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According to the allegations in her complaint, a few months later, plaintiff became aware
of inappropriate sexual behavior between defendant’s upper management and other nursing
assistants wherein staff were allegedly given preferential treatment in exchange for sexual acts.
Plaintiff reported this behavior to defendant’s human resources division and the state of Michigan.
On July 1, 2017, plaintiff finished her shift and, upon leaving the building, realized that
she had accidentally left her purse in a locked room. Plaintiff was unable to access the room until
the next day, when she discovered her purse had been stolen. Plaintiff reported the theft to
defendant, as well as the police department. Defendant, however, accused plaintiff of lying, and
defendant allegedly showed the police a false video recording of plaintiff leaving with her purse.
The police then charged plaintiff, on July 3, 2017, with making a false report. Defendant
terminated plaintiff’s employment shortly thereafter on July 7, 2017 Ultimately, the criminal
charge was dismissed when defendant could not produce footage of plaintiff leaving with her purse
on the day of the alleged theft.
Nearly three years later, in May 2020, plaintiff filed the instant seven-count complaint.
Plaintiff pleaded claims for harassment based on race and sex or gender, retaliation, and hostile
work environment in violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA), MCL 37.2101 et
seq. (Counts I through IV); wrongful discharge in violation of public policy (Count V); malicious
prosecution (Count VI); and abuse of process (Count VII). In lieu of answering the complaint,
defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). Defendant argued, in
part, that because all of plaintiff’s claims arose out of her employment, and she filed them more
than two years after they accrued, all her claims were barred by the contractual six-month (180-
day) limitations period contained in the Acknowledgment. Plaintiff countered that the
Acknowledgment was unenforceable as an unconscionable contract of adhesion and, alternatively,
that defendant should be estopped from relying on it because defendant did not provide her the
Acknowledgment in violation of the Bullard-Plawecki Employee Right to Know Act (ERKA),
MCL 423.501 et seq.
Ultimately, the circuit court agreed with defendant and dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims
under MCR 2.116(C)(7). The circuit court reasoned that the Acknowledgment “clearly and
unambiguously required plaintiff to file suit within six months after the date of the employment
action giving rise to suit,” and that plaintiff failed to provide any authority that the
Acknowledgment was unconscionable. Regarding plaintiff’s claim that defendant should be
estopped from relying on the Acknowledgment under the ERKA, the circuit court found that the
statute was not triggered because plaintiff had not requested her personnel file. Additionally, the
circuit court dismissed plaintiff’s abuse-of-process claim under MCR 2.116(C)(8), finding that
plaintiff failed to plead facts that defendant abused the criminal process for an ulterior motive after
its initiation. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration as to the abuse-of-process claim only, and the
circuit court denied her motion. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is properly granted when a claim is barred by a statute
of limitations. Such a motion is reviewed de novo and may be supported or opposed by affidavits,
depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. By Lo Oil Co v Dep’t of Treasury, 267
Mich App 19, 26; 703 NW2d 822 (2005). We accept “[t]he allegations of the complaint . . . as