BRIEFING
EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service
Author: Martin Russell
Members' Research Service
PE 621.870 – May 2018
EN
EU sanctions: A key foreign and
security policy instrument
SUMMARY
Sanctions have become an increasingly central element of the EU's common and foreign security
policy. At present, the EU has 42 sanctions programmes in place, making it the world's second-most
active user of restrictive measures, after the US.
Unlike the comprehensive trade embargoes used in the past, the EU has moved towards asset
freezes and visa bans targeted at individual persons and companies, aiming to influence foreign
governments while avoiding humanitarian costs for the general population. Other measures in the
sanctions toolkit include arms embargoes, sectoral trade and investment restrictions, as well as
suspensions of development aid and trade preferences.
The declared purpose of EU sanctions is to uphold the international security order as well as
defending human rights and democracy standards, by encouraging targeted countries to change
their behaviour. Measuring their effectiveness is difficult, as sanctions rarely achieve all their aims,
and usually there are other causes to which changes can be attributed. However, even when this
primary purpose is not achieved, sanctions may have useful secondary effects, for example by
deterring other actors from similar behaviour.
The broader the international support for EU sanctions and the closer the relationship between the
EU and the targeted country are, the stronger the prospects for success will be. On the other hand,
effectiveness can be undermined by inconsistent application of sanctions standards and by the
difficulty of coordinating implementation between multiple stakeholders.
In this Briefing
History of EU sanctions policy
Principles of EU sanctions policy
The EU sanctions toolkit
What impact do EU sanctions have?
Sanctions success factors and challenges
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History of EU sanctions policy
Until the 1980s, the European Community did not adopt its own sanctions; instead, Member States
took measures at national level to implement United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions
(which they, as UN members, were – and still are – obliged to follow). Until 1980, UN sanctions were
only adopted against two countries, Rhodesia (1965) and South Africa (1977). However, the end of
the Cold War made it easier to reach consensus at UN level, ushering in a 'sanctions decade' during
the 1990s.
Community sanctions in 1980 against the Soviet Union over its invasion of Afghanistan marked the
beginning of a coordinated European sanctions policy independent of the UN. The Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), established in 1992 by the Maastricht Treaty, further
strengthened coordination. Sanctions are becoming an increasingly central element of the CFSP,
with a steady increase in the number of countries under sanctions, from just six in 1991, to nearly
thirty
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at present. Between 1980 and 2014, the EU accounted for 36 % of the world's non-UN
sanctions, making it the second-most active user after the United States (36.9 %).
Principles of EU sanctions policy
Definition of sanctions
At UN level, sanctions are defined as 'measures not involving the use of armed force ... employed to
give effect to [UN Security Council] decisions' (Article 41 of the UN Charter). EU-level sanctions are
not explicitly defined in European law, but they serve a similar purpose in implementing the
decisions either of the UN Security Council or the Council of the EU.
When are sanctions used and against whom?
According to the Council's 2004 Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures, sanctions aim to
'maintain and restore international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN
Charter and of our common foreign and security policy'. UN principles and purposes include
maintaining international peace and security, preventing threats to peace, refraining from threats
to the territorial integrity of any state, and promoting human rights (Articles 1 and 2 of the UN
Charter). Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on the principles of the common foreign
and security policy includes a similar list, with the addition of supporting democracy.
Implicit in the UN's commitment to preventing threats to international peace is non-proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, the basis for UN and EU sanctions against Iran's and North Korea's
nuclear programmes. Territorial integrity is the basis for sanctions against Russia adopted by the EU
(but not the UN, due to Russia's Security Council veto). Recognising that threats to peace and
security come not only from governments, sanctions also target non-state actors, such as: al-Qaeda,
ISIL/Da'esh, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and rebel groups in Mali, Libya, Somalia and Yemen.
Despite the UN's commitment to human rights in its charter, it rarely adopts sanctions over
violations of human rights, not least due to opposition from Security Council members Russia and
China, which consider such issues 'domestic affairs'. However, human rights and democracy are the
dominant theme of most autonomous EU sanctions, for example against Belarus, Burundi, China,
Guinea and Venezuela. The EU has also adopted sanctions against former regime leaders accused
of misappropriating state funds, such as Tunisia's Ben Ali and Ukraine's Viktor Yanukovych.
