*, $(1!0%!1*, $(1!0%!1
*'/(! --/! ,.%'!
$!).!#,.! ,--*%.%*)$!).!#,.! ,--*%.%*)
*''*1.$%-) %.%*)'1*,&-.$..+-%,'1)!."*, $(! /4,
,.*".$!1*((*)-
!*((!) ! %..%*)!*((!) ! %..%*)
$!).!#,.! ,--*%.%*)
*, $(!0
0%''!.$..+-%,'1)!."*, $(! /4,0*'%--
$%-,.%'!%-,*/#$..*2*/"*,",!!) *+!)!--2$!*, $(1,$%0!*"$*',-$%+)
%-.*,2.$-!!)!+.! "*,%)'/-%*)%)*, $(1!0%!12)/.$*,%3! ! %.*,*"$!*, $(
1,$%0!*"$*',-$%+) %-.*,2*,(*,!%)"*,(.%*)+'!-!*)...(!')%&'1"*, $(! /
isolated group
chargeable
with
liability
has
an
element
of
unfairness
about
it.
If
liability
is
to
be
imposed
at
all,
would
it
not
be
more
equitable
to
make
each
stockholder
bear
his
pro
rata
share
of
the
liability?
In
his Memorandum
of
Approval5
3
on
the
Business
Corporation
Law,
Gover-
nor
Rockefeller
lauded
the
changes
made
therein,
but
concluded:
While
opinions
may
differ
as
to
the
visdom
of
particular
changes
made
by
the
bill,
its
delayed
effective
date
-will
permit
enactment
at
the
next
two
regular
sE.
sions
of
the
Legislature
of
any
amendments
which
are
cosidered
necessary
or
desirable
before
the
new
law
takes
effect.Z
4
It
is
suggested
that
further
study
is
required
and
that
amendment,
perhaps
even
repeal,
might
well
be
one
of
the
actions
"which
are
considered
nece~sary
or
desirable
before
the
new
law
takes
effect".5
THE INTEGRATED
BAR
ASSOCIATION
Advocates
of
bar
integration
found
some
measure
of
encouragement,
however
small,
when,
on
June
19,
1961,
the
United States
Supreme
Court,
in
Lathrop
v.
Donohue,'
upheld
the
constitutionality
of
the
compulsory
state
bar
association
as
established
in
the
State
of
Wisconsin.
An
integrated
bar
is
defined
as
an
official
state
organization
requiring
mem-
bership
and
financial
support
of
all
attorneys admitted
to
practice
in
that
jurisdiction.
2
It
has
two
facets which
set
it
apart
from
a
voluntary
bar
association-official
organization by
authority
of
the
state
and
compulsory
membership.
The
purpose of
an integrated
bar
is
substantially
the
same
as
that
of
voluntary
associations.
A
generally
representative summary
is
found
in
the
Wisconsin
State
Bar
which
aims
to
aid
the
courts
in
carring
on
and
improving
the
administration
of
justice;
to
foster
and maintain
on
the
part
of
those
engaged
in
the
practice of
law
high
ideals
of
in-
tegrity,
learning,
competence
and
public
service
and
high
standards
of
conduct;
to
safeguard
the
proper
professional
interests of
the
members
of the
bar;
to
encourage
the
formation
and
activities
of
local
bar
associations;
to
provide
a
forum
for
the
53.
Governor's
Memorandum
of
Approval,
in
N.Y. Bus,
Corp.
Law
p.
1
(McKinnzy's
1961).
54.
Id.
at
3.
55.
Ibid.
1.
367
US.
820
(1961),
affirming
10
Wis.
2d
230,
102
N.W.2d
404
(19C0).
Trayton
L.
Lathrop,
a
Wsconsin
lawyer sued
Joseph
Donohue,
treasurer
of
the
Wisconsin
Bar
Aso-
ciation,
to
recover his
$15
dues
on
the ground
that
the
integrated
bar
of
Wiscencin
vas
unconstitutional
as
infringing
on
his
rights
of
freedom
of
as-ociation
and
spzcch.
The
Wisconsin
Supreme
Court
held
that
the
integrated
bar
did
not
violate
the
United
States
Constitution.
The
Supreme
Court
of
the
United
States
affirmed
with
Justices
Black
and
Douglas
dissenting.
See
note
29
infra
and
accompanying
text.
2.
