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A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for
Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution Determining the Original Meaning of the Constitution
Gregory E. Maggs
George Washington University Law School
, gmaggs@law.gwu.edu
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Recommended Citation Recommended Citation
Maggs, Gregory E., A Concise Guide to the Articles of Confederation as a Source for Determining the
Original Meaning of the Constitution (2017). 85 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 397 (2017); GWU Law School Public
Law Research Paper No. 2017-18; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2017-18. Available at SSRN:
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A Concise Guide to the
Articles of Confederation as a Source
for Determining the Original
Meaning of the Constitution
Gregory E. Maggs*
A
BSTRACT
Judges and scholars often refer to the Articles of Confederation when
making claims about the original meaning of the United States Constitution.
To help readers understand and evaluate such claims, this piece describes the
formation and content of the Articles of Confederation and explains four ways
in which the Articles may provide evidence of the original meaning of the
Constitution. The two appendices to this piece contain an annotated copy of
the Articles of Confederation and a table linking provisions of the Constitu-
tion to their antecedents in the Articles.
T
ABLE OF
C
ONTENTS
I
NTRODUCTION
................................................. 398
R
I. O
VERVIEW OF THE
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
..... 401
R
A. The Continental and Confederation Congresses ..... 401
R
B. Key Sources for Research Concerning the Articles of
Confederation ....................................... 403
R
C. Description of the Articles of Confederation ........ 406
R
D. Drafting the Articles of Confederation .............. 409
R
E. Approval and Ratification ........................... 411
R
F. Successes and Shortcomings ......................... 414
R
G. Replacement by the Constitution .................... 417
R
II. D
EFINITIONS OF
O
RIGINAL
M
EANING
................... 418
R
III. F
OUR
W
AYS OF
U
SING THE
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION TO
M
AKE
C
LAIMS
A
BOUT THE
O
RIGINAL
M
EANING OF THE
C
ONSTITUTION
............ 420
R
A. Claims Based on a Comparison of the Text of the
Constitution to the Text Used in the Articles of
Confederation ....................................... 420
R
* Professor of the Law, The George Washington University Law School. The Author
thanks the Law School for its generous financial support and is grateful to his research assistant,
Mr. Frank Chang, for improving the Article in many ways.
March 2017 Vol. 85 No. 2
397
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398 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
B. Claims Based on a Comparison of the Structure of
Government Set Up by the Constitution to the
Structure of the Government Established by the
Articles of Confederation............................ 424
R
C. Claims Based on Extrinsic Evidence of the Framers’
Goals in Replacing the Articles of Confederation
with the Constitution ................................ 427
R
D. Claims Based on the Controversial Theory that the
Constitution Did Not Fully Replace the Articles and
that the Articles Therefore Continue to Supplement
the Constitution ..................................... 428
R
C
ONCLUSION
................................................... 431
R
A
PPENDIX
A: A
NNOTATED
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
.... 432
R
A
PPENDIX
B: T
ABLE OF
C
ONSTITUTIONAL
P
ROVISIONS AND
R
ELATED
P
ROVISIONS IN THE
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
................................. 448
R
I
NTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has looked to the Articles of Confederation
in more than 150 cases for guidance in determining the meaning of the
Constitution.
1
The most famous example appears in McCulloch v. Ma-
ryland.
2
In that case, the Court held that Congress has implied legisla-
tive powers based in part on a comparison of the text of the Tenth
Amendment of the Constitution to the text of an antecedent provision
in the Articles of Confederation.
3
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Marshall observed that while the Tenth Amendment limits Congress
to those powers “delegated” to it by the Constitution,
4
Article II of
the Articles of Confederation previously had limited Congress to
those powers “expressly delegated” by the Articles.
5
Chief Justice
Marshall concluded that omission of the word “expressly” indicated
that the Framers intended the Constitution to include implied con-
gressional powers. He reasoned: “The men who drew and adopted this
amendment had experienced the embarrassments resulting from the
insertion of this word in the articles of confederation, and probably
omitted it to avoid those embarrassments.”
6
1
A Westlaw search of “articles of confederation” in the Supreme Court database yields
175 cases.
2
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3
Id. at 406–07.
4
Id. at 406 (quoting U.S. C
ONST
. amend. X).
5
Id. (citing A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. II).
6
Id. at 406–07.
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 399
More modern examples of similar reasoning are abundant. Mem-
bers of the Supreme Court have cited the Articles of Confederation in
ten constitutional cases since John Roberts became Chief Justice, in-
cluding in major cases such as National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius,
7
McDonald v. City of Chicago,
8
and Arizona v.
United States.
9
Thousands of law review articles and hundreds of lower
court opinions have also relied on the Articles of Confederation in
addressing constitutional issues.
10
The Articles of Confederation, in-
deed, now appear to have almost as much influence in efforts to deter-
mine the original meaning of the Constitution as other key sources
such as the notes from the Constitutional Convention, the Federalist
Papers, and the records of the state ratifying conventions.
Despite the significant role of the Articles of Confederation in
constitutional interpretation, most lawyers and judges have received
little instruction about them. They typically know that the Articles of
Confederation set up a weak union whose shortcomings became ap-
parent in the 1780s and led to adoption of the Constitution. But they
usually do not study in greater detail the content of the Articles of
Confederation or how their provisions relate to the Constitution. This
brief Article seeks to address this situation by providing necessary in-
formation to those wishing to make or assess arguments about the
original meaning of the Constitution that rely on the Articles of Con-
federation. This Article complements four other recent guides by the
same Author addressing other sources of the original meaning.
11
Part I provides an overview of the Articles of Confederation. It
describes the Continental Congress and identifies key sources relating
to the Articles. It also outlines the content of the Articles and then
7
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2615 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(addressing the constitutionality of federal health care regulations under the Commerce Clause).
8
561 U.S. 742, 819 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)
(addressing the constitutionality of a municipal gun control law under the Second Amendment).
9
132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511–12 (2012) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judg-
ment) (addressing constitutionality of state law restrictions on immigration under the Supremacy
Clause).
10
A Westlaw search revealed 6046 law review articles and 1012 federal and state cases
referencing the Articles of Confederation.
11
Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Federalist Papers as a Source of the Original
Meaning of the United States Constitution, 87 B.U. L. R
EV
. 801 (2007); Gregory E. Maggs, A
Concise Guide to the Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention of 1787 as a Source of the
Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 80 G
EO
. W
ASH
. L. R
EV
. 1707 (2012); Gregory E.
Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions as a Source of the
Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. I
LL
. L. R
EV
. 457 (2009); Gregory E. Maggs, A
Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine the Original Meaning
of the Constitution, 82 G
EO
. W
ASH
. L. R
EV
. 358 (2014).
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400 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
describes their drafting and ratification. It further discusses the excep-
tional achievements and failures of the government created by the Ar-
ticles of Confederation.
Part II discusses different definitions of original meaning.
Part III then critically examines four types of claims about the
original meaning of the Constitution that rely in one way or another
on the Articles of Confederation. These include:
claims based on a comparison of the language of the Constitution
to the language of the Articles of Confederation;
claims based on a comparison of the structure of the government
set up by the Constitution to the structure of the government
established by the Articles of Confederation;
claims based on extrinsic evidence of the Framers’ goals in replac-
ing the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution; and
claims based on the controversial theory that the Constitution did
not fully replace the Articles of Confederation and that the Ar-
ticles therefore continue to supplement the Constitution.
As this Article will show with specific examples from Supreme Court
decisions, each type of claim has certain strengths and weaknesses.
Knowing these strengths and weaknesses may help writers bolster
their own claims about the original meaning that rely on the Articles
of Confederation and assess such claims when made by others.
Appendix A contains an annotated copy of the Articles of Con-
federation. Appendix B presents a table showing current constitu-
tional provisions and their antecedents in the Articles of
Confederation.
Before going further, one additional preliminary point requires
mention. Although this Article discusses how the Articles of Confed-
eration might be used as a source for understanding the original
meaning of the Constitution, it takes no position on whether or to
what extent courts must follow the original meaning. That is an inter-
esting and important question that other works address.
12
Suffice it to
say that researchers may want to know more about the original mean-
ing of the Constitution even if they do not believe that the original
meaning should necessarily dictate the answers to modern constitu-
tional issues.
12
See, e.g., G
REGORY
E. M
AGGS
& P
ETER
J. S
MITH
, C
ONSTITUTIONAL
L
AW
: A C
ONTEM-
PORARY
A
PPROACH
13–18 (3d ed. 2015).
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 401
I. O
VERVIEW OF THE
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
A. The Continental and Confederation Congresses
In the 1760s and 1770s, an important question arose about
whether the Parliament of the United Kingdom had power to impose
taxes on the American colonies. The passage of the Customs Act (or
“Tea Act”) of 1772 was a key event in this controversy. The Tea Act
went into effect on May 10, 1773.
13
This Act required Americans to
pay a duty on all imported tea.
14
The tax was not large, and Parliament
in fact simultaneously subsidized the cost of tea by eliminating export
duties on tea shipped from Great Britain.
15
Through the Act, Parlia-
ment apparently hoped to achieve American acquiescence to taxation.
On December 16, 1773, opponents of the Tea Act staged the so-
called “Boston Tea Party” as a protest.
16
They took tea belonging to
the British East India Company and threw it into Boston Harbor, thus
preventing its sale and the collection of any tax.
17
Parliament re-
sponded by passing five acts in early 1774 that were designed to pun-
ish Massachusetts and keep other colonies in check.
18
These laws were
called the “Coercive Acts” in Great Britain and the “Intolerable
Acts” in America.
19
Among other things, the Intolerable Acts closed
the Port of Boston,
20
lessened the autonomy of the government of
13
The Customs Act, 13 Geo. 3 c. 44 (Eng.), reprinted in 30 T
HE
S
TATUTES AT
L
ARGE
74
(Danby Pickering ed. 1773) (also known as the Tea Act).
14
See id. pt. II, at 76 (imposing a duty of £4 for every tub or chest of tea).
15
See id. pt. I, at 74–75 (“draw[ing] back” any duties for export of teas to any British
colonies in America).
16
The Port of Boston Act 1774, 14 Geo. 3 c. 12, pmbl. (Eng.), reprinted in 30 T
HE
S
TAT-
UTES AT
L
ARGE
335 (Danby Pickering ed. 1773) (describing the Boston Tea Party); see also
Boston Tea Party, E
NCYCLOPAEDIA
B
RITANNICA
, https://www.britannica.com/event/Boston-Tea-
Party (last updated Feb. 2, 2007).
17
The Port of Boston Act 1774, pmbl., at 335.
18
See, e.g., The Administration of Justice Act 1774, 14 Geo. 3 c. 39, § V (Eng.), reprinted
in 30 T
HE
S
TATUTES AT
L
ARGE
370 (Danby Pickering ed. 1773); The Port of Boston Act 1774
§ I, at 336–37; The Massachusetts Government Act 1774, 14 Geo. 3 c. 45, § I (Eng.), reprinted in
30 T
HE
S
TATUTES AT
L
ARGE
382 (Danby Pickering ed. 1773).
19
Intolerable Acts, E
NCYCLOPAEDIA
B
RITANNICA
, https://www.britannica.com/event/In-
tolerable-Acts (last updated Apr. 1, 2015).