Targeted sanctions
Early European sanctions often included very wide-ranging measures, for example an embargo on
Argentine imports in 1982 following the country's occupation of the Falkland Islands. However,
concerns about the humanitarian impact of the 1990-2003 UN trade embargo on Iraq have resulted
in a shift by the EU and the UN to a more targeted approach. EU sanctions therefore aim to have
EU sanctions: A key foreign and security policy instrument
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maximum impact on the persons responsible for the behaviour concerned – typically, the political
and military leaders of a regime – while minimising adverse humanitarian effects, where possible.
For this reason, the most commonly used EU sanctions are visa bans, asset freezes and arms
embargoes; such measures can cause considerable inconvenience to targeted individuals and
organisations without affecting the general population. Economic sanctions are rarer; where they
exist, they typically target one or two strategic activities, rather than the economy as a whole. For
example, sanctions against Russia restrict EU exports of technology and services used by the
country's oil industry to develop Arctic, deep-water and shale oil reserves, but do not affect Russian
exports of oil and gas to the EU.
The two exceptions to the principle of targeted sanctions are North Korea and Syria. It is true that
EU sanctions against these countries are less comprehensive than those against Iraq in the 1990s,
allowing humanitarian aid and limited trade. Even so, UN officials have expressed concerns about
the humanitarian impact of international (EU, US and in North Korea, UN) sanctions, which are
hindering vital medical supplies in both countries.
A targeted approach also applies to development aid. In response to severe human rights abuses,
the EU only very rarely cuts off development aid altogether. For example, even though it stopped
paying funds directly into the Burundi government budget in 2016, EU funding for NGO-led projects
and humanitarian aid continues.
Renewal procedures
EU sanctions (at least those based on a CFSP decision) are adopted for a limited period not longer
than a year, but sometimes only six or even three months. Towards the end of that period, the EU
reviews the situation and decides whether or not to extend sanctions.
Multilateralism
Even when UN-level sanctions are not possible, the EU aims for maximum impact by coordinating
with the widest possible range of partners. The EU has adopted most of its autonomous sanctions
in tandem with similar measures by the US and allied countries. For example, sanctions against
Belarus were adopted by the EU, the US, Canada, Switzerland, as well as several EuropeanEconomic
Area and candidate countries.
Differences between EU and US sanctions policy
Although the EU and the US often closely align their sanctions, there are several important
differences in their general approaches. Unlike those of the EU, most US sanctions are open-ended
and stay in force until a decision is taken to lift them. Partly as a result, the EU is often quicker to
respond to positive developments than the US; for example, in December 2016 the US eased some
restrictions against Myanmar/Burma, four years after the EU had lifted all of its sanctions except an
arms embargo.
US sanctions are generally broader in scope than EU ones. For example, US trade sanctions against
Syria restrict a much wider range of goods. In Russia, EU restrictions on cooperation with oil
companies bar new deep-water, Arctic and shale projects, but allow pre-existing projects to
continue; US sanctions bar both, and also apply to the gas sector. The EU's Ukraine-related sanctions
target 38 organisations, compared to 428 on the United States' list.
In addition, some US sanctions are extra-territorial in scope, meaning that non-US citizens and
companies are also expected to comply with them. For example, in 2015 French bank BNP Paribas
was fined US$9 billion for violating US sanctions against Cuba, Iran and Sudan. For its part, the EU
opposes such extra-territorial application of US and other third-country laws. In 1996, it adopted
legislation allowing Member States to take measures to protect citizens and companies from the
effects of such laws.
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This difference of views on extra-territorial scope has led to EU-US tensions; the French government
criticised the fine levied on BNP Paribas as 'unreasonable'. In 2017, the European Commission
expressed concerns about new US sanctions against Russia. In this particular case, five EU companies
cooperating with Russian gas producer Gazprom on its Nord Stream 2 pipeline – an activity that is
allowed by the EU – could face heavy fines as a result of possible new US sanctions on Russian energy
export pipelines. It remains to be seen whether the US will actually adopt such sanctions, and if so,
how the EU will respond.