In
re
Mundy,
202
La.
41,
11
So.
2d
398
(1942);
Ayres
v.
Hadaway,
303
Midi.
SS9,
6
N.W.2d
905
(1942);
In
re
Gibson,
35
N.M.
550,
4
P.2d
643
(1931).
1962]
COMM11EN1TS
FORDHAM
LAW
REVIEW
[Vol.
30
discussion
of
subjects
pertaining
to
the
practice
of
law,
the
science
of
jurisprudence
and
law
reform,
and
the
relations
of
the
bar
to
the
public,
and
to
publish
informa-
tion
relating
thereto;
to the
end
that
the
public
responsibilities of
the
legal
profession
may
be
more
effectively
discharged.
3
The
integrated
bar
movement
is
not
a
recent
innovation.
On
the contrary,
it
has
had
its
advocates
in this
country
since
19144
and
has
existed
in
various
parts
of
the
United
Kingdom
for
many
years.,
In
1921,
a
few
years
after
a
model
bar
act
was
published
by
the
American
Judicature
Society,
o
North
Dakota
became
the first
jurisdiction
to
establish
an integrated
bar.
7
To
date
there
are
twenty-seven
states
and
two
federal
jurisdictions,
Puerto
Rico
and
the
Virgin
Islands,
which
have
followed
suit.
8
3.
Wis.
Stat.
Ann.
ch.
256
app.,
rule
1, § 2
(1957),
quoted
with
approval
in
Lathrop
v.
Donohue,
367
U.S.
at
826.
4.
Harley,
A
Lawyer's
Trust,
29
J.
Am.
Jud.
Soc'y
50
(1945).
Impressed
by
the
ef-
fectiveness
of
the
Canadian
Bar, Herbert
Harley,
the
founder
of
the
American
Judicature
Society,
initiated
the
movement in this
country
with
his
Address Before
Lancaster
County,
Neb.
Bar
Ass'n,
Dec.
28, 1914.
5.
See
Winters,
Integration
of
the
Bar-You
Can't
Lose,
39
J.
Am.
Jud.
Soc'y
140,
141
(1956).
6.
4
J.
Am.
Jud.
Soc'y
111-24
(1920).
7.
N.D.
Cent.
Code
§§
27-11-01
to
-27
(1960).
8.
Table
of
Integrated
Jurisdictions:
(A) Statutory
Integration:
Alabama:
Ala.
Code
tit.
46,
§§
21-26
(1958).
Alaska:
Alaska
Comp.
Laws
Ann.
§§
35-2-77a
to
-77o
(Supp.
1958).
Arizona:
Ariz.
Rev.
Stat.
Ann.
§§
32-201
to
-275
(1956).
California:
Cal.
Bus.
&
Prof.
Code
§§
6000-154.
Idaho:
Idaho
Code
Ann.
§§
3-101
to
-420
(1948).
Mississippi:
Miss.
Code
Ann.
§§
8685-724
(1956).
Nevada:
Nev.
Rev.
Stat.
§§
7.270-.600
(1960).
New
Mexico:
N.M.
Stat.
Ann.
§§
18-1-1
to
-36
(1953).
North
Carolina: N.C.
Gen.
Stat.
§§
84-15
to
-38
(1958).
North
Dakota:
N.D.
Cent.
Code
§§
27-11-01
to
-27
(1960).
Oregon:
Ore.
Code
Ann.
§§
28-101
to
-111
(1930).
Puerto
Rico:
P.R.
Laws
Ann.
tit.
4,
§§
771-85
(1954).
South
Dakota:
S.D.
Code
§§
32.1101-.1124
(1939).
Utah:
Utah
Code
Ann.
§§
78-51-1
to
-44
(1953).
Washington:
Wash.
Rev.
Code
Ann.
§§
2.48.010-.230
(1961).
(B)
Court
Rule:
Florida:
Petition
of
Florida
State
Bar
Ass'n,
40
So.
2d
902
(Fla.
1949).
Missouri:
Leimer
v.
Hulse,
352
Mo.
451,
178
S.W.2d
335,
cert.
denied,
323
U.S.
744
(1944).
Nebraska:
In
re
Integration
of
Nebraska State
Bar
Ass'n,
133
Neb.
283, 275
N.W.
265
(1937).
Oklahoma:
In
re
Integration
of
State
Bar,
185
Okla.