20
The Port of Boston Act 1774 § I, at 336–37 (providing that “it shall not be lawful for any
person or persons whatsoever to lade put, or cause or procure to be laden or put, off or from any
quay, wharf, or other place, within the said town of Boston”).
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402 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
Massachusetts,
21
and provided that British officials could be tried in
England, rather than Massachusetts, if accused of crimes.
22
The Intolerable Acts prompted Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, New
York, and Massachusetts to call for the colonies to hold an assembly
which became known as the First Continental Congress.
23
The First
Continental Congress met from September 5, 1774 to October 26,
1774.
24
At its conclusion, the First Continental Congress called for a
Second Continental Congress to meet the following spring.
25
In the
interim, fighting broke out in Massachusetts when British forces un-
successfully raided the towns of Lexington and Concord in April
1775.
26
The Second Continental Congress convened on May 10, 1775
and continued meeting until March 2, 1781.
27
During this time, Con-
gress directed the fighting of the Revolutionary War, declared inde-
pendence from the United Kingdom, and established the Articles of
Confederation.
In his eighteenth-century Dictionary of the English Language, Sa-
muel Johnson defined a “confederation” as a “league” or “alliance.”
28
This definition accurately captures the essential nature of what the
Articles of Confederation established among the thirteen North
American colonies that had declared their independence from the
United Kingdom in July 1776. The Articles of Confederation were not
21
The Massachusetts Government Act 1774 § I, at 382 (providing that “the charter,
granted by their majesties King William and Queen Mary to the inhabitants of the said province
of the Massachusetts’s Bay . . . and all and every clause, matter, and thing, therein contained,
which relates to the time and manner of electing the assistants or counsellors for the said prov-
ince, be revoked, and is hereby revoked and made void and of none effect”).
22
The Administration of Justice Act 1774 § V, at 370 (providing that an official indicted
for “murder, or other capital crime” allegedly committed during “suppression of riots, or in the
support of the laws of revenue, or in acting in his duty as an officer of revenue . . . may be tried in
some other of his Majesty’s colonies, or in Great Britain”).
23
See Office of the Historian, Bureau of Pub. Affairs, Continental Congress, 1774–1781,
U.S. D
EP
TOF
S
TATE
, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/continental-congress (last
visited Dec. 23, 2016).
24
See Journals of the Continental Congress, L
IBR
.
OF
C
ONGRESS
, http://memory.loc.gov/
ammem/amlaw/lwjc.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2016).
25
See 1 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 102 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1904) (“Resolved, as the Opinion of this Congress, that it will be necessary,
that another Congress should be held on the tenth day of May next . . . .”).
26
See Battles of Lexington and Concord, E
NCYCLOPAEDIA
B
RITANNICA
, https://
www.britannica.com/event/Battles-of-Lexington-and-Concord (last updated Aug. 12, 2010).
27
See L
IBR
.
OF
C
ONGRESS
, supra note 24. R
28
Confederation, S
AMUEL
J
OHNSON
, A D
ICTIONARY OF THE
E
NGLISH
L
ANGUAGE
(London, J.F. & C. Rivington et al., 10th ed. 1792).
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 403
so much a constitution as a mutual defense treaty establishing a “firm
league of friendship” among newly-formed, co-equal states.
29
The drafting of the Articles of Confederation took place between
July 1775 and November 1777.
30
The subsequent state ratification pro-
cess was slow; the Articles were not ratified until March 1, 1781.
31
When Congress reconvened on March 2, 1781, it called itself “the
United States in Congress Assembled.”
32
Subsequently, many histori-
ans have referred to this body as the “Congress of the Confederation”
or “Confederation Congress” (although others still refer to it as the
“Continental Congress”).
33
The Confederation Congress met from
March 2, 1781 until March 4, 1789, when the federal government
under the Constitution took over.
34
Although the Articles of Confed-
eration did not remain in effect for a long period, experience under
the Articles paved the way for creating the far more enduring Consti-
tution.
35
As the subsequent discussion shows, the influence of the Ar-
ticles of Confederation remains discernable to this day.
B. Key Sources for Research Concerning the Articles of
Confederation
Researchers who are interested in discerning how the Articles of
Confederation may provide evidence of the original meaning of the
Constitution generally should start with a careful examination of the
text of the Articles. Appendix A contains an annotated copy of the
complete document, which is considerably shorter than the Constitu-
tion. The annotations explain difficult passages and link most of the
provisions to analogues in the Constitution. Appendix B contains a
table of constitutional provisions that have antecedents in the Articles
of Confederation.
29
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. III.
30
See 5 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 432 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1906); see also Office of the Historian, Bureau of Pub. Affairs, Articles of
Confederation, 1777–1781, U.S. D
EP
TOF
S
TATE
, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1776-1783/
articles (last visited Dec. 23, 2016).
31
See 19 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 223 (Gaillard Hunt
ed., 1912).
32
Id.
33
Congress of the Confederation, B
LACK
S
L
AW
D
ICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014).
34
See 19 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 31, at 223; 34 R
J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 605 (Roscoe R. Hill ed., 1937) (final
entry of the Journal of the Continental Congress on March 2, 1789).
35
1 F
RANCIS
N
EWTON
T
HORPE
, T
HE
C
ONSTITUTIONAL
H
ISTORY OF THE
U
NITED
S
TATES
280–88 (1901).
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404 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
After the text of the Articles of the Confederation, the best pri-
mary source for understanding the Articles is the thirty-four-volume
collection of the Journals of the Continental Congress, which is now
available for free online.
36
Carefully compiled, edited, and published
by the Library of Congress between 1904 and 1937, the Journals con-
tain all of the records—including formerly secret portions of the
records—that the Continental Congress kept from September 5, 1774
until March 2, 1789.
37
These records reveal substantial information
about the drafting of the Articles, beginning with Benjamin Franklin’s
early draft in July 1775,
38
and ending with the final version completed
in November 1777.
39
They also show how and why the state approval
and ratification process dragged from November 1777 to March
1781.
40
The records further reveal important details about how Con-
gress functioned both before and after ratification, and the call for the
Constitutional Convention and the replacement of the Articles of
Confederation with the new Constitution.
In addition to providing specific details about the Articles of
Confederation, perusing the Journals places the whole subject in con-
text by revealing the extraordinary military, financial, diplomatic, and
political exigencies that the Continental Congress had to address. For
example, on June 12, 1776, the same day that the Continental Con-
gress created a committee to draft the Articles of Confederation, it
approved a resolution that “General Washington be directed to order
the riffles of such men belonging to the riffle regiments as will not re-
inlist, to be purchased.”
41
On November 15, 1777, the day Congress
approved the text of the Articles of Confederation for submission to
the states, they also dealt with General Washington’s increasingly ur-
gent call “to send, without delay, to the army under his command, the
blankets and other articles of cloathing” that had previously been re-
quested and would be desperately needed during the bitter winter the
Army spent in Valley Forge.
42
On March 2, 1781, in the first session
following ratification of the Articles, Congress took up the news that
36
L
IBR
.
OF
C
ONGRESS
, supra note 24. R
37
Id.
38
2 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 195–99 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1905).
39
9 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 907–25 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1907).
40
See generally 2 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 38; 9 R
J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 39. R
41
5 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 30, at 432. R
42
9 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 39, at 906–07. R
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 405
Henry Laurens, who had been the President of the Continental Con-
gress from November 1, 1777 to December 9, 1778, was “taken upon
the high seas, instead of being treated as a Prisoner of War, was sent
to the Tower of London, put into close confinement, and by the tenor
of his commitment is pretended to be considered as a traitorous sub-
ject of the King of Great Britain.”
43
And on February 20, 1787, the
day before Congress called for the assembly that became the Consti-
tutional Convention, the members were greatly concerned with con-
flicts with Indian tribes.
44
Congress resolved that
the Secretary at War be, and he is hereby directed to take
order for immediately posting the Troops now in the Western
Country at such places, as most effectually under circum-
stances to protect the Inhabitants, on the Western frontier of
Pennsylvania and Virginia from incursions and depredations
of the Savages.
45
The classic secondary source for understanding the creation of
the Articles of Confederation, the United States’s experience under
the Articles, and the Articles’ ultimate failure is Francis Newton
Thorpe’s The Constitutional History of the United States (available for
free online).
46
Another fine work, cited in eight Supreme Court cases,
is Merrill Jensen’s The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of
the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution,
17741781.
47
Numerous law review articles also helpfully address spe-
cific questions about the relationship of the Articles of Confederation
to the Constitution.
48
43
19 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 31, at 227; see R
also U.S. Cong., LAURENS, Henry, 1724–1792, B
IOGRAPHICAL
D
IRECTORY OF THE
U.S. C
ON-
GRESS
, http://bioguide.congress.gov/scripts/guidedisplay.pl?index=L000121 (last visited Dec. 20,
2016).
44
32 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 69 (Roscoe R. Hill ed.,
1936).
45
Id.
46
See generally 1 T
HORPE
, supra note 35, at 208–88. R
47
M
ERRILL
J
ENSEN
, T
HE
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
: A
N
I
NTERPRETATION OF THE
S
OCIAL
-C
ONSTITUTIONAL
H
ISTORY OF THE
A
MERICAN
R
EVOLUTION
, 1774–1781 (1959).
48
See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Why Constitutional Lawyers and Historians Should Take a
Fresh Look at the Emergence of the Constitution from the Confederation Period: The Case of the
Drafting of the Articles of Confederation, 60 T
ENN
. L. R
EV
. 783, 784 (1993); Vasan Kesavan,
When Did the Articles of Confederation Cease to Be Law?, 78 N
OTRE
D
AME
L. R
EV
. 35 (2002);
Douglas G. Smith, An Analysis of Two Federal Structures: The Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution, 34 S
AN
D
IEGO
L. R
EV
. 249, 255–56 (1997).
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406 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
C. Description of the Articles of Confederation
Articles I, II, and III of the Articles of Confederation concerned
the nature of the Confederacy. They announced that it would be
called “The United States of America,”
49
but emphasized that each
state would retain its own “sovereignty, freedom and independence”
50
and every power not “expressly delegated” to Congress.
51
They fur-
ther committed the states to a common defense, “binding themselves
to assist each other, against all force offered to, or attacks made upon
them, or any of them.”
52
Articles IV, V, VI, VII, and IX addressed domestic and foreign
relations and military matters. They specified that no state could deny
the “privileges and immunities” of citizens of other states and re-
quired the states to allow freedom of movement.
53
They gave each
state one vote in Congress.
54
They further specified that only Con-
gress, not the states, could engage in foreign diplomacy, enter treaties,
receive ambassadors, and declare war.
55
They described how states
would raise military forces and authorized the state legislatures to ap-
point military officers below the rank of colonel.
56
They also provided
that Congress would resolve disputes among the states.
57
Articles VIII and XII concerned the finances of the Confedera-
tion. They provided that the United States would pay expenditures
from funds contributed by state legislatures and that states would con-
tribute in proportion to the value of the real property located within
their territories.
58
These provisions also reaffirmed any debts incurred
before the effective date of the Articles of Confederation.
59
Article X authorized a committee of the states to make certain
decisions and take certain administrative actions when Congress was
not in session.
60
Article XI provided for admission of Canada to enter
the confederation.
