or conditional value. As

a practical matter, animal welfare provides almost no benefit to animals and

only makes exploitation more efficient for producers at the same time that it

makes animal users more comfortable about exploiting nonhumans.

The choice is not between doing nothing or pursuing traditional welfare.

The choice is between reinforcing the property paradigm or challenging it. We

can pursue the incremental eradication of the property status—and we can do

190. The Executive Director of Humane Farm Animal Care, Adele Douglass, “serves as an invited

participant on numerous industry animal welfare committees including for the Food Marketing

Institute, National Council of Chain Restaurants, and Burger King,” and in 2003, “was a keynote

speaker at the Animal Welfare Conference of the American Meat Institute.” Humane Farm Animal

Care, The Staff, http://www.certifiedhumane.com/people.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2007). Temple

Grandin is a member of the Scientific Committee of Humane Farm Animal Care. Id.

191. The partners of Humane Farm Animal Care are listed on the homepage of the organization’s

website. See Human Farm Animal Care, http://www.certifiedhumane.com/default.html (see pull-down

menu “Other Organizations”) (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).

192. Id. at http://www.certifiedhumane.com/whatis.html.

193. Id. (quoting unspecified article in Agricultural Research).

194. Id. at http://www.certifiedhumane.com/whyproduce.html.

195. See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.

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Winter 2007] ANIMALS, PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 57

so now—in a variety of ways starting with our own veganism and with our

educational efforts directed toward building an abolitionist movement with

veganism as its moral baseline. To the extent that we choose to pursue laws,

administrative regulations, or litigation, those efforts should be consistent with

the abolitionist goal of the progressive recognition of the inherent value of

nonhumans.

Property status and the animal-welfare laws based upon it “benefit”

nonhumans

196

in the same way that property status and slave-welfare laws

“benefited” human slaves. Any use of “benefit” in either context is perverse.

There is, of course, at least one very significant difference between the abolition

of human slavery and the abolition of the property status of nonhumans. Our

accepting that we have no moral justification to continue to treat nonhumans as

commodities would not entail letting domesticated nonhumans run free in the

streets. It would, however, entail that we stop bringing animals into existence

for the purpose of human exploitation.

197

We should care for those who are here

now, but we should stop causing more to come into existence. We would still

have to work through what equal consideration would mean in our dealings

with non-domesticated animals. But even that would be much easier to do if we

accepted that the property status of nonhumans has no justification other than

as a result of a speciesist hierarchy that we created and that we perpetuate.

196. This position is presented by a number of welfare advocates. See supra note 114 and

accompanying text.

197. For a further discussion of the consequences of accepting that nonhumans have a right not to

be treated as property, see F

RANCIONE, supra note 2, at 153–60.