505,
95
P.2d
113
(1939).
Virgin
Islands:
2
V.I.
Code
Ann.
it. 5,
Judicial
Procedure
app.,
pt.
III,
rule
51
(1957).
(C)
Combination
of
Statute
and
Court
Rule
Kentucky:
Ky. Rev.
Stat.
Ann.
§§
30.010-.990
(1955)
(§
30.170-court
rules
to
govern
State
Bar);
Commonwealth
v.
Defever,
241
Ky.
834,
45
S.W.2d
489
(1932).
Bar
integration
has
been
accomplished
in
three
principal
ways.
The
most
common
is
by
a
detailed
act
of
the
legislature in
the
exercise
of
its
police
powers;
the
second
is
by
rule
of
court
based
on
the
court's
inherent
poroer
to
regulate
and
control
the
practice
of
law;
and
the
third
is
by
a
combination
of
legislative
act
and court
rule,
the
legislature
first
creating
the
organization and
the
court acting
pursuant
to
an
enabling
statute
to
develop
the
particulars
of
its
structure
and
of
its
government by
court
promulgated
rules.
The
validity
of
an
integrated
bar
created
by
statute
has
been
sustained
in
several
state
court
decisions.
And
it
has
also
been
held
that
there
is
no
delegation
of
a
legislative
function
when
the
integration
is
accomplished by
rule
of
court.
10
Since
integration
is
an
incident
to
the
exercise
of
the
judicial
power
vested
in
the
courts,
it
has been
said
that
it
is
not
a
legislative function,
and an
enabling
statute
is
not
a
prerequisite
to
its
exercise.'
Thus
when
the
Oklahoma
legislature repealed
its
state
bar
act
in
1939,
the
Supreme
Court
of
Oklahoma
asserted
its
inherent
power
to
integrate
the
bar
without
reliance
upon
statutory
authority.'-
Several
other
jurisdictions
also
have adopted
integration
purely
by
rule
of
court.
13
In
those
jurisdictions
the
integrated
Louisiana:
La
Rev.
Stat.
§§
37:211-:218
(1950);
195
La.
xiv-xlvii
(1940).
Michigan:
Mich.
Stat.
Ann.
§§
691.51-.52
(1943)
;
273
Mich.
xxv-x.lv
(1935).
Texas:
Ter.
Rev.
Civ.
Stat.
Ann.
art.
320a-1
(1959).
Virginia:
Va. Code
Ann.
§
54-49
(1950);
171
Va.
xvii-lvii
(1933).
West Virginia:
W.
Va.
Code
Ann.
§
5133
(1)
(1961)
;
123
W.
Va.
liii-Lbii
(1947).
Wisconsin:
Wis.
Stat.
Ann.
§
256.31
(1957);
In
re
Integrated Bar,
273
Wis.
231,
77
N.W.
2d
602
(1956).
Wyoming:
Wyo.
Comp.
Stat.
Ann.
§
5-22
(1957);
Wyo.
Comp.
Stat.
Ann.
Sup.
Ct.
Rules
for
State
Bar,
rule
5
(1957).
(D)
Constitutional
Amendment
Arkansas: Ark.
Cost.
amend.
xviiL
9.
Rinds
v.
State
Bar,
19
Cal. 2d
37,
119
P.2d
134
(1941);
Hill
v.
State Bar,
14
Cal
2d
732,
97
P.2d
236
(1939),
sustaining
the
statute
as
a regulatory measure
under the
police
power;
Ayres
v.
Hadaway,
303
Mich.
589,
6
N.W.2d
905
(1942),
holding
that
such
Etatute3
do
not
violate
the
due
process
clause
of
the United States Constitution.
10.
Integration
of
Bar
Case,
244
Wis.
3,
11
N.W.2d
604
(1943).
11.
In
re
Sparks,
267
Ky.
93, 101
S.W.2d
194
(1937).
The court
stated
that
"the
power to
regulate
the
conduct
and
qualifications
of
its
officers
does
not
dcplnd
upon
constitutional
or statutory
grounds.
It
is
a
power
which
is
inherent
in
this
court
as
a
court-appropriate,
indeed
necessary,
to
the
proper
administration of
justice.