61
Article XIII required the states to comply with
the Acts of Congress, declared the union of the states to be perpetual,
49
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. I.
50
Id. art. II.
51
Id.
52
Id. art. III.
53
Id. art. IV, para. 1.
54
Id. art. V, para. 4.
55
Id. art. VI.
56
Id. art. VII.
57
Id. art. IX, para. 2.
58
Id. art. VIII.
59
Id. art. XII.
60
Id. art. X.
61
Id. art. XI.
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 407
and specified that any changes to the Articles of Confederation would
require approval of Congress and ratification by all the states.
62
Notably absent from the Articles of Confederation is any provi-
sion for a separate executive branch of government. Congress, accord-
ingly, had to make executive decisions itself. For example, in perusing
the Journals of the Continental Congress, it is common to see Congress
considering resolutions on topics such as whether “to order the party
of Colonel Bland’s regiment of light dragoons now at Charlotteville,
to proceed to South Carolina forthwith and join the regiment there”
63
and whether “to send Mr. Carmichael to the Court of Portugal in pur-
suance of the resolution of the 11th day of July, 1781, [provided] he
shall have good grounds to expect that such a measure will attain the
object proposed by the Superintendant of Finance.”
64
But it would be
an overstatement to say the United States had no “executive” agen-
cies or officials. Because Congress could not carry out all of its deci-
sions without assistance, it created what are now called executive
departments. These included, among other bodies, a Board of Trea-
sury, a Board of War, a Board of Admiralty, and a Department of
Foreign Affairs, all of which compiled records that still exist.
65
The Articles of Confederation also did not create a general na-
tional court system as the United States has today. But the Articles
did provide for the appointment of specialized courts for “trial of pira-
cies and felonies committed on the high seas” and “cases of cap-
tures.”
66
It further allowed Congress to create courts to hear cases
between states concerning “boundary, jurisdiction, or any other
causes,” and it designated Congress as “the last resort on appeal” in
all such cases.
67
The Constitution now gives these roles to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
68
The Articles of Confederation delegated a number of strong pow-
ers to the Confederation Congress. As under the current Constitution,
Congress had sole power, exclusive of the states, to declare war, send
62
Id. art. XIII.
63
15 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 1367 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1909).
64
22 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 250 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1914).
65
Records of the Continental and Confederation Congresses and the Constitutional Con-
vention, N
ATIONAL
A
RCHIVES
, http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/
360.html#360.4 (last updated Aug. 15, 2016) (identifying the existing collections of the records
from these different boards).
66
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. IX.
67
Id.
68
U.S. C
ONST
. art. III, § 2, cls. 1–2.
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408 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
and receive ambassadors, make treaties, and prohibit exportation and
importation of goods, and grant letters of marque and reprisal.
69
Con-
gress also could borrow and spend money, a power which it exercised
in great measure.
70
When the new federal government took over in
1789, the Continental and Confederation Congresses had already
amassed a national debt of more than $70 million.
71
Congress also had
power to build an Army and Navy,
72
which it used successfully to de-
feat the United Kingdom, the world’s greatest military power.
But the Confederation Congress lacked two key powers. No pro-
vision gave Congress power to regulate commerce, a power which was
left to the states themselves. Congress also could not directly impose
taxes. Instead, the revenue of the United States was to be “supplied
by the several states, in proportion to the value of all land within each
state.”
73
And the “taxes for paying that proportion” were to be “levied
by the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several
states.”
74
The states routinely failed to meet their obligations. Con-
gress had no options other than to “remind the states” of the necessity
of making payments or to excuse the debts.
75
On April 24, 1784, a
report to Congress lamented: “The requisitions of October 30, 1781,
for eight millions of dollars, and of October 16, 1782, for two millions
of dollars, have been so partially complied with, and in such unequal
proportions, that Congress can retain no hopes of their full
execution.”
76
The Articles of Confederation contained no Bill of Rights. Dur-
ing the drafting of the Articles, no member proposed one.
77
Historian
Francis Newton Thorpe suggests the drafters may have thought that
Congress would have such limited powers that it could not take ac-
tions which would violate individual rights.
78
The Articles of Confederation is considerably shorter than the
Constitution, having only 3400 words as compared to the Constitu-
tion’s 4500 words (excluding the constitutional amendments). But at
69
See A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. IX.
70
Id.
71
Our History, U.S. D
EP
TOF
T
REASURY
, https://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/
histdebt/histdebt_ourheritage.htm (last updated Apr. 29, 2014).
72
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. IX.
73
Id. art. VIII.
74
Id.
75
26 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 299 (Gaillard Hunt ed.,
1928).
76
Id.
77
See 1 T
HORPE
, supra note 35, at 232. R
78
See id.
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 409
the same time, the Articles of Confederation are more verbose, in
some respects. The document covers fewer subjects but treats them in
greater detail and, generally, with less eloquence. Article XIII pro-
vided that the Articles could be altered if “such alteration be agreed
to in a congress of the united states, and be afterwards con-firmed by
the legislatures of every state,” but no amendments were ever made.
79
When Congress called for a convention to consider amendments on
February 21, 1787,
80
this convention quickly changed course, drafting
and reporting a completely new Constitution to replace the Articles of
Confederation.
81
D. Drafting the Articles of Confederation
The Journals of the Continental Congress document the drafting
of the Articles of Confederation. As noted above, the Second Conti-
nental Congress began meeting in May of 1775, shortly after the fight-
ing began in Boston.
82
Although the United States did not declare
independence until more than a year later, Benjamin Franklin very
early on foresaw the direction that the conflict was heading. On his
own initiative, he drew up proposed “Articles of Confederation,”
which he presented on July 21, 1775.
83
Congress, however, did not act on Franklin’s proposal immedi-
ately. Instead, the impetus for forming a confederation came on June
11, 1776, when James Randolph proposed that the Continental Con-
gress declare its independence from the United Kingdom.
84
Congress
immediately appointed a committee to draft this declaration consist-
ing of Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger
Sherman, and Robert Livingston
85
At this point, Congress realized
that if the colonies did become independent, they would need to work
out some kind of new legal arrangement to keep them aligned with
each other and to establish foreign relations with other nations. Ac-
cordingly, on the same day, Congress resolved “that a committee be
appointed to prepare and digest the form of a confederation to be
entered into between these colonies.”
86
79
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. XIII.
80
32 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 44, at 73–74. R
81
See Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the Federal Constitutional Convention,
supra note 11, at 1711. R
82
See supra note 27 and accompanying text. R
83
2 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 38, at 195–99. R
84
5 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 41, at 431. R
85
Id.
86
Id.
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410 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
The committee to draft the Articles of Confederation was formed
the following day, on June 12, 1776.
87
The committee was to consist of
one member from each “colony”—a word soon to be replaced with
“state.”
88
The initial committee included John Dickinson, Samuel Ad-
ams, Roger Sherman, and other luminaries of the era.
89
The commit-
tee did not include Benjamin Franklin, presumably because he was
busy with the Declaration of Independence. The committee, however,
incorporated many of Franklin’s ideas from the draft he had prepared
the previous year.
90
On July 12, 1776, the drafting committee presented a draft of the
Articles of Confederation to the Continental Congress.
91
The manu-
script was handwritten by John Dickinson.
92
This draft contained
twenty articles and was similar in many ways to the final version of the
Articles discussed above.
93
The limited nature of the proposed Con-
federation is typified by emphatic statements like “the United States
assembled shall never impose or levy any Taxes or Duties, except in
managing the Post-Office . . . .”
94
Congress did not immediately discuss the draft of the Articles of
Confederation, but instead ordered copies to be printed for subse-
quent discussion.
95
Starting on July 22, 1776, and on selected days af-
terward, Congress began meeting as a committee of the whole to
address the Articles.
96
Because these were not formal sessions, official
records were not kept. But notes taken by John Adams and Thomas
Jefferson describe some of what occurred during these sessions.
97
Perhaps the two most controversial topics discussed were how the
Confederation would make decisions and how it would raise money
from the states. Congress ultimately decided that each state would
have one vote and that each state would contribute money according
to the total value of the property located in the state.
98
According to
87
See id. at 433.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 545, 546 & n.1; 2 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra
note 38, at 195–99 (Franklin’s “Articles of Confederation”). R
91
5 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
, supra note 41, at 546. R
92
Id. at 546–54 (reprinting the draft).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 552 (portion of the proposed article XVIII).
95
Id. at 555.
96
Id. at 600.
97
6 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 1069–83 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1906) (notes of John Adams); id. at 1085–1106 (notes of Thomas Jefferson).
98
9 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 39, at 910, 913–14. R
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 411
notes taken by John Adams, on July 30, 1776, Franklin presciently ar-
gued that this formula was a recipe for failure: “Let the smaller Colo-
nies give equal money and men, and then have an equal vote. But if
they have an equal vote without bearing equal burthens, a confedera-
tion upon such iniquitous principles will never last long.”
99
Franklin
proposed that the Articles of Confederation should provide for the
states to vote “in proportion to numbers,” but this proposal failed.
100
In discussions of that suggested alternative, one difficulty that arose
was how to count slaves.
101
Benjamin Harrison V, a delegate from Vir-
ginia and the father of President William Henry Harrison and great-
grandfather of President Benjamin Harrison, “proposed a compro-
mise, that two slaves should be counted as one freeman”—presaging
the similar three-fifths compromise that later marred the Constitu-
tion.
102
But Congress did not change the rule that each state would
have one vote.
103
E. Approval and Ratification
Despite the importance of formally uniting the states, Congress
was extremely busy with the conduct of the Revolutionary War and
could not devote its full attention to the proposed draft of the Articles
of Confederation.
104
Debates and discussions on the subject took place
from time to time until Congress ultimately approved the final version
of the Articles on November 15, 1777.
105
Because the Articles of Con-
federation were like a multilateral treaty, before they could go into
effect, each of the thirteen state legislatures had vote to approve them
and then formally ratify them.
106
Congress sent a copy of the Articles to each state together with a
letter urging their approval.
107
The drafters knew that the Articles
were not perfect, but they stressed that they were about the best that
the states could hope for under the circumstances.
108
Congress ex-
plained that “progress [had] been attended with uncommon embar-
99
Id. at 1079.
100
Id. at 1081.
101
Id. at 1099–1100.
102
Id. at 1100 (notes of Thomas Jefferson); see also U.S. Cong., HARRISON, Benjamin,
(1726–1791), B
IOGRAPHICAL
D
IRECTORY OF THE
U.S. C
ONGRESS
, http://bioguide.congress.gov/
scripts/biodisplay.pl?index=H000262 (last visited Dec. 26, 2016).
103
9 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 39, at 910. R
104
See Freedman, supra note 48, at 799–800. R
105
9 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 39, at 906–07. R
106
See id. at 925.
107
Id. at 932–34.
108
See id. at 933.
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412 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
rassments and delay.”
109
In its letter, Congress cited the difficulty of
having to prepare provisions “accommodated to the opinion and
wishes of the delegates of so many states, differing in habits, produce,
commerce, and internal police.”
110
Congress also stressed to the states
that forming a union would “confound our foreign enemies, defeat the
flagitious practices of the disaffected, strengthen and confirm our
friends, support our public credit, restore the value of our money, en-
able us to maintain our fleets and armies, and add weight and respect
to our councils at home, and to our treaties abroad.”