The EU sanctions toolkit
Types of Common Foreign and Security Policy sanctions
As of February 2018, the EU has ten sanctions programmes implementing UN measures (for
example, against Somalia and Eritrea). In a further eight cases (Iran, North Korea), the EU applies its
own additional sanctions in parallel to UN sanctions. Finally, the EU has 24 autonomous sanctions
programmes, in situations where no UN sanctions exist (Russia, Venezuela).
The most widely used measures are asset freezes,
blocking individuals and organisations from
accessing bank accounts and investments held in the
EU. Usually they are combined with visa bans, barring
individuals from EU territory.
Arms embargoes prohibiting weapons exports to
countries such as China, Sudan and Yemen are very
common. In some cases there are also restrictions on
exports of dual-use goods (goods that can be used for
both civilian and military purposes – Russia, Iran), or
equipment that can be used for internal repression
(Belarus, Myanmar/Burma).
Examples of financial measures include bans on
bank transfers to and from North Korea, and on loans
to certain Russian banks and energy companies.
Investments in North Korea, Crimea and the Syrian oil sector are similarly banned.
Flight and shipping bans bar access to European airspace and ports to aircraft and ships from
North Korea and Syria.
Trade measures limit exports of oil to North Korea, and of certain equipment and technology to
Russian oil companies. Oil imports from Syria are banned.
Figure 1: Restrictive measures, 2018
Number of sanctions programmes including:
Source: EU sanctions map, 20 April 2018.
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How are CFSP sanctions adopted?
Most CFSP sanctions are adopted in a two-step procedure:
1. based on a proposal from the EU's High
Representative, the Council of the EU adopts a
decision, which, like other CFSP decisions must be
unanimous (Article 31, TEU);
2. the Council also adopts, by a qualified majority (Article
215 TFEU), a regulation with detailed provisions for
implementation, this time based on a joint proposal
from the High Representative and the European
Commission. In addition, Member States have to
adopt their own national rules implementing arms
embargoes and visa bans, as these areas are not EU
competences.
In practice, these two steps are simultaneous, with the Council adopting both the CFSP decision and
regulation at the same time. The involvement of the High Representative and the Commission in
preparing the proposals, and of the Council in adopting them, mean that the Council, the
Commission and the European External Action Service are the three institutions most involved in
sanctions. The European Parliament is informed of CFSP decisions on sanctions, but has no formal
role in taking them.
Sanctions-like measures
The EU toolkit includes measures which, though not officially referred to as sanctions, play a similar
role:
Cutting off bilateral negotiations
The EU responded to civil war in Syria and human rights abuses in Turkmenistan, by putting bilateral
agreements it had negotiated with the two countries (in 2008 and 1998 respectively) on hold. In
2014 it also suspended negotiations on a new trade and investment agreement with Russia.
Suspending development aid and loans
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries covered by the 2000 Cotonou Agreement (the
majority of aid recipients) commit to upholding human rights and democratic principles. In the
event of a country violating those commitments, Article 96 of the agreement provides for
consultations with the country concerned; if these fail to produce a satisfactory resolution,
'appropriate measures' including suspending or restricting aid are taken, by a unanimous decision
of the Council. Such measures have been applied to countries including Fiji (2000, 2007), Zimbabwe
(2002), Togo (2004) and in 2016, Burundi.
Respect for international law and human rights is also a condition for preferential European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) loans. Following the 2005 Andijan massacre, the Bank
pulled out of Uzbekistan, only returning ten years later; in 2014 it stopped issuing new loans in
Russia after the latter's aggression in Ukraine.
Withdrawing trade preferences
The EU's Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Regulation gives developing countries
preferential access to EU markets, allowing them to export more easily. That access is conditional on
compliance with human rights and labour rights conventions. Countries with additional privileges
under the GSP+ scheme also have to comply with environmental and good governance standards.
'Serious and systematic violation' of those principles may lead to dialogue with the country
concerned, and if that fails to reach a satisfactory conclusion, a temporary withdrawal of trade
'Informal' sanctions
Some sanctions are adopted by being
announced in Council of the EU or
European Council conclusions, without
going through the above formal
procedure. For example, in 2009 the
Council announced restrictions on
diplomatic contacts and development
aid for Honduras. In October 2017, it
suspended official visits to EU countries
by senior military officers from
Myanmar/Burma.