That
we
have
in
deference
to
the
Bar
Integration
Act
.. .
sct
up
a
standing Board
of
Com-
missioners
and
machinery
to
conduct
and
report
on investigations
concerning
the
conduct
of
attorneys,
does
not
alter
the
fact
that
we
are
but
exerting
an
inherent
power
. . . ."
Id.
at
95,
101
S.W.2d
at
196.
In In
re
Day,
131
IMi.
73,
54
N.E.
646
(1399),
the court vent
further
and stated
that
any
act
of
the
legislature
purporting
to
grant
to
the judiciary
the
power to
regulate
the
bar,
is
itself
a
usurpation
of
judicial power
by
the
leJ-iature.
12.
In
re
Integration
of
State
Bar,
135
Okla.
505,
95
P.2d
113
(1939).
A
new
statute
to
the
same
effect
was enacted
shortly thereafter.
Okla.
Stat.
Ann.
tit.
5,
§13
(1941).
13.
Florida,
Missouri,
Nebraska,
Oklahoma,
and
the
Virgin
Islands.
See
note
23
infra
and
accompanying
text.
1962]
COMMENTS
FORDHAM
LAW
REVIEW
bar
was
characterized
as
"an
agency
of
the
court"'
14
to
provide
for
the
discipline
of
all
attorneys
admitted
to
practice and
for
the
levy
and
collection
of
annual
dues
for
the
privilege
of
practicing
law.
FUTURE
OF
INTEGRATION
IN
NEw
YORK
By
reason
of
its
peculiar
constitutional
history
and court
structure
it
is
doubtful
whether
in
New
York
integration
could
be
accomplished
by
rule
of
court.
New
York
is
one
of
several
states
which
have
patterned
their
judi-
cial
systems
on
that
of
Great
Britain.
The
New
York
State
constitution
of
1777
specifically
continued
in
existence
the
then
existing
courts,
1
of
which
the
supreme
court
was
paramount.
10
After
1777,
appeals
from
the
supreme
court
were
treated
in
much
the
same
way
as
they
were
in
colonial
times,
17
the
state's
highest
tribunal
being
composed
almost
entirely
of
nonjudicial
members,
who
convened
irregularly.
From
the
outset,
the
power
to
discipline
attorneys
was
vested
in
the
supreme
court
and
remained
there
through
every
subsequent
statutory
and
constitutional
revision.'
8
Section
88
of
the
Judiciary
Law,
19
amended
in
191220
to
read
substantially
as
it
does
today,
gives
the
supreme
court
express
power
and
control
over
attorneys
and
counselors
at
law.
2
'
Traditionally
then,
it
is
clear
that
the granted
or
asserted
general
control
and
disciplinary
powers
which
the
highest
tribunals
of
other
states
have,
are
not
within
the
domain
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
of
New
York.
Its
primary
function
is
to
hear
and
pass
on
questions
of
law
2 2
The
four
states
2
3 in
14.
In
re
Mundy,
202
La.
41, 43,
11
So.
2d 398,
400
(1942).
15.
N.Y.
Const.
art.
XXVII
(1777).
16.
Two
years
prior
to
the
Declaration
of
Independence,
Governor
Tryon,
New
York's
ablest
executive
during the
colonial
period,
summed
up
the
judicial
structure
in
Ncw
York
In
his
report
to
the
home
country:
"Of
the
Courts
of
Common
Law
the
Chief
is
called
the
Supreme
Court-The
Judges
of
which
have
all
the
Powers
of
the
King's
Bench,
Common
Pleas
&
Exchequer
in England."
1
Lincoln,
The
Constitutional
History
of
New
York
39 (1906).
17.
1
Lincoln,
op.
cit.
supra
note
16,
at
39-40.
In
the
colonial
period
the
supreme
court
was
the
highest
tribunal
with
appeals
going
to
the Royal
Governor
and
his
Council
only
in
certain
instances.
An
appeal
from
there
to the
Privy
Council
was
only
allowed
where
the
amount
in
controversy
exceeded
f500
sterling.
18.
See
People
v.
Culkin,
248
N.Y.
465,
477,
162
N.E.
487, 492
(1928),
where
Judge
Cardozo
traced
the
history
and
development
of
this
power.
19.
N.Y.
judiciary
Law
§
88
(now
N.Y.
Judiciary
Law
§
90).
20.
N.Y.
Sess.
Laws
1912,
ch.
253.
21.
N.Y.
Judiciary
Law
§
90(2).