111
Table 1 details
the timeline of when the legislatures of each state approved and rati-
fied the Articles of Confederation.
T
ABLE
1. A
PPROVAL AND
R
ATIFICATION OF THE
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
State Legislature Approved Ratified
Virginia December 16, 1777 July 9, 1778
South Carolina February 5, 1778 July 9, 1778
New York February 6, 1778 July 9, 1778
Rhode Island February 9, 1778 July 9, 1778
Connecticut February 12, 1778 July 9, 1778
New Hampshire March 4, 1778 July 9, 1778
Pennsylvania March 5, 1778 July 9, 1778
Massachusetts March 10, 1778 July 9, 1778
North Carolina April 5, 1778 July 21, 1778
Georgia February 26, 1778 July 24, 1778
New Jersey November 19, 1778 November 26, 1778
Delaware February 1, 1779 February 1, 1779
Maryland February 2, 1781 March 1, 1781
Nine state legislatures—all except New Jersey, Delaware, and
Maryland—took heed of Congress’s urging and quickly considered,
approved, and authorized their delegates to ratify the Articles of
Confederation.
112
Ratification took place in Congress, with delegates
from these states signing a parchment on which the Articles were
engrossed.
113
Delegates from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 933–34.
112
11 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 677 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1908).
113
See id.
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 413
Carolina signed the document on July 9, 1778.
114
The delegates from
North Carolina and Georgia were absent that day but signed on July
21 and July 24 respectively.
115
This left only New Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland. Their
delegates informed Congress that their state legislatures had not
approved the Articles of Confederation because they were concerned
about claims that several of the other states were making to land to
the west.
116
In particular, New York, Virginia, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia all asserted
far-reaching boundaries based on their original charters.
117
The other
states did not have such claims and were concerned that they might
later be dwarfed in size.
118
Despite these concerns, New Jersey approved the Articles of
Confederation on November 26, 1778,
119
and Delaware approved
them on May 5, 1779.
120
This left Maryland as the sole holdout, and it
did not approve the Articles of Confederation until February 2,
1781.
121
Although the other states’ territorial claims were not fully
resolved by that time, steps toward compromise occurred. The New
York legislature passed a law on February 19, 1780, agreeing to settle
the western boundary and cede the western lands to the United
States.
122
Similarly, Connecticut conditionally offered to relinquish its
claims to western lands on October 10, 1780.
123
And when Maryland
ultimately did give approval, it expressly asserted a claim to a
proportionate share of the “back country.”
124
Those who worked on the drafting and ratification of the Articles
of Confederation undoubtedly learned important lessons in nation-
building. Benjamin Franklin and five of the men who signed the
114
See id.
115
Id. at 677, 709, 716.
116
See id. at 677; see also 1 T
HORPE
, supra note 35, at 229; Peter A. Appel, The Power of R
Congress “Without Limitation”: The Property Clause and Federal Regulation of Private Property,
86 M
INN
. L. R
EV
. 1, 16–17 (2001).
117
See 1 T
HORPE
, supra note 35, at 229–30, 230 n.1 (summarizing these claims and what R
ultimately happened with respect to them).
118
See id.
119
12 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 1164 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford ed., 1908).
120
14 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, at 548 (Worthington
Chauncey Ford, ed., 1909).
121
19 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 31, at 213–14. R
122
3 J
OHN
B
ACH
M
C
M
ASTER
, A H
ISTORY OF THE
P
EOPLE OF THE
U
NITED
S
TATES
, F
ROM
THE
R
EVOLUTION TO THE
C
IVIL
W
AR
95 (1921).
123
12 R
EGISTER OF
D
EBATES IN
C
ONGRESS
1334 (1836).
124
19 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 31, at 139. R
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414 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
Articles of Confederation on behalf of the ratifying states later
participated in the Constitutional Convention: Daniel Carroll
(Maryland), John Dickinson (Delaware), Gouverneur Morris (New
York), Robert Morris (Pennsylvania), and Roger Sherman
(Connecticut).
125
F. Successes and Shortcomings
The ratification of the Articles of Confederation in March 1781
did not dramatically alter the conduct of Congress. Congress had not
been waiting patiently for a formal union to get started with the busi-
ness of governing. On the contrary, it had been actively directing the
conduct of the war since 1775.
126
It declared independence on behalf
of the colonies in a united manner.
127
It requested that state legisla-
tures take measures such as imposing embargoes on the export of
needed commodities.
128
It not only raised an army but also enacted
the Articles of War to govern the army.
129
It entered into diplomatic
relations with foreign nations and attempted to negotiate peace.
130
It
borrowed money and issued bills of credit.
131
In short, it did many of
the functions of a government formed under a proper constitution.
Although the Articles of Confederation were not perfect, they
were sufficient to allow Congress to achieve many admirable accom-
plishments. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress led a suc-
cessful war effort under extremely difficult circumstances. The
Articles kept the thirteen colonies together in times of great stress
even though they often had very differing interests. The Articles al-
lowed Congress to make foreign allies who provided loans and mili-
tary assistance.
132
The Articles also established a nation that secured
recognition and a very favorable settlement from the United Kingdom
in the Treaty of Paris in 1783.
133
And in the Northwest Ordinance
passed under the Articles of Confederation, Congress came up with a
plan to organize the disputed western lands, to provide for the even-
125
12 J
OHN
F
ISKE
, T
HE
H
ISTORICAL
W
RITINGS OF
J
OHN
F
ISKE
430–32 (1902).
126
See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. R
127
See T
HE
D
ECLARATION OF
I
NDEPENDENCE
pmbl. (U.S. 1776).
128
See, e.g., 11 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 112, at R
569 (resolution recommending to the several states that they embargo wheat, rice, rye, Indian
corn, flour, bread, beef, pork, and other commodities).
129
5 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 41, at 788–807. R
130
See id. at 490.
131
See id. at 551.
132
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. VI.
133
See generally 1 H
OWARD
W. P
RESTON
,D
OCUMENTS
I
LLUSTRATIVE OF
A
MERICAN
H
IS-
TORY
1606–1863 (1886).
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 415
tual admission of new states into the Union, and to address some of
the divisive issues presented by slavery.
134
Yet, despite these successes, Congress struggled constantly with
the inherent weakness and other flaws of the Confederation. Perhaps
the best source for understanding the problems of the Articles of Con-
federation as they were perceived in the late 1780s is the Federalist
Papers, a collection of eighty-seven essays written by Alexander Ham-
ilton, James Madison, and John Jay in 1787 and 1788 to convince the
people of New York to support ratification of the U.S. Constitution.
135
Federalists Nos. 15 to 22 specifically addressed perceived “insufficien-
cies” and “other defects” in the Articles of Confederation.
136
Finances were a great issue. Fighting a war and recovering from
its aftermath cost a fortune.
137
Scarcely a page of the Journals does not
include discussion of the need to approve some great expense.
138
As
noted above, the states did not meet their obligations to provide for
the common treasury.
139
While Congress could make promises to pay
in the future with bills of credit, these soon lost their currency as it
appeared that Congress could never pay off its war debts.
140
Federalist
No. 15 captured the problem: “Do we owe debts to foreigners and to
our own citizens contracted in a time of imminent peril for the preser-
vation of our political existence? These remain without any proper or
satisfactory provision for their discharge.”
141
Foreign policy was also a difficulty. Although the Articles of Con-
federation in theory left diplomatic matters to Congress, the states en-
gaged in their own international negotiations. They also refused to
adhere to the terms of treaties. Federalist No. 22 lamented:
No nation acquainted with the nature of our political associa-
tion would be unwise enough to enter into stipulations with
the United States, conceding on their part privileges of im-
portance, while they were apprised that the engagements on
134
See generally 1 L
AUREL
W
ENDT
,I
LLINOIS
L
EGAL
R
ESEARCH
G
UIDE
(2d ed. 2006).
135
See generally T
HE
F
EDERALIST
N
OS
. 15–17, 21–22 (Alexander Hamilton), N
OS
. 18–20
(Alexander Hamilton and James Madison). For the purposes of this Article, the Federalist Pa-
pers are those edited by Clinton Rossiter.
136
T
HE
F
EDERALIST
N
OS
. 15–17, 21–22 (Alexander Hamilton), N
OS
. 18–20 (Alexander
Hamilton and James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The quoted words appear in the
titles of these essays.
137
15 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
, supra note 63, at 1053. R
138
See generally 1 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 25. R
139
Supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text. R
140
See 15 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 63, at R
1053–54.
141
T
HE
F
EDERALIST
N
O
. 15, at 101 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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416 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
the part of the Union might at any moment be violated by its
members . . . .
142
Militarily, despite the victory over the United Kingdom, the
United States soon became weak. Though short-lived, Shay’s Rebel-
lion showed how emboldened disaffected citizens were and how
weakly the United States military could respond.
143
Federalist No. 19
said: “The small body of national troops, which has been judged nec-
essary in time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected
with local prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate
contributions to the treasury.”
144
Even worse, the gains of the War
were being lost. The states were not complying with the Treaty of
Paris, which required them to repay pre-Revolutionary War debts.
This failure, in the view of the United Kingdom, justified keeping
British forts in the Great Lakes region despite contrary provisions in
the treaty. “Have we valuable territories and important posts in the
possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought
long since to have been surrendered?” asked Federalist No. 15.
145
Another key problem was that Congress had very little legisla-
tive, executive, and judicial power. It had little authority to pass laws
and almost no authority to enforce them. Federalist No. 16 remarked:
“[I]f any State should be disaffected to the authority of the Union it
could at any time obstruct the execution of its laws . . .”; the national
government must “stand in need of no intermediate legislations; but
must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magis-
trate to execute its own resolutions.”
146
This essay later repeated the
same theme:
The next most palpable defect of the existing Confederation
is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United
States, as now composed, have no power to exact obedience,
or punish disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuni-
ary mulcts, by a suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by
any other constitutional means.
147
Under the Articles of Confederation, the economy also suffered
from state hindrances of commerce. Federalist No. 42 made an affirm-
142
T
HE
F
EDERALIST
N
O
. 22, at 139–40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
143
Rahul Tilva, Shays’ Rebellion
,
M
OUNT
V
ERNON
L
ADIES
’ A
SSOC
., http://
www.mountvernon.org/digital-encyclopedia/article/shays-rebellion/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2016).
144
T
HE
F
EDERALIST
N
O
. 19, at 127 (Alexander Hamilton and James Madison) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961).
145
T
HE
F
EDERALIST
N
O
. 15, supra note 141, at 101 (Alexander Hamilton). R
146
T
HE
F
EDERALIST
N
O
. 16, at 111–12 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
147
T
HE
F
EDERALIST
N
O
. 21, at 134 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 417
ative case for giving Congress the power to regulate interstate com-
merce. It decried the “defect of power in the existing Confederacy to
regulate the commerce between its several members” and emphasized
the need for “the relief of the States which import and export through
other States from the improper contributions levied on them by the
latter.”
148
G. Replacement by the Constitution
Perhaps the greatest achievement of Congress under the Articles
of Confederation was its recognition that problems existed and its
willingness to promote and accept reform. On February 21, 1787, Con-
gress approved the calling of a convention to discuss and propose
amendments to the Articles of Confederation.