EU sanctions: A key foreign and security policy instrument
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privileges. To date, that has only happened three times: in 1997 (Myanmar/Burma, re-admitted to
the GSP in 2017), in 2007 (Belarus) and in 2010 (Sri Lanka; re-admitted to the GSP in 2017).
Based on environmental rather than human rights concerns, the EU can also ban fisheries imports
from countries having serious problems with illegal fishing. This ban currently applies to three
countries: Cambodia, the Comoros, and St Vincent and the Grenadines. Several others, including
Thailand and Kiribati, have received a warning. The decision to ban fisheries imports from a given
country is proposed by the Commission and confirmed by a qualified-majority decision of the
Council.
Procedures for adopting sanctions-like measures
Adoption procedures vary according to the type of measure: bilateral talks with a third country can
be cut off by an informal Council or European Council decision; development aid is suspended by
the Council of the EU, voting by qualified majority; trade preferences are withdrawn or restored by
a European Commission decision. As with CFSP sanctions, the Parliament is informed of decisions,
but takes no part in them.
What impact do EU sanctions have?
Economic impact of sanctions on targeted countries
As mentioned above, most EU sanctions programmes focus on visa bans, asset freezes and arms
embargoes – measures that have little overall economic effect. However, as the EU is the world's
biggest trading power, when it does adopt economic sanctions, they usually have a considerable
effect. In most cases, that impact is hard to quantify, given that sanctions are only one of many
factors influencing a country's economy.
Russia. One of the EU's most effective sanctions againstRussia is the ban on lending money to state-
owned banks, which has made it much harder for Russian businesses to access Western loans and
investment. In 2016, a US State Department study calculated that the average company targeted by
EU and US sanctions had lost about one-third of its revenue compared to non-sanctioned peers.
Measuring the impact on the broader economy is difficult, given that sanctions coincided with a
75 % drop in the price of crude oil, Russia's main export earner; nevertheless, in 2015 the IMF
estimated that EU and US sanctions were costing Russia 1.5 % of its GDP per year, potentially rising
to 9 % in the long term. Sanctions were therefore the second main cause, after the drop in oil prices,
of Russia's 2015-2016 economic recession.
North Korea. The lack of data from the reclusive country makes it impossible to quantify the impact
of international sanctions; nevertheless, there is strong evidence that North Korea's economy is
suffering. Admittedly, the EU's contribution to this is limited, given that even before sanctions,
Brussels was not a major trade partner, accounting for just7 %of North Korean foreign trade in 2006.
Syria. In 2010, the EU accounted for 95 % of Syrian oil exports and one-third of its foreign trade.
Syria's loss of oil export revenue, combined with other trade and investment restrictions imposed
by the EU and the US, has undoubtedly hurt the country, although any economic impact is tiny
compared to the effects of a devastating civil war, estimated by the World Bank to have cost the
equivalent of 400 % of Syria's pre-conflict GDP.
Iran. In 2012, the EU decided to stop importing Iranian oil, which at the time accounted for 80 % of
Iran's export earnings, 20 % of its GDP, and 80 % of government revenue. As a result of this embargo
and financial sanctions that made it hard for Iran to sell oil elsewhere, the country's oil exports
halved. Given Iran's critical dependence on oil, it is very likely that sanctions played a major part in a
sharp economic downturn: in 2012, growth plummeted to -7.4 %, compared to 2.6 % in 2011. After
sanctions were lifted in 2016, growth rebounded to 13.4 %.
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Myanmar/Burma. EU sanctions in place till 2012 banned investment in state-owned companies, as
well as imports of Myanmar gemstones and timber. Myanmar was also barred from the EU's
Generalised Scheme of Preferences, which would normally give it, as a least developed country, the
right to export to the EU without import duties. The direct impact of trade sanctions was probably
limited, as most of the country's trade is with partners that did not impose sanctions, China and
Thailand in particular; exports to the EU have doubled since sanctions were lifted in 2012, but still
only represent 5 % of the country's total exports. However, it is likely that ending sanctions has
helped the government's efforts to reform the economy and attract more foreign investment; the
latter has more than doubled, from US$1.3 billion in 2012 to US$3.2 billion in 2016.
Do sanctions work?
