indicated a significant main effect of Right to Sue Information, F (1,
151) ¼ 4.74, p ¼ .031,
η
p
2
¼ 0.03. Participants who received instructions
with the right to sue information (M ¼ 2.28, SD ¼ 1.03) performed
significantly worse on the quiz than those who did not receive in-
structions on the right to sue (M ¼ 2.84, SD ¼ 0.89). This result was
contrary to our hypothesis, which posited that participants who received
the right to sue information would have better knowledge of their rights
as a research participant.
A 3 (Consent Form Perspective: first person, second person, third
person) x 2 (Right to Sue Information: yes, no) x 2 (Participant Gender:
male, female) x 6 (Other Participants Present: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) between-
subjects ANOVA on the liberally-scored consent form quiz did not yield
any significant effects.
2.2.3. Persistence and performance on experimental tasks
2.2.3.1. Time spent on triangle task. A 3 (Consent Form Perspective: first
person, second person, third person) x 2 (Right to Sue Information: yes,
no) x 2 (Participant Gender: male, female) x 6 (Other Participants Pre-
sent: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) between-subjects ANOVA on time spent on the tri-
angle task yielded no significant effects.
3
2.2.3.2. Time spent on word completion task. A 3 (Consent Form
Perspective: first per son, second person, third person) x 2 (Right to Sue
Information: yes, no) x 2 (Partic ipant Gender: male, female) x 6 (Other
Partic ipants Present: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) between-subjects ANOVA on time
spent on the word completion task resulted in several significant ef-
fects.
4
However, all of these effects were subsumed by a significant
Consent Form Perspective x Right to Sue Information x Participant
Gender x Other Participants Present interaction, F (2, 152) ¼ 3.83,
p ¼ .024,
η
p
2
¼ 0.048.
To break down this four-way interaction, the data were separated
according to Right to Sue Information condition. Among participants
who received the right to sue information, the only significant effect was
a main effect of Other Participants Present, F (5, 89) ¼ 3.51, p ¼ .006,
η
p
2
¼ 0.165. Participants who had between two and five other participants
present in the laboratory (Ms ¼ 7:02, 7:18, 8:14, and 7:16, respectively)
spent considerably more time on the word completion task than partic-
ipants with no other participants present or only a single other partici-
pant present (Ms ¼ 4:49 and 4:18, respectively). Among participants who
did not receive the right to sue information, the only significant effect
was a Consent Form Perspective x Participant Gender x Other Partici-
pants Present interaction, F (5, 63) ¼ 2.53, p ¼ .037,
η
p
2
¼ 0.167. Follow-
up analyses suggested this interaction was driven by a marginal tendency
(p ¼ .074) for female participants to be affected by the presence of other
participants, taking more time on the word completion task when one or
more other participants were present. Male participants did not show this
tendency.
2.2.3.3. Performance on word completion task. A 3 (Consent Form
Perspective: first person, second person, third person) x 2 (Right to Sue
Information: yes, no) x 2 (Participant Gender: male, female) x 6 (Other
Participants Present: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) between-subjects ANOVA on the
number of words correctly completed revealed a significant main effect
of Consent Form Perspective, F (2, 152) ¼ 3.32, p ¼ .039,
η
p
2
¼ 0.042.
However, this effect was qualified by a Consent Form Perspective x
Participant Gender interaction, F (2, 152) ¼ 3.03, p ¼ .051,
η
p
2
¼ 0.038.
Female participants (M ¼ 4.28, SD ¼ 2.21) outperformed male partici-
pants (M ¼ 2.70, SD ¼ 1.42) among those who received the first person
consent form, t (75) ¼2.19, p ¼ .032, whereas male participants
(M ¼ 5.38, SD ¼ 2.14) outperformed female participants (M ¼ 4.12,
SD ¼ 1.68) among those who received the second person consent form, t
(60) ¼ 2.27, p ¼ .027. There was no gender difference among partici-
pants who received the third person consent form.
2.3. Discussion
Our first hypothesis – that consent form language perspective
would not affect participant perceptions of coercion – was sup-
ported. Although we understand this support is based on null ef-
fects, and interpretation of such effects can be difficult, we feel
confident in this outcome for two reasons: (1) the sample size here
was substantial enough that detecting even small effects should not
have been problematic; and (2) the current data essentially replicate
the null pattern obtained by Edlund et al. ( 2014). However, the
interactio n between the right to sue information and participant
gender on perceptions of coercion was an unexpected effect. These
results are somewhat similar to Sloan et al. (2013), who found
African American males expressed more pessimistic views about
their likelihood of arrest and convictionondrivingwhileintoxi-
cated (DWI) charges relative to other ethnicity/gender combina-
tions. Nonetheless, because Sloan et al. (2013) focused on
perceptions of freedom in a legal c ontext rather than a research
context, our finding requires further replication before any defini-
tive conclusions can be dr awn.
We also expected that providing participants with verbal informa-
tion about their research rights (particularly the right to sue the re-
search ers) would improve the accuracy of their recall regarding su ch
rights, but this was not the case. In fact, the opposite occurred: Par-
ticipants who were verbally informed of their right to sue performed
worse on the research rights qu iz than those who were not verbally
informed. We speculate that this decline in recall am ong verbally-
informed participants may be at tributable to a decrease in their moti-
vation to pay attention to the informed consent process after learning
their rights were protected. That is, upon hearing their rights were
protected, some participants may have had little de sire to actually read
and comprehend the specific content of the consent form. Another
possibility is that the additional information rece ived by participants in
the right to sue information condition disrupted memory consolidat ion
for the informed consent information. That is, receiving additional
verbal information may have interfered with memory processing for
the informed consent information as it occurred immediately after
Table 1
Mean Perceptions of Freedom vs. Coercion as a Function of Right to Sue Infor-
mation and Participant Gender, Study 1.
Right to Sue Information Participant Gender
Male Female
Yes 24.95 (3.87) 25.19 (3.90)
No 23.10 (3.88) 25.90 (3.46)
Note. Right to Sue Information x Participant Gender interaction, F (1,
151) ¼ 6.40, p ¼ .012,
η
p
2
¼ 0.041. Higher values reflect greater perceptions of
freedom within the experimental situation; standard deviations are presented in
parentheses.
3
An astute reader will note that the four-way interactions in this section are
significantly underpowered. The omnibus analyses were not focused on this
four-way interaction; instead, this approach was utilized to attenuate
experiment-wise error rates. Parallel lower-order confirmatory analyses reached
the same conclusions when the underpowered higher-order interactions were
dropped.
4
The significant effects in this analysis included a main effect of Consent
Form Perspective, F (2, 152) ¼ 4.82, p ¼ .009,
η
p
2
¼ 0.06; a main effect of Right
to Sue Information, F (1, 152) ¼ 7.43, p ¼ .007,
η
p
2
¼ 0.047; a Consent Form
Perspective x Participant Gender interaction, F (2, 152) ¼ 3.13, p ¼ .046,
η
p
2
¼ 0.04; a Right to Sue Information x Other Participants Present interaction, F
(5, 152) ¼ 2.96, p ¼ .014,
η
p
2
¼ 0.089; and a Consent Form Perspective x Right to
Sue Information x Participant Gender interaction, F (2, 152) ¼ 4.42, p ¼ .014,
η
p
2
¼ 0.055. To conserve space, we focused on the four-way interaction in the
Study 1 results section.
J.D. Heider et al. Methods in Psychology 2 (2020) 100015
4