149
The Convention
quickly got away from this initial goal. Instead of just drafting amend-
ments to the Articles of Confederation, the assembly proposed a new
Constitution.
150
The Convention decided that the Constitution would
go into effect if conventions in nine states ratified it.
151
In this way,
they bypassed the Confederation Congress and did not allow the state
legislatures to vote on the Constitution.
The Convention also sidestepped the requirement that any
amendments to the Articles of Confederation had to be approved by
all of the states.
152
While this step has provoked considerable aca-
demic discussion, it was largely overlooked as a serious issue. James
Madison dismissed any concern in Federalist No. 40, saying this about
critics who might insist on a unanimous ratification: “Let them de-
clare, whether it was of most importance to the happiness of the peo-
ple of America, that the Articles of Confederation should be
disregarded, and an adequate government be provided, and the Union
preserved; or that an adequate government should be omitted, and
the Articles of Confederation preserved.”
153
Madison and the other
Framers must have remembered the delay and hardship caused by re-
quiring all of the states to ratify the Articles of Confederation.
In the fall of 1787 and spring of 1788, the states held ratification
conventions.
154
One by one, states began approving the new Constitu-
tion. New Hampshire was the ninth state, followed closely by New
148
T
HE
F
EDERALIST
N
O
. 42, at 267 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
149
32 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 44, at 71–74. R
150
See id.
151
34 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 34, at VII. R
152
See A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. XIII.
153
T
HE
F
EDERALIST
N
O
. 40, at 249 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
154
See Kesavan, supra note 48, at 36. R
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418 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
York and Virginia.
155
In July 1788, although North Carolina and
Rhode Island had not yet ratified, Congress acknowledged that a suf-
ficient number of states had approved the Constitution.
156
Congress
then created a committee to report an “Act to Congress for putting
the said constitution into operation.”
157
On September 13, 1788, the
Congress voted to implement the new Constitution, to establish New
York as the capital, and to set March 4, 1789, as the day that the new
government would start and the Confederation would end.
158
II. D
EFINITIONS OF
O
RIGINAL
M
EANING
Judges, scholars, lawyers, and others often seek to discover the
original meaning of the Constitution. This task is not always straight-
forward. The Constitution is now over 225 years old. During this time,
some words have changed their meaning, background principles that
once may have been generally known have now become obscure, and
the intents and purposes of those who drafted the document may have
been forgotten.
In addition, an important complication is that there is more than
one definition of the term “original meaning.” The term might refer to
(1) the original intent of the Framers who drafted the Constitution at
the Constitutional Convention; (2) the original understanding of the
participants in the state ratification debates as to what they were ap-
proving; or (3) the original, objective (or public meaning) of the words
and phrases in the Constitution without reference to any individual’s
or group’s subjective intent or understanding. Other works have ex-
plored these different definitions at length, providing examples of how
they might differ, identifying important figures who have favored one
type of meaning over another, and so forth.
159
This Article takes no
position on the merits of one definition over another or whether one
type of meaning should carry more weight in constitutional interpreta-
tion. Instead, the emphasis here is on clarity: distinguishing the differ-
ent types of original meaning which the Articles of Confederation
might help to establish.
When writers compare the text of the Constitution to the text of
the Articles of Confederation, they are usually making arguments
155
Id. at 36 n.9.
156
34 J
OURNALS OF THE
C
ONTINENTAL
C
ONGRESS
1774–1789, supra note 34, at 304. R
157
Id. at 281.
158
Id. at 515.
159
See, e.g., Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning of the Constitution Matters to Jus-
tice Thomas?, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & L
IBERTY
494, 495 (2009).
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 419
about the original, objective meaning of the Constitution.
160
The same
is usually true when they compare the structure of the government set
up by the Constitution to the structure of the government set up by
the Articles of Confederation.
161
This type of original meaning is ob-
jective because it looks for reasonable inferences that might be drawn
from the comparison, rather than what Madison, Hamilton, or anyone
else subjectively intended the Constitution to mean or understood the
Constitution to mean.
162
In contrast, when writers make arguments about how the Consti-
tution was designed to address perceived problems with the Articles
of Confederation, they more typically are addressing the original in-
tent or the original understanding.
163
The inquiry is not objective be-
cause it requires consideration of extrinsic facts about the Articles’
perceived defects and the intended improvements found in the Consti-
tution. As explained more fully below, these arguments do rely on the
Articles of Confederation, but they also might rely on other sources,
such as remarks at the Constitutional Convention, statements in the
Federalist Papers, and so forth. The goal in discerning the original in-
tent or original understanding is to get at what the Framers or ratifiers
subjectively thought they were accomplishing.
164
More details relating to these matters appear in the Part that fol-
lows.
165
What is most important going forward is only that the readers
recognize that more than one possible “original” meaning may exist
166
and to think critically about how different kinds of arguments might
be addressing different kinds of original meaning.
167
160
See infra Section III.A.
161
See infra Section III.B.
162
See Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era, supra note
11, at 363–64 (describing differences between subjective original meaning and objective original R
meaning).
163
See infra Section III.A.
164
See Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era, supra note
11, at 362–63 (describing original intent as an inquiry into the subjective goals of the Framers). R
165
See infra Part III.
166
See Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era, supra note
11, at 362 (describing three different types of original meaning); see infra C
ONCLUSION
. R
167
Compare infra Section III.A (discussing claims about original meaning based on com-
paring the text of the Constitution and Articles of Confederation), and Section III.B (discussing
claims about original meaning based on comparing the governmental structure established by
the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation), with Section III.C (discussing claims about
original meaning based on extrinsic evidence relating to the goals of the Framers when replacing
the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution), and Section III.D (discussing claims about
original meaning based on the theory that the Articles of Confederation supplement, rather than
replace, the Constitution).
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420 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
III. F
OUR
W
AYS OF
U
SING THE
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION TO
M
AKE
C
LAIMS
A
BOUT THE
O
RIGINAL
M
EANING OF THE
C
ONSTITUTION
Claims about the original meaning of the Constitution that rely
on the Articles of Confederation tend to fall into four categories. The
following discussion identifies these categories, provides multiple il-
lustrations from Supreme Court decisions, and then considers some of
the rhetorical strengths and weaknesses of each type of claim.
A. Claims Based on a Comparison of the Text of the Constitution
to the Text Used in the Articles of Confederation
Many claims about the original meaning of the Constitution rely
on a comparison of the text of the Constitution to the text of the Arti-
cles of Confederation. If the texts are exactly the same or nearly iden-
tical, this may suggest that the Constitution simply continued the work
of the Articles of Confederation. For example, as the Supreme Court
observed in Baker v. General Motors Corp.,
168
the first sentence of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause is almost the same as an antecedent pro-
vision in the Articles of Confederation.
169
The Constitution says: “Full
Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”
170
Using very
similar language, the Articles of Confederation formerly said: “Full
faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to the records,
acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates of every
other state.”
171
The evident conclusion is that the Constitution did not
change the law on this point; as the Supreme Court put it, the two
provisions are of “the same order.”
172
This line of reasoning is not very controversial, but it is also not
necessarily very helpful. Knowing that a provision in the Constitution
has the same meaning as an antecedent provision in the Articles of
Confederation does not facilitate interpretation of the constitutional
provision absent evidence of what the earlier provision meant. Such
evidence about the meaning of the Articles of Confederation simply
may be scarce. Still, some researchers have managed to find useful
information in historical records. For example, Professor David Eng-
dahl has uncovered cases from the 1780s interpreting the Full Faith
168
522 U.S. 222 (1998).
169
See id. at 231, 231 n.3.
170
U.S. C
ONST
. art. IV, § 1.
171
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. IV, para. 3.
172
Baker, 522 U.S. at 231 n.3.
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2017] GUIDE TO THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 421
and Credit Clause in the Articles of Confederation that yield clues
about the meaning of the corresponding clause in the Constitution.
173
This approach may prove fruitful with respect to other provisions if
similar evidence can be discovered.
When the text of the Constitution differs from an antecedent pro-
vision in the Articles of Confederation, sometimes the change indi-
cates something about the meaning of the Constitution. As described
in some detail above,
174
a famous example appears in McCulloch v.
Maryland.
175
Chief Justice Marshall in that case concluded that Con-
gress has implied legislative powers based in part on a comparison of
the Tenth Amendment to Article II of the Articles of Confedera-
tion.
176
He observed that the Tenth Amendment limits Congress to
those powers “delegated by the Constitution,”
177
while Article II re-
stricted the Confederation Congress to the powers “expressly dele-
gated.”
178
Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that omission of the word
“expressly” from the Tenth Amendment indicated that the Framers
intended the Constitution to give implied power to Congress.
179
But a difference in language does not necessarily imply that the
Constitution has a different meaning from the Articles of Confedera-
tion. Instead, the variation in wording might simply reflect an alterna-
tive manner of drafting. As mentioned previously,
180
the Constitution
addresses more subjects than the Articles of Confederation, but in
general tends to treat them in a less verbose manner. One example
concerns the Privileges and Immunities of citizens. The Constitution
simply says: “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privi-
leges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”
181
The antece-
dent of this clause appears in Article IV of the Articles of
Confederation,
182
and it is much longer and more detailed:
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different states in this
union, the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers,
vagabonds and fugitives from Justice excepted, shall be enti-
173
See David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 Y
ALE
L.J. 1584,
1614–19 (2009).
174
See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. R
175
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
176
See id. at 384 (citing U.S. C
ONST
. amend. X).
177
See id. at 406 (citing A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. II).
178
Id.
179
Id. at 406–07.
180
See supra Section I.C.
181
U.S. C
ONST
. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
182
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. IV.
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422 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
tled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several states; and the people of each state shall have free
ingress and regress to and from any other state, and shall
enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, sub-
ject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the
inhabitants thereof respectively, provided that such restric-
tions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of
property imported into any state, to any other State of which
the Owner is an inhabitant; provided also that no imposition,
duties or restriction shall be laid by any state, on the prop-
erty of the united states, or either of them.
183
Comparing these two clauses reveals a number of omissions. For
instance, the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not expressly
mention a right to “free ingress and regress to and from any other
state,” as did the Articles of Confederation. Does this omission mean
that the drafters intended to eliminate the right to travel across state
lines as one of the privileges protected by the Clause? In Zobel v.
Williams,
184
the Supreme Court concluded that it did not, explaining:
While the Framers of our Constitution omitted the reference
to “free ingress and regress,” they retained the general guar-
anty of “privileges and immunities.” Charles Pinckney, who
drafted the current version of Art. IV, told the Convention
that this Article was “formed exactly upon the principles of
the 4th article of the present Confederation.” Commenta-
tors, therefore, have assumed that the Framers omitted the
express guaranty merely because it was redundant, not be-
cause they wished to excise the right from the
Constitution.
185
These two examples from McCulloch v. Maryland and Zobel v.
Williams reveal a simply stated difficulty: a divergence between the
text of the Constitution and the text of the Articles of Confederation
sometimes indicates a difference in meaning and sometimes does not.
Unfortunately, no simple formula exists for telling the two situations
apart. As a result, in each instance of a difference in wording, re-
searchers must examine the evidence in a lawyerly manner, draw a
logical conclusion about what it shows, and then explain the reasoning
in much the same way that the Supreme Court did in these two cases.