Of course, the purpose of sanctions is not to cause economic pain, but (according to the Council of
the EU) 'to bring about a change in policy or activity by the target country'. Judged by this criterion,
sanctions more often fail than not. EU and US sanctions have not been any more successful in
curbing the brutality of the Assad regime in Syria than UN measures were in Libya under Gaddafi.
13 years of sanctions have not stopped fighting or restored democracy in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo; in Sudan and South Sudan, both under EU and UN sanctions for many years, horrific
human rights abuses continue. According to one study, fewer than one-quarter of UN sanctions
achieve their aims. An analysis of the EU's CFSP sanctions is equally pessimistic,
2
but concludes that
other measures (for example, suspending development aid) are more likely to succeed.
Sanctions successes and failures in bringing about change
One of the most obvious sanctions success stories is the Iran nuclear deal signed in 2015. After nine
years of UN sanctions and three years of an EU oil embargo, Iran agreed to safeguards ensuring that
its nuclear programme would not be used to develop weapons; in exchange, some sanctions have
been lifted. In the country's 2013 presidential election, an economic crisis triggered by sanctions
swayed voters in favour of Hassan Rouhani, who had promised to work towards getting restrictive
measures lifted. Although the future of the deal is now in doubt due to the US threat to withdraw
from it, sanctions did at least succeed in their purpose of persuading the Iranians to sign up to it.
Sanctions do not usually succeed as unambiguously as this; where changes happen, they tend to
only partially match the demands expressed by sanctions, and in many cases, sanctions are only one
of several likely causes. A case in point is Zimbabwe, under EU sanctions since 2002. Despite brutal
repression, the opposition won the 2008 election, but President Robert Mugabe refused to step
down. After holding out for several months, Mugabe eventually agreed later to form a government
of national unity including opposition politicians. Though this arrangement did not fully meet the
EU's demand for Mugabe to resign, it was at least a step forward. There is evidence to suggest that
pressure on Mugabe to compromise came from regime leaders, eager to get EU and US freezes of
their personal assets lifted; on the other hand, an equally important factor may have been the
country's catastrophic economic situation, the result not of targeted sanctions but of misguided
domestic policies.
Indirectly, EU and US sanctions also may have helped to bring about change in Myanmar/Burma.
During their first 17 years, sanctions appeared to have very little effect on the country's military
junta. However, in 2008 the junta adopted a new constitution envisaging a handover of power to a
democratically elected civilian government. Since then, serious human rights abuses have
continued (the EU is currently considering asset freezes and visa bans on senior military officers
involved in alleged ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya minority in 2017). Nevertheless, progress was
sufficient to persuade the EU to lift all sanctions except for an arms embargo in 2012. The junta's
willingness to embrace reform appears to have sprung from its fears of over-dependence on China;
in order to break that dependence, Myanmar needed to reach out to Western countries, which it
could only do by responding to sanctions.
EU sanctions: A key foreign and security policy instrument
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By contrast, it would be difficult to argue that 12 years of EU and other international sanctions have
persuaded North Korea to abandon its quest for nuclear weapons. After years of missile tests, in
August 2017 Pyongyang threatened a strike on the US Pacific island of Guam, and in November 2017
it announced that it had developed a nuclear-capable missile capable of reaching the US mainland.
At first sight, sanctions against Russia have also failed to bring about change; almost no progress
has been made towards implementing theMinsk II agreement, the condition set by the EU for lifting
its economic sanctions. However, it could also be argued that sanctions have at least deterred Russia
from recognising separatist-controlled areas as independent states or encouraging further
expansion into territory controlled by the Ukrainian government. Moreover, there are tentative
signs that Russia may be willing to make concessions in order to get sanctions lifted; in September
2017, Russian President, Vladimir Putin, agreed to consider a UN peacekeeping mission throughout
the conflict zone, an idea that he had previously rejected, and in December he brokered the
exchange of over 300 prisoners between the two sides.
Achieving change is not the only purpose of sanctions
Although the declared purpose of sanctions is to achieve change, an absence of change does not
mean they have necessarily failed. Even when targets cannot be persuaded to change their
behaviour, sanctions can at least constrain their capacity to cause harm. For example, sanctions
made it harder for Iran to import the materials it needed for its nuclear programme, significantly
delaying implementation. Similarly, EU and UN sanctions have helped to cut off financing to al-
Qaeda and other terrorist groups.