See
also
N.Y.
Judiciary
Law
§
90,
which
enumerates
as
being
delegated
or
confirmed
in
the
supreme
court
the
majority
of
powers
claimed
to
be
inherent
in the
highest
courts
of
other
states.
22.
N.Y.
Const.
art.
VI,
§ 7.
The
facts are
reviewable
only
in
capital
cases;
the
court
may
also
review
where
the
appellate
division,
reviewing
a
trial
held
without
a
jury,
finds
new facts
and
reverses
the
trial
court.
23.
Florida,
Petition
of
Florida
State Bar
Ass'n,
40
So.
2d
902
(Fla.
1949);
Nebraska,
In
re
Integration
of
Nebraska
State
Bar
Ass'n,
133
Neb.
283,
275
N.W.
265
(1937);
Okla-
[Vol.
30
which
integration
was
adopted
by
rule
of
court
had the
following
in
common:
(1)
governments
established
long
after
the
colonial
era;
(2)
pyramidal
legal systems
modeled
after
that
of
the
federal
government;
(3)
constitutions
expressly
granting
broad judicial
powers;
2-
1
(4)
original
jurisdiction
vested,
in
many
instances,
in
their
highest
courts;
(5)
rule
making
power claimed
by
inherent
right;
and,
(6) a
tradition
of
judicial
supremacy
in
the
fields
of
admission
and
discipline.5
It
is
safe
to
say
that
if
there
is
to
be an
integrated
bar
in
New
Yorl:,
it
may
be
accomplished
only
by
act
of
the
legislature.
ARGU=AINTS
IN
FAVOR OF
INTEGIrATION
Effective
Disciplinary Program
The
argument most
often
urged
in
favor
of
the integrated
bar
is
that
integration
provides
the
most
effective
method
of
policing
and
disciplining
the
legal
profession.
All-inclusive
membership,
in
addition
to
official
status,
makes
it
possible
to
clothe
the
bar
with
the
power
of
self-government.
As
a
result,
all
lawyers
admitted
to
practice
within
the jurisdiction
are
required
to
conform
to
uniform
standards
of conduct.
The
advocates of
integration
in
New
York
cite
this
as
affording
a
remedy
for
the
often
conflicting
rules
of
the
four
departments
of
the
appellate
division.
It
is
argued
in
rebuttal
that
lawyers
who
fail
to
abide
by
the
accepted
standards
of
practice
are
subject
to
disbarment under
the
system
now
existing,
and
higher
standards
can
easily
be
imposed
through
more
difficult
and
searching
bar
examinations
as
well
as
by
raising
the
requirements
relating
to
scholastic achievement.
It
is
a
plausible
proposition.
The
basic problem
however, is
that
the
standards
of
practice
are
not
dearly
defined.
There
is
an
ever
present
need
to
raise
moral, ethical,
and
general
qualifications
both
for
admission
to
the
bar
and
for
the
continuing
practice
of
law.
And
the
further
objection
has
been
made
that
since
this
determination
would
rest in
a
committee's discretion
we
would
have
a
system
essentially "undemocratic."
It
would
seem
that
the
policing
of
professional
ranks
by
the
members
themselves
represents
a
tradi-
tional
form
of
self-government.
But,
even
aside
from
that
fact,
is
this any
different
than the
present
New
York
system
which
puts
the
character
com-
mittees
into
the
various
voluntary
bar
associations,
particularly in
view
of
the
fact
that
as
bar
integration
has
proceeded
in
other
states the ultimate
authority
for
disciplinary
action
has
been
placed
in
the
highest
court
of
each
state?
homa,
In
re Integration
of
State
Bar,
185
OQda.
505,
95
P.2d
113
(1939);
Mizzouri,
Le.imer
v.
Hulse,
352
Mo.
451,
178
S.W.2d
335
(1944).
See
also
Virgin
lands,
2
VI.
Code
Ann.
tit.
5,
Judicial
Procedure
app.
pt.
III,
rule
51
(1957).
24.
Fia.
Const.
art.
V,
§
1;
16o.
Const.
art.
V,
§§
1-2;
Neb.
Cort.
art.
V,
§§
1-2;
Okia.
Coust.
art.
VII,
§
1.
25.
State
v.
City
of
Avon
Park,
117
Fla.
565,
153
So.
159
(1934);
Rem
v.