In some instances, a provision in the Constitution has no clear
antecedent in the Articles of Confederation. In this situation, courts
183
Id. art. IV, para. 1.
184
457 U.S. 55 (1982).
185
Id. at 79–80 (citation omitted).
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generally conclude that the constitutional provision creates a new
power or new limitation that did not exist under the Articles of Con-
federation. For example, in Central Virginia Community College v.
Katz,
186
the Supreme Court observed that while the Constitution con-
tains a clause empowering Congress to pass uniform laws on the sub-
ject of bankruptcy, no such clause existed under the Articles of
Confederation.
187
The Court concluded that the constitutional clause
must have conferred a power to address problems that had arisen in
cases before the Constitution’s ratification.
188
In other instances, the situation is reversed: A provision in the
Articles of Confederation has no analogue in the Constitution. For
example, a clause in Article IX of the Articles of Confederation, ex-
pressly gave Congress the power to regulate Indian affairs, saying:
The united states, in congress assembled, shall also have the
sole and exclusive right and power of . . . regulating the trade
and managing all affairs with the Indians, not members of
any of the states; provided that the legislative right of any
state, within its own limits, be not infringed or
violated . . . .
189
In contrast, although the Constitution empowers Congress to regulate
“commerce . . . among . . . the Indian Tribes,”
190
the Constitution con-
tains no provision allowing Congress to regulate Indian “affairs” more
generally. In his concurring opinion in Adoptive Couple v. Baby
Girl,
191
Justice Thomas observed that at the Constitutional Conven-
tion, James Madison had proposed giving Congress the power to regu-
late “Indian affairs” but the Convention did not adopt this proposal.
192
He accordingly concluded:
It is, thus, clear that the Framers of the Constitution were
alert to the difference between the power to regulate trade
with the Indians and the power to regulate all Indian affairs.
By limiting Congress’ power to the former, the Framers de-
clined to grant Congress the same broad powers over Indian
affairs conferred by the Articles of Confederation.
193
186
546 U.S. 356 (2006).
187
Id. at 368.
188
See id. at 369.
189
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. IX, para. 4 (emphasis added).
190
U.S. C
ONST
. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
191
133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
192
See id. at 2569 (Thomas, J., concurring).
193
Id. (citing Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 C
ORNELL
L. R
EV
. 1069,
1090 (2004)).
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424 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
As the foregoing discussion suggests, efforts to compare the text
of the Constitution to the text of the Articles of Confederation gener-
ally seek to establish the original, objective meaning of the Constitu-
tion. They rely on logical inferences from the language used in each
document more than on extrinsic evidence about the intentions of the
Framers or the understanding of the participants at the state ratifying
convention. Accordingly, they may complement other sources of evi-
dence about the original, objective meaning, such as dictionaries from
the Founding Era.
194
B. Claims Based on a Comparison of the Structure of Government
Set Up by the Constitution to the Structure of the Government
Established by the Articles of Confederation
Structural constitutional arguments seek to determine the an-
swers to specific constitutional questions by looking at the organiza-
tion of the government set up by the Constitution. A well-known
example appears in Marbury v. Madison.
195
Chief Justice Marshall ob-
served that the Constitution creates a legislature with defined and lim-
ited powers.
196
He then asked rhetorically, “[t]o what purpose are
powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to
writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended
to be restrained?”
197
He reasoned that the limited powers would not
make sense if Congress could transcend the limits without conse-
quence.
198
This structural reasoning supported Chief Justice Marshall’s
conclusion that the acts of Congress that are “repugnant to the consti-
tution” cannot become law.
199
The Articles of Confederation may contribute to structural con-
stitutional arguments. Sometimes comparing the structure of the gov-
ernment under the Constitution to the structure of the government
under the Articles of Confederation helps with reasoning about par-
194
The original, objective meaning may be consistent with original intent of the Framers
and the original understanding of the ratifiers, and sometimes the courts look at more than one
type of meaning. For example, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, Justice Thomas bolstered his
conclusions about Congress’s power with respect to Indian affairs by looking at James Madison’s
proposed amendment at the Constitutional Convention. 133 S. Ct. at 2569. And based on infer-
ences drawn from the text in McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall drew an inference
about what “the men who drew and adopted” the Tenth Amendment “probably” intended to
accomplish. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406–07 (1819).
195
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
196
See id. at 176.
197
Id.
198
See id. at 176–77.
199
Id. at 177.
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ticular issues. Two examples of this kind of claim about the original
meaning appear in Justice Stevens’s separate opinions in New York v.
United States
200
and Printz v. United States.
201
Both cases concerned
intergovernmental immunity. In New York v. United States, the Court
held that the federal government could not require a state to take
legislative action.
202
In Printz, the Court held that the federal govern-
ment could not require state officials to implement federal legisla-
tion.
203
Justice Stevens disagreed with these conclusions. In New York
v. United States, Justice Stevens advanced this structural argument:
Under the Articles of Confederation, the Federal Govern-
ment had the power to issue commands to the States. Be-
cause that indirect exercise of federal power proved
ineffective, the Framers of the Constitution empowered the
Federal Government to exercise legislative authority directly
over individuals within the States, even though that direct
authority constituted a greater intrusion on state sovereignty.
Nothing in that history suggests that the Federal Govern-
ment may not also impose its will upon the several States as
it did under the Articles. The Constitution enhanced, rather
than diminished, the power of the Federal Government.
204
In other words, a comparison of the structure of the government
under the Articles of Confederation to the government under the
Constitution showed that a change had occurred but that the change
did not take away a power that formerly had belonged to the govern-
ment.
205
Justice Stevens used similar reasoning in Printz:
Under the Articles of Confederation the National Govern-
ment had the power to issue commands to the several sover-
eign States, but it had no authority to govern individuals
directly. Thus, it raised an army and financed its operations
by issuing requisitions to the constituent members of the
Confederacy, rather than by creating federal agencies to
draft soldiers or to impose taxes. That method of governing
proved to be unacceptable, not because it demeaned the sov-
ereign character of the several States, but rather because it
was cumbersome and inefficient.
206
200
505 U.S. 144, 210 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
201
521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 178–79.
203
Printz, 521 U.S. at 936.
204
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 210 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citation omitted).
205
See id.
206
Printz, 521 U.S. at 945 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Again, Justice Stevens was making a structural constitutional argu-
ment, using the Articles of Confederation to help determine the struc-
ture of the Constitution, which in turn he used to address the specific
issue before the Court.
Attempting to determine the original meaning of the Constitu-
tion by comparing the structure of the government under the Consti-
tution to the structure of the government under the Articles of
Confederation is sometimes difficult because the relevant history may
not be clear. An example of this problem appears in Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida.
207
In that case, the Seminole tribe sued the State of
Florida in federal court, claiming that Florida had not complied with
its obligations under a federal statute regulating gambling.
208
The Su-
preme Court had to determine whether the Indian Commerce Clause
gave Congress power to abrogate the state’s Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
209
The Solicitor General’s brief in the case advanced a
structural argument about state sovereignty that relied in part on a
comparison of the Constitution to the Articles of Confederation.
210
But the Court eschewed this approach in deciding the case, presuma-
bly because of its difficulty. The Court chose not to “calculate exactly
how close the American States came to sovereignty in the classic sense
prior to ratification of the Constitution,”
211
and ruled on other
grounds.
Comparing constitutional structures is often more complicated
than comparing the texts. In New York v. United States, Justice Ste-
vens appears to have been relying on the common logical inference
that “the greater includes the lesser.” Because Congress generally has
more power under the Constitution than it had under the Articles of
Confederation, he concluded that it must have whatever powers the
Confederation Congress had.
212
This reasoning may hold true in some
instances, but it is subject to counter examples. As Justice Thomas’s
opinion in Seminole Tribe indicates, the Confederation Congress may
have had some powers—like regulating Indian affairs—that Congress
currently does not have. Put simply, while the Constitution generally
expanded Congress’s powers, it also contracted a few of them. The
207
517 U.S. 44 (1996).
208
See id. at 51–52.
209
See id. at 47.
210
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22–24, Semi-
nole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1995) (No. 94-12).
211
Seminole Tribe of Fla., 517 U.S. at 150.
212
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 210 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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greater powers Congress now enjoys, therefore, do not always include
the lesser powers that the Confederation Congress previously had.
Structural comparisons, like textual comparisons, generally sup-
port claims about the original, objective meaning of the Constitution.
They do not focus on the subjective intentions of the Framers or un-
derstandings of those who ratified the Constitution, but instead on
logical reasoning.
C. Claims Based on Extrinsic Evidence of the Framers’ Goals in
Replacing the Articles of Confederation with the Constitution
In some instances, in attempting to discern the original meaning
of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has focused not just on the
text and structure of the Articles of Confederation, but also on criti-
cism of the Articles of Confederation during the Founding period.
213
The Supreme Court has reasoned that the Framers of the Constitution
intended to correct these deficiencies and that those who ratified the
Constitution understood that it would accomplish this goal.
214
Most
frequently, the Court has relied on the Federalist Papers to discern the
Framers’ concerns about the Articles of Confederation, although
other sources also might serve this function equally well.
215
The clearest cases of this type of reasoning about the original
meaning of the Constitution concern the Commerce Clause, which
empowers Congress to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several
States.”
216
This provision has no antecedent in the Articles of Confed-
eration, and the lack of national power over commerce was seen as a
major problem in the 1780s.
217
In Federalist No. 42, James Madison
identified the inability of Congress to regulate interstate commerce as
a “defect of power in the existing Confederacy” which has “been
clearly pointed out by experience.”
218
He then explained that a “very
material object” of granting power to Congress to regulate interstate
commerce was to allow Congress to provide for “the relief of the
States which import and export through other States from the im-
proper contributions levied on them by the latter.”
219
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause in
light of this criticism of the Articles of Confederation. For example, in
213
See, e.g., id. at 163.
214
See id.
215
See id.
216
U.S. C
ONST
. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
217
See T
HE
F
EDERALIST
N
O
. 42, supra note 148, at 266–68 (James Madison). R
218
Id. at 267 (James Madison).
219
Id.
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428 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
Dennis v. Higgins,
220
the Supreme Court cited Federalist Nos. 7, 11,
22, 42, and 53, which all described the poor economic conditions that
prevailed prior to adoption of the Constitution.
221
The Court ex-
plained: “The lack of a national power over commerce during the Ar-
ticles of Confederation led to ongoing disputes among the States, and
the prospect of a descent toward even more intense commercial ani-
mosity was one of the principal arguments in favor of the Constitu-
tion.”
222
Other cases have cited the same experience under the
Articles of Confederation when interpreting the Commerce Clause.
223
Claims that rely on criticisms of the Articles of Confederation
typically seek to establish what the Framers subjectively intended or
the participants at the state ratifying conventions subjectively under-
stood the Constitution to accomplish. Unlike claims based on a com-
parison of texts or governmental structures, they necessarily rely on
extrinsic evidence that typically would not affect the original, objec-
tive meaning of the text of the Constitution. In particular cases, how-
ever, all three types of meaning might be consistent.