Another purpose of sanctions is deterrence. The heavy cost of nuclear-related sanctions to North
Korea is likely to discourage other countries from following its example. Finally, sanctions are a
means of satisfying political demand for a response to crisis situations at a much lower human and
economic cost than military intervention.
Finally, sanctions also have a signalling effect, in that they confirm the EU's commitment to certain
values. For the EU to remain silent in the face of brutal repression of pro-democracy protests in
Tiananmen Square would have been morally unacceptable, even if the arms embargo adopted in
1989 has had little impact on China and is unlikely to influence its policies.
Sanctions success factors and challenges
Factors that help and hinder the success of sanctions
Broad international support is a key success factor
The more countries support sanctions, the harder it is for targets to get round them. Sanctions
against Iran were more effective because they were supported by most of the international
community. By contrast, Myanmar/Burma was able to hold out against EU and US sanctions for
decades, thanks to uninterrupted economic cooperation with China and other neighbouring
countries. Western arms embargoes have little effect on countries such as Myanmar and Syria, since
they can easily buy from alternative suppliers, such as China and Russia. Despite officially backing
the UN's position on North Korea, China and Russia are also suspected of undermining sanctions
against the country, for example through secret oil sales.
Targeted versus general sanctions – which work better?
As explained above, EU sanctions policy has shifted since the 1990s from more comprehensive
economic sanctions to targeted measures, such as visa bans and asset freezes, often aimed at a
country's elite. Sanctions experts are divided on the question of which approach works best. The
case of Iran, where the effect of sanctions on living standards helped to bring success, suggests that
the greater the economic impact of sanctions is, the more likely they are to get results. A counter-
example is Zimbabwe, where targeted sanctions worked by causing personal inconvenience to
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regime leaders. The choice between broad and narrowly targeted sanctions partly depends on
conditions in the country concerned. For example, economic sanctions against vulnerable
developing countries could come at an unacceptable humanitarian cost. Another consideration is
the nature of the behaviour that sanctions are intended to address. It could be argued that the
seriousness of North Korea's nuclear threat justifies the humanitarian impact of sanctions on the
country's population.
The more democratic a country, the greater the influence of sanctions
Sanctions aim to bring about change by inconveniencing a country's general population or its elite,
resulting in pressure on governments to make concessions. The case of Iran suggests that this
mechanism is most likely to work in countries that even if not fully democratic, at least provide for
an alternation of power. By contrast, authoritarian regimes do not allow public discontent at the
effect of sanctions to be expressed, let alone to influence government policy; this factor could help
explain why international sanctions on North Korea have not succeeded despite their economic
impact.
A second factor that also prevents sanctions from influencing policy is the 'rally round the flag'effect.
Instead of inspiring calls for change, sanctions can sometimes rally public opinion behind leaders,
perceived as defenders of the country against hostile foreign acts. In Russia, despite discontent at
an economic downturn aggravated by sanctions, a May 2017 poll suggests that an overwhelming
majority (70 %) of Russians want their country to continue its foreign policy unchanged, regardless
of sanctions, with only 19 % in favour of making concessions to get them lifted.
Sanctions are also favoured by close ties with the targeted country
The closer the economic and political ties between the countries targeted and those imposing
sanctions, the greater the leverage that sanctions can have. A statistical analysis of sanctions
between 1914 and 2006 shows a strong correlation between the level of pre-sanctions trade as a
percentage of the targeted country's GDP and the probability of a successful outcome. This factor is
another explanation why international sanctions against North Korea have not worked; after
decades of isolation, the country has become resilient to external influences.
Challenges faced by EU sanctions policy
Consistently defending the international order
One accusation often levelled against EU sanctions policy is a lack of consistency. The EU is
participating in anti-proliferation sanctions against Iran and North Korea; by contrast, its response
to Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests was much weaker. Iran is also targeted by EU sanctions due to
human rights abuses, unlike Saudi Arabia, where the situation is arguably worse. In 2007, the EU
withdrew Belarus's GSP trading privileges, citing the country's harassment of independent trade
unions; however, Vietnam, which continues to benefit from GSP, does not even have independent
trade unions. Sanctions are only occasionally adopted against major powers: the only sanction to
be adopted against China in 1989 for its violent repression of the Tiananmen Square protests was
an arms embargo; in 2008, no new sanctions were added after another wave of violence in Tibet. In
the same year, Russia's attack on Georgia went unpunished.