State,
S9
Fla.
113, 103
So.
399
(1925);
In
re
Sparrow,
33S
Mlo.
203,
90
S.AVd
401
(1935);
In
re
Richards,
333
MIo.
907,
63
S.W.2d
672
(1933);
In
re
Sizer,
3C0
Mo.
369, 254
S.V.
S2
(1923);
State v.
Reynolds,
252
Mo.
369,
153
S.W.
671
(1913);
State
v.
Turner,
141
Neb.
556,
4
N.W.2d
302
(1942);
State
v.
Barlow,
131
Neb.
294, 263
N.W.
95
(1936).
1962]
COMMENTS
FORDHAM
LAW
REVIEW
A
Unified
Voice
Integration
gives
the bar
increased
prominence
in
the
community
by
provid-
ing
a
unified
voice,
26
so
that
greater
force
is
given
to
the
opinions
of
the
bar
on
matters
of
interest
to
lawyers.
This
is
significant
in
New
York
where
the
numerous
voluntary
bar
associations
have
created a
fragmentation
of
the
bar.
27
It
is
argued,
however,
that
this
unity
would
be
a
false one,
imposed
upon
minority
groups
espousing
divergent
views
on
questions
of
bar
discipline,
standards,
ethics,
and unauthorized
practice.
Furthermore,
chief
among
the
bar's
functions
is
lobbying for
measures
deemed
necessary
and
advantageous
for
good
government
and
the
proper administration
of
justice.
The
question
naturally
arises
as
to
the
propriety
of compelling
an
individual
to
join and
support
an
organization
which
campaigns
for
measures
to
which
he
may
be
opposed.
2
8
A1RGUIZENTS
AGAINST
INTEGRATION
Membership
Fee
as
a
Tax
One of
the
main
objections
to
integration
by
court
rule
has
been
that
membership
fees
would
be
a
tax
which
the
courts
are not
empowered
to
levy.
Several
cases
have
found
this
objection,
as
well
as
the
related
protest
that
the involuntary
assessment
constituted
a
deprivation
of
property
without
due
process
of law,
to
be
without
merit.2
In
Lathrop
v.
Donohue,
30
the
United
States
Supreme
Court
did
not
come
to
grips
with
these
constitutional
questions.
The
petitioner
contended
that
both
the
action
of
the
state
supreme
court integrating
the
Wisconsin
bar,
coupled
with
that
bar's
campaigns
for
legal
reforms,
were
violative
of due
process
and
equal
protection
as
guaranteed
by
the fourteenth
amendment.
The
Court
could
find
no
violation
of
the
first
amendment's
guarantee
of
freedom
of
association
but,
because
adequate
facts
did
not appear
in
the
record,
it
did
not
pass
upon
the
alleged
violation of
freedom
of
speech
or
upon
any
of
the
other
constitutional
issues.
31
In
view
of
the
increased
interest
26.
Petition
of
Florida
State Bar
Ass'n,
40
So.
2d
902
(Fla.
1949).
The
court
outlined
the
progress made
by
the
California
integrated
bar,
indicating
the
effectiveness
of
the
greater
resources
of
a
unified
bar.
It
publishes
a
journal
with
a
mailing
list
of
16,000,
giving
In
detail
the
accomplishments
of
the integrated
bar.
It
has
a
membership
of
15,000
and
a
budget
of
$250,000
annually.
Id.
at
905.
27.
See
Porter,
The
Bar:
Fragmented
All
Apart,
18
B.
Bull.
50
(N.Y.
County
Lawyers'
Ass'n
1960).
28.
See
note
29
infra
and
accompanying
text.
29.
In
re
Mundy,
202
La.
41,
11
So.
2d
398
(1942);
Ayes
v.
Hadaway,
303
Mich.
589,
6
N.W.2d
905
(1942);
Petition
for
Integration
of
the
Bar,
216
Minn.
195,
12
N.W.2d
SIS
(1943).
30.
367
U.S.
820
(1961).
See 45
3.
Am.
Jud.
Soc'y
49
(Aug.,
1961);
34
Wis.
B.
Bull.
43
(Oct.
1961).
31.
Mr.
Justice
Brennan,
writing
for the
Court
was
joined
by
Mr.
Chief
Justice Warren
and
Justices
Clark
and
Stewart.