Researchers making claims about the original meaning of a con-
stitutional provision that rely on this kind of reasoning must under-
take several steps. First, they must find some criticism of the Articles
of Confederation—in the Federalist Papers or elsewhere—that is ad-
dressed to the same issue as the constitutional provision. Then, re-
searchers must show in some way that the persons who framed and
ratified the Constitution were familiar with the criticism. For instance,
perhaps they remarked on it at the Constitutional Convention or in
one of the state ratifying conventions. Finally, researchers must find
indications that the Constitution was designed or understood to ad-
dress and remedy the criticism of the Articles of Confederation. A
deficiency in any link in this chain would weaken the claim about the
original meaning.
D. Claims Based on the Controversial Theory that the Constitution
Did Not Fully Replace the Articles and that the Articles
Therefore Continue to Supplement the Constitution
A fourth type of claim about the meaning of the Constitution
rests on a theory that the Constitution implicitly continues some of the
220
498 U.S. 439 (1991).
221
Id. at 453–54 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
222
Id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
223
See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 244–45, 245 n.1 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
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principles established by the Articles of Confederation. The theory is
controversial because it goes against the generally accepted idea that
the Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation, and that the
Articles, like a repealed statute or rescinded treaty, have no continu-
ing validity. Yet, despite being somewhat counterintuitive, the theory
has a strong pedigree and appears to be correct at least in some
instances.
A very simple illustration of the theory, with little practical conse-
quence, concerns the name “United States of America.” When and
how did this become the official title of our national government? The
answer appears in the first article of the Articles of Confederation,
which announced: “The Stile of this confederacy shall be, ‘The United
States of America.’
224
The Constitution contains no comparable pro-
vision expressly conferring a name on the new Republic. Instead, the
Constitution’s preamble and several subsequent provisions simply use
the name “United States of America,” or “United States,”
225
appar-
ently assuming that the name given to the national government under
the Articles of Confederation would remain in effect—which history
shows it did.
A more significant example concerns Article XIII of the Articles
of Confederation, which declares that “the union shall be perpet-
ual.”
226
Nothing in the Constitution addresses this issue, a point that
became evident before and during the Civil War when some states
claimed the power to secede. In his first Inaugural Address, Lincoln
believed secession was not possible. Drawing on the Articles of Con-
federation, Lincoln said:
[W]e find the proposition that, in legal contemplation, the
Union is perpetual, confirmed by the history of the Union
itself. The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was
formed in fact, by the Articles of Association in 1774. It was
matured and continued by the Declaration of Independence
in 1776. It was further matured and the faith of all the then
thirteen States expressly plighted and engaged that it should
be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And
finally, in 1787, one of the declared objects for ordaining and
establishing the Constitution, was “to form a more perfect
union.”
227
224
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. I.
225
U.S. C
ONST
. pmbl.
226
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. XIII.
227
Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address—Final Text (Mar. 4, 1861), in 4 T
HE
C
OL-
LECTED
W
ORKS OF
A
BRAHAM
L
INCOLN
262, 265 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953) (footnote omitted).
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430 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
In this passage, President Lincoln assumes that the Constitution con-
tinued the principle of perpetual union formally established by Article
XIII of the Articles of Confederation.
This question of whether the Constitution allows states to secede
ultimately came before the Supreme Court in 1868, in Texas v.
White.
228
That case concerned U.S. government bonds worth $5 mil-
lion that were issued to the state government of Texas in settlement of
certain boundary claims.
229
After the Civil War, litigation arose about
whether the bonds could be enforced.
230
After describing how the “in-
surgent legislature” voted to secede from the United States,
231
the Su-
preme Court considered two fundamental issues: “Did Texas, in
consequence of these acts, cease to be a State? Or, if not, did the State
cease to be a member of the Union?”
232
The Court ultimately held
that the acts of secession were null and void.
233
Echoing what Presi-
dent Lincoln had said, the Court ruled:
[The Union of the States] received definite form, and charac-
ter, and sanction from the Articles of Confederation. By
these the Union was solemnly declared to “be perpetual.”
And when these Articles were found to be inadequate to the
exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained “to
form a more perfect Union.” It is difficult to convey the idea
of indissoluble unity more clearly than by these words. What
can be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect,
is not?
234
A third example of this type of claim about the original meaning
of the Constitution concerns the obligation of the states jointly to re-
spond to external threats. Article III of the Articles of Confederation
established a duty of mutual self-defense, proclaiming:
The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of
friendship with each other, for their common defence, . . .
binding themselves to assist each other, against all force of-
fered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on ac-
count of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence
whatever.
235
228
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868), overruled in part by Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476
(1885).
229
See White, 74 U.S. at 703.
230
See id. at 717.
231
Id. at 718.
232
Id. at 724.
233
See id. at 726.
234
Id. at 725.
235
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
of 1781, art. III.
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The Constitution mentions in the preamble that a goal of the
Constitution is to “provide . . . for the common defence”
236
and that
Congress can spend money for the “common defense,” but the Consti-
tution does not say expressly that all states will respond to an attack
against anyone of them. Still, the obligation of mutual self-defense
may continue.
237
Although established by history, this line of argumentation raises
a few difficult theoretical questions. One issue is how the Articles of
Confederation might bind the thirty-seven out of fifty states that
never ratified them. Perhaps the Constitution implicitly incorporates
some prior principles from the Articles and all states became bound
by them when they ratified the Constitution. A second question is why
the Framers of the Constitution would have wanted to preserve im-
portant principles from the Articles of Confederation but did not ad-
dress them with explicit provision. Perhaps they thought they were so
self-evident that they required no discussion. Unfortunately, neither
President Lincoln, nor the Supreme Court, has provided clear answers
to these questions.
C
ONCLUSION
The Articles of Confederation joined the states in their first for-
mal union over 230 years ago. Although the Articles remained in ef-
fect for only eight years, some good can come even from experiments
that ultimately fail. Experience under the Articles of Confederation
greatly influenced the drafting of the Constitution. As this Article has
shown, the Articles of Confederation serve a very important continu-
ing role by providing evidence, in various ways, of the original mean-
ing of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has cited the Articles of
Confederation in more than 180 cases. Reviewing these decisions
reveals four general types of constitutional arguments that in some
way rely on the Articles of Confederation. Although none of them is
free from difficulty, each at least rests on a sound theoretical basis.
Anyone making or evaluating claims about the original meaning of
the Constitution should consider how the Articles of Confederation
might provide additional or contrary evidence.
236
U.S. C
ONST
. pmbl.
237
Cf. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 380 (1918) (upholding federal law drafting men
for service in the Army in part on grounds that states provided men for the Continental Army
under the Articles of Confederation).
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432 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
A
PPENDIX
A: A
NNOTATED
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
Below is an annotated copy of the Articles of Confederation. The
text of the Articles is in Roman type.
238
The annotations are in italics
and the text of the United States Constitution is underlined. Para-
graph designators, which are indicated in brackets (e.g., “[1]”) have
been added for clarity; official versions of the Articles of Confedera-
tion do not include the paragraph designators. The annotations princi-
pally serve to link the clause in the Articles of Confederation to
closely related clauses in the Constitution.
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781
To all to whom these Presents shall come, we, the undersigned
Delegates of the States affixed to our Names send greeting. Whereas
the Delegates of the United States of America in Congress assembled
did on the fifteenth day of November in the year of our Lord One
Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy seven, and in the Second Year
of the Independence of America agree to certain articles of Confeder-
ation and perpetual Union between the States of Newhampshire,
Massachusetts-bay, Rhodeisland and Providence Plantations, Con-
necticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia in the Words
following, viz. “Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union be-
tween the States of Newhampshire, Massachusetts-bay, Rhodeisland
and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia.
I. The Stile of this confederacy shall be, “The United States of
America.”
The Constitution contains no provision conferring a name on the
Republic. The preamble, however, identifies the Constitution as being
“for the United States of America.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
pmbl.
II. Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence,
and every Power, Jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confeder-
ation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.
Although the Constitution presupposes some degree of state auton-
omy, it does not expressly guarantee (or even) address state “sover-
238
The text of the Articles of the Confederation is taken from the Our Documents initia-
tive by the National History Day, The National Archives and Records Administration, and USA
Freedom Corps. Transcript of Articles of Confederation (1777), O
UR
D
OCUMENTS
, http://
www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?doc=3&page=transcript (last visited Dec. 20, 2016).
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eignty,” “freedom,” or “independence.” But the Tenth Amendment
says: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
amend. X.
III. The said states hereby severally enter into a firm league of
friendship with each other, for their common defence, the security of
their Liberties, and their mutual and general welfare,
This provision resembles the Constitution’s preamble, which says:
“We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish
this Constitution for the United States of America.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
pmbl.
binding themselves to assist each other, against all force offered
to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on account of religion,
sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence whatever.
The Constitution does not expressly commit the states to defend
each other. But it does provide that “Congress shall have Power . . . To
provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl.
15.
IV. [1] The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different states in this union, the
free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugi-
tives from Justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and im-
munities of free citizens in the several states;
“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. IV, § 2,
cl. 1.
and the people of each state shall have free ingress and regress to
and from any other state,
Not expressly addressed in the text of the Constitution.
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce,
subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabi-
tants thereof respectively,
Not expressly addressed in the text of the Constitution.
provided that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to pre-
vent the removal of property imported into any state, to any other
State of which the Owner is an inhabitant;
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434 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
Not expressly addressed in the text of the Constitution. This provi-
sion apparently served to allow a slaveowner, who had brought a slave
into a free state, to take the slave back out of the state. Brainerd Currie
& Herma Hill Schreter, Unconstitutional Discrimination in the Con-
flict of Laws: Privileges and Immunities, 69
Y
ALE
L.J
. 1323, 1336 n.35
(1960). This was a concern following Somerset v. Stewart, 98 Eng.
Rep. 499 (1772), in which the King’s Bench freed a slave brought from
Virginia to England. The Constitution addressed fugitive slaves in Arti-
cle IV, saying “No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour,
but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service
or Labour may be due.”
U.S. C
ONST
. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
provided also that no imposition, duties or restriction shall be laid
by any state, on the property of the united states, or either of them.
Not expressly addressed in the text of the Constitution. The Su-
preme Court, however, has held that the states do not have the power to
tax the federal government in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819).
[2] If any Person guilty of, or charged with, treason, felony, or
other high misdemeanor in any state, shall flee from Justice, and be
found in any of the united states, he shall upon demand of the Gover-
nor or executive power of the state from which he fled, be delivered
up, and removed to the state having jurisdiction of his offense.
“A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall
on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled,
be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
Crime.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
[3] Full faith and credit shall be given in each of these states to
the records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and magistrates
of every other state.
“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such
Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. IV, § 1.
V. [1] For the more convenient management of the general inter-
ests of the united states, delegates shall be annually appointed in such
manner as the legislature of each state shall direct, to meet in Con-
gress on the first Monday in November, in every year, with a power
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reserved to each state to recall its delegates, or any of them, at any
time within the year, and to send others in their stead, for the remain-
der of the Year.
The Constitution originally provided that the state legislatures
would appoint senators from each state: “The Senate of the United
States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the
Legislature thereof, for six Years . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
[2] No State shall be represented in Congress by less than two,
nor by more than seven Members;
“Representatives . . . shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of
free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual
Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of
the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of
ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of
Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but
each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enu-
meration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to
chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Planta-
tions one, Connecticut five, New York six, New Jersey four, Penn-
sylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North
Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 2, cl. 3. “The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six
Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 3,
cl. 1.
and no person shall be capable of being delegate for more than
three years, in any term of six years;
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution.
nor shall any person, being a delegate, be capable of holding any
office under the united states, for which he, or another for his benefit
receives any salary, fees or emolument of any kind.