All of these inconsistencies suggest that sanctions decisions are often influenced by European
political and economic interests. There is an apparent reluctance to adopt measures against
countries that are allies or important trading partners, or are powerful enough to retaliate. Whether
or not this is true, even the appearance of inconsistency undermines the effectiveness of sanctions
as a deterrent. For example, having escaped sanctions after its 2008 conflict with Georgia, Russia
may have expected to get away with its 2014 aggression against Ukraine.
In the end, those expectations were disappointed: in July 2014, the EU and the US decided to adopt
economic sanctions against Russia, regardless of the cost (estimated by a 2017 study commissioned
EU sanctions: A key foreign and security policy instrument
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by the European Parliament at US$35 billion in lost exports between 2014 and 2016). EU sanctions
against Russia show that, despite a past track record of frequent inconsistencies, the EU is still
capable of putting its economic interests second to a principled defence of international law.
Coordinating sanctions between multiple players
EU sanctions decisions require unanimity between 28 countries with often disparate interests.
Adoption procedures are potentially cumbersome, involving the European Commission, the Council
of the EU and the European External Action Service. Again, sanctions against Russia are a positive
example of how such challenges can be overcome. In 2014, the EU responded swiftly to the Ukraine
crisis and, despite repeated challenges to its unity, has maintained sanctions in place since then.
Ensuring effective sanctions implementation
Once adopted, sanctions face numerous challenges. Targets often contest restrictive measures in
court, sometimes successfully; for example, in 2008 the European Court of Justice ruled that an EU
assets freeze had violated the rights of suspected al-Qaeda supporter Yassin Abdullah Kadi. Evasive
tactics include asset transfers to entities not under sanctions. To meet such challenges, studies have
recommended that, as the number of sanctions programmes continues to grow,the EU institutions
allocate more resources to sanctions policy; they have also called for closer coordination with
Member State authorities involved in sanctions enforcement.
Position of the European Parliament on EU sanctions policy
The Parliament has made several recommendations on sanctions policy, for example, in a February
2012 resolution, which criticises the EU's double standards, leading to different treatment of
'countries with similar human rights and democratic records'. The resolution goes on to criticise the
lack of coordination between Member States, resulting in ineffective enforcement of sanctions, and
the potentially counter-productive effects of sanctions, which sever the few remaining ties with the
countries 'most isolated from the international system'.
The Parliament's recommendations to amend such problems include defining clear criteria for
applying sanctions; consulting Member States and stakeholders such as human rights defenders in
targeted countries on the design of sanctions; and coordinating implementation more closely
between EU institutions, Member States, and other countries imposing sanctions. In addition, the
Parliament calls for adequate resources and expertise to support sanctions policy, as well as for
annual European Commission reports on sanctions implementation (a recommendation that has
not been followed). In 2009, the Parliament also asked to be consulted on future sanctions decisions.
In its resolutions on individual countries (such as Burundi, January 2017), the Parliament has
supported sanctions and in several cases has called for their expansion. For example, in 2013 the
Parliament demanded restrictive measures against those responsible for human rights abuses in
Bahrain; in addition, it has repeatedly (most recently in September 2017) urged the EU to follow the
example of the United States and Canada by targeting Russian officials involved in the death of
Russian whistle-blower Sergey Magnitsky and other gross human rights abuses.
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ENDNOTES
1
According to the EU sanctions map, as of May 2018 the EU has 42 sanctions programmes concerning 33 countries.
Several countries (such as Iran and Syria) are the targets of multiple EU sanctions programmes. Some of the items on
this list are not sanctions programmes as such, for example those concerning Haiti, Serbia and Montenegro (bans on
satisfying claims arising from former sanctions against these three countries), as well as the United States (measures
restricting extra-territorial effects of US law).
2
C. Portela, European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and why do they work? Routledge, 2010.
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www.eprs.ep.parl.union.eu (intranet)
www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank (internet)
http://epthinktank.eu (blog)