This
segment
of
the
Court
relied,
to
a
large
extent,
upon
Rail-
way
Employees
Dep't
v.
Hanson,
351
U.S.
225
(1956),
which
held
that
the
reasonable
ex-
pectation
of
the
union
shop,
being
a
stabilizing
force
in
interstate
commerce,
justified
[Vol.
30
1962]
COMMENTS
in
the integrated
bar
it
appears
doubtful
that
the
Court
will
be
able
to
avoid
indefinitely
the
constitutional
issues
raised
by
Lathrop.
Until
such
a
time
the
state
courts
will
be
faced
with
the
"disquieting
constitutional
uncer-
tainty"
3 2
created
by
the
plurality.
Political
Encroachment
Those
who
disagree
with
the
usefulness
of
bar
integration
have
questioned
the
independence
of
such
an
organization
from
political
parties,
especially
in
a state
such
as
New
York,
where
control
of
judicial
patronage
plays a
major
role
in
the
functioning
of
the
county
organizationsPa
There
is
evidence
of some
presently
existing
political
control
of
a
few
bar
associations
and
the
fear
has
therefore
been
raised
that
these
occasional
attempts
by
political
factions
to
dominate
individual
voluntary
bar
groups
might
turn
into
a
fierce
struggle
for
control
of
a
monolithic
integrated
bar
if
such
bar
had
a
great
voice
in
the
selection
of
judges.
34
Unnecessary
Where
Voluntary
Bars
Arc Active
The
advantages
claimed
for
the
integrated
bar
are
the
same
that
an
efficiently
operating
bar
association
offers.
3
5
The
advocates
of
bar
integration
stress
the
fact
that
no
state
that
has
integrated
has
ever
returned
to
its
old
system.'-
On
the
other
hand,
no
state
with
an
efficiently
operated
voluntary
bar
of
which
a
high percentage
of actively
practicing
attorneys
were
members,
has
found
it
necessary
to
integrate.
Only
states
with
inadequate
voluntary
bar
associations
have
integrated.
Hence,
in
Kansas,
Illinois,
and
Iowa,
where
83%,
78-85%,
and
93%
respectively,
of
the
active
lawyers
in
the
state
belong
governmental
action
designed
to
foster
union
membership.
Thus
it
was
reasoncd
that
the
requirement
that
lawyers practicing
in
the
state
become
mcmbers
of
the
integratcd
bar
and
pay
reasonable
annual
dues
did
not
violate
the first
amendment's
guarantee
of
freedcm
of
association
as
made
applicable
to the
states
through the
fourteenth
amendment.
Mr.
Juztice
Harlan,
with
whom
Mr.
Justice
Frankfurter
joined,
concurred
in
the
judgmcnt.
Thcir
view
was
that
constitutional
rights
had
not
been
impinged
upon,
and
that
the
firt
amendment
question
should
not
be
left
in
doubt.
Mr.
Justice
Whittaker
concurred
in
a
Erparate
and
tersely
stated
opinion
in
which
he
declared
flatly
that
the
requirement
of
a
$15
annual
fe
did
not
violate
any constitutional
provision.
Mr.
Justice
Black,
in
his
disznt
,
cundudcd
that
there
could
be
"few
plainer,
more direct
abridgments
of
the
frecdoms
of
the
First
Amendment
than
to
compel
persons
to
support
candidates,
partic.,
ideologie
or
cau:
that
they
are
against."
367
U.S.
at
873.
Mr.
Justice
Douglas,
in
his
diwcnt,
loecd
upcn
the
Hanson
case
"as
a
narrow
exception
to
be
closely
confined
.
. . .
[lezt]
we
practically
give
carte
blanche
to
any
legislature
to
put
at
least
professional
people
into
gc2.--qtcpping
brigades."
Id.
at
S84.
32.
Id.
at
S48
(Black,
J.,
dissenting).
33.
Sayre
v
Kaufman,
Governing
New
York
City
53S-43
(1960).
34.
Id.
at
551.
35.
Edmonds,
Integration
of
the
Bar:
A
Boon
or
A
Bust?,
32
NY.S1B.
Bull.
297,
303
(1960).
36.
The
Oklahoma
legislature
did
repeal
its
integration
statute in
1939,
after
sEven
years
of operation,
but
a
new
and
similar
statute
was enacted
vithin
a
few
years.
See
ncte
12
supra
and
accompanying
text.