“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he
was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the
United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments
whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either
House during his Continuance in Office.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
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436 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
[3] Each State shall maintain its own delegates in a meeting of the
states, and while they act as members of the committee of the states.
“The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation
for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Trea-
sury of the United States.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
[4] In determining questions in the united states, in Congress as-
sembled, each state shall have one vote.
“[E]ach Senator shall have one Vote.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
Note: The Constitution does not expressly say that each representative
will have one vote.
[5] Freedom of speech and debate in Congress shall not be im-
peached or questioned in any Court, or place out of Congress, and the
members of congress shall be protected in their persons from arrests
and imprisonments, during the time of their going to and from, and
attendance on congress, except for treason, felony, or breach of the
peace.
“They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the
Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session
of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be ques-
tioned in any other Place.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
VI. [1] No State, without the Consent of the united States, in con-
gress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy
from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with
any King, prince or state;
“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confedera-
tion . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1. “No State shall, without the
Consent of Congress, . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact . . . with
a foreign Power . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
nor shall any person holding any office of profit or trust under the
united states, or any of them, accept of any present, emolument, of-
fice, or title of any kind whatever, from any king, prince or foreign
state;
“[A]nd no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under
them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present,
Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King,
Prince, or foreign State.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 9, cl. 8.
nor shall the united states, in congress assembled, or any of them,
grant any title of nobility.
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“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States.”
U.S.
C
ONST
.
art. I, § 9, cl. 8. “No State shall . . . grant any Title of Nobility.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
[2] No two or more states shall enter into any treaty, confedera-
tion, or alliance whatever between them, without the consent of the
united states, in congress assembled, specifying accurately the pur-
poses for which the same is to be entered into, and how long it shall
continue.
“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any
Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I,
§ 10, cl. 3.
No State shall lay any imposts or duties, which may interfere with
any stipulations in treaties, entered into by the united States in con-
gress assembled, with any king, prince, or State, in pursuance of any
treaties already proposed by congress, to the courts of France and
Spain.
“No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Im-
posts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all
Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be
for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall
be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 10, cl. 2. “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay
any Duty of Tonnage . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
[3] No vessels of war shall be kept up in time of peace, by any
state, except such number only, as shall be deemed necessary by the
united states, in congress assembled, for the defence of such state, or
its trade;
“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . keep Troops,
or Ships of War in time of Peace . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
nor shall any body of forces be kept up, by any state, in time of
peace, except such number only as, in the judgment of the united
states, in congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison
the forts necessary for the defence of such state;
“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . keep Troops,
. . . in time of Peace . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
but every state shall always keep up a well regulated and disci-
plined militia, sufficiently armed and accounted, and shall provide and
constantly have ready for use, in public stores, a due number of field
pieces and tents, and a proper quantity of arms, ammunition, and
camp equipage.
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438 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution.
[4] No State shall engage in any war without the consent of the
united States in congress assembled, unless such State be actually in-
vaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution
being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the
danger is so imminent as not to admit of a delay till the united states
in congress assembled, can be consulted:
“No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . engage in
War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not
admit of delay.”
U.S. C
ONST
. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
nor shall any state grant commissions to any ships or vessels of
war, nor letters of marque or reprisal, except it be after a declaration
of war by the united states in congress assembled, and then only
against the kingdom or State, and the subjects thereof, against which
war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be es-
tablished by the united states in congress assembled, unless such state
be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out
for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or
until the united states in congress assembled shall determine
otherwise.
“No State shall . . . grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
VII. When land forces are raised by any state, for the common
defence, all officers of or under the rank of colonel, shall be appointed
by the legislature of each state respectively by whom such forces shall
be raised, or in such manner as such state shall direct, and all vacan-
cies shall be filled up by the state which first made appointment.
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution.
VIII. All charges of war, and all other expenses that shall be in-
curred for the common defence or general welfare, and allowed by the
united states in congress assembled, shall be defrayed out of a com-
mon treasury, which shall be supplied by the several states, in propor-
tion to the value of all land within each state, granted to or surveyed
for any Person, as such land and the buildings and improvements
thereon shall be estimated, according to such mode as the united
states, in congress assembled, shall, from time to time, direct and
appoint.
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution.
The taxes for paying that proportion shall be laid and levied by
the authority and direction of the legislatures of the several states
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within the time agreed upon by the united states in congress
assembled.
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution.
IX. [1] The united states, in congress assembled, shall have the
sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war,
except in the cases mentioned in the sixth article
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To declare War . . . .”
U.S.
C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
—of sending and receiving ambassadors
“[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Minis-
ters and Consuls . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. “[The President]
shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers . . . .”
U.S.
C
ONST
.
art. II, § 3.
—entering into treaties and alliances,
“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Sen-
ators present concur.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
provided that no treaty of commerce shall be made, whereby the
legislative power of the respective states shall be restrained from im-
posing such imposts and duties on foreigners, as their own people are
subjected to,
“[A]ll Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
or from prohibiting the exportation or importation of any species
of goods or commodities whatsoever
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution. Note:
Congress regularly prohibits importation of goods (e.g., illegal drugs)
and exports of goods (e.g., certain weapons and technologies). But the
Constitution did contain this provision: “The Migration or Importation
of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to
admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one
thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed
on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.”
U.S.
C
ONST
.
art. I, § 9, cl. 1.
—of establishing rules for deciding, in all cases, what captures on
land or water shall be legal, and in what manner prizes taken by land
or naval forces in the service of the united Sates, shall be divided or
appropriated
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440 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To . . . make Rules concern-
ing Captures on Land and Water.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
—of granting letters of marque and reprisal in times of peace
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To . . . grant Letters of Mar-
que and Reprisal.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
—appointing courts for the trial of piracies and felonies commit-
ted on the high seas; and establishing courts; for receiving and deter-
mining finally appeals in all cases of captures; provided that no
member of congress shall be appointed a judge of any of the said
courts.
“Congress shall have Power . . . To define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl.
10. “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Trea-
ties made . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “[N]o Person holding
any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House
during his Continuance in Office.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
[2] The united states, in congress assembled shall also be the last
resort on appeal, in all disputes and differences now subsisting, or that
hereafter may arise between two or more states concerning boundary,
jurisdiction, or any other cause whatever;
“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, . . . to Controversies between two or more States.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art.
III, § 2, cl. 1.
which authority shall always be exercised in the manner follow-
ing. Whenever the legislative or executive authority, or lawful agent of
any state in controversy with another, shall present a petition to con-
gress, stating the matter in question, and praying for a hearing, notice
thereof shall be given, by order of congress, to the legislative or execu-
tive authority of the other state in controversy, and a day assigned for
the appearance of the parties by their lawful agents, who shall then be
directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or judges to con-
stitute a court for hearing and determining the matter in question: but
if they cannot agree, congress shall name three persons out of each of
the united states, and from the list of such persons each party shall
alternately strike out one, the petitioners beginning, until the number
shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than
seven, nor more than nine names, as congress shall direct, shall, in the
presence of congress, be drawn out by lot, and the persons whose
names shall be so drawn, or any five of them, shall be commissioners
or judges, to hear and finally determine the controversy, so always as
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a major part of the judges, who shall hear the cause, shall agree in the
determination: and if either party shall neglect to attend at the day
appointed, without showing reasons which congress shall judge suffi-
cient, or being present, shall refuse to strike, the congress shall pro-
ceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the secretary of
congress shall strike in behalf of such party absent or refusing; and the
judgement and sentence of the court, to be appointed in the manner
before prescribed, shall be final and conclusive; and if any of the par-
ties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such court, or to appear
or defend their claim or cause, the court shall nevertheless proceed to
pronounce sentence, or judgement, which shall in like manner be final
and decisive; the judgement or sentence and other proceedings being
in either case transmitted to congress, and lodged among the acts of
congress, for the security of the parties concerned: provided that every
commissioner, before he sits in judgement, shall take an oath to be
administered by one of the judges of the supreme or superior court of
the State where the cause shall be tried, “well and truly to hear and
determine the matter in question, according to the best of his judge-
ment, without favour, affection, or hope of reward:
“In all Cases . . . in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court
shall have original Jurisdiction.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
“provided, also, that no State shall be deprived of territory for the
benefit of the united states.
“The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all need-
ful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be
so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any
particular State.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
[3] All controversies concerning the private right of soil claimed
under different grants of two or more states, whose jurisdictions as
they may respect such lands, and the states which passed such grants
are adjusted, the said grants or either of them being at the same time
claimed to have originated antecedent to such settlement of jurisdic-
tion, shall, on the petition of either party to the congress of the united
states, be finally determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as
is before prescribed for deciding disputes respecting territorial juris-
diction between different states.
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution.
[4] The united states, in congress assembled, shall also have the
sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of
coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective states
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442 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
“Congress shall have Power . . . To coin Money, regulate the Value
thereof, and of foreign Coin . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 5. “No
State shall . . . coin Money.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
—fixing the standard of weights and measures throughout the
united states
“Congress shall have Power . . . To . . . fix the Standard of Weights
and Measures.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
—regulating the trade and managing all affairs with the Indians,
not members of any of the states; provided that the legislative right of
any state, within its own limits, be not infringed or violated
“Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce . . . with
the Indian Tribes.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
—establishing and regulating post-offices from one state to an-
other, throughout all the united states, and exacting such postage on
the papers passing through the same, as may be requisite to defray the
expenses of the said office
“Congress shall have Power . . . To establish Post Offices and post
Roads.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
—appointing all officers of the land forces in the service of the
united States, excepting regimental officers
“[The President] . . . shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
—appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commission-
ing all officers whatever in the service of the united states;
“[The President] . . . shall appoint . . . all other Officers of the
United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided
for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by
Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
making rules for the government and regulation of the said land
and naval forces, and directing their operations.
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make Rules for the Gov-
ernment and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
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[5] The united States, in congress assembled, shall have authority
to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of congress, to be denomi-
nated, “A Committee of the States,” and to consist of one delegate
from each State;
“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
and to appoint such other committees and civil officers as may be
necessary for managing the general affairs of the united states under
their direction
“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may
happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions
which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. II,
§ 2, cl. 3.
—to appoint one of their number to preside; provided that no
person be allowed to serve in the office of president more than one
year in any term of three years;
“[The President] shall hold his Office during the Term of four
Years . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
to ascertain the necessary sums of money to be raised for the ser-
vice of the united states, and to appropriate and apply the same for
defraying the public expenses;
“The Congress shall have Power . . . to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
to borrow money or emit bills on the credit of the united states,
transmitting every half year to the respective states an account of the
sums of money so borrowed or emitted,
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To borrow Money on the
credit of the United States.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 2.
—to build and equip a navy
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To provide and maintain a
Navy.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art I. § 8, cl. 13.
—to agree upon the number of land forces, and to make requisi-
tions from each state for its quota, in proportion to the number of
white inhabitants in such state, which requisition shall be binding; and
thereupon the legislature of each state shall appoint the regimental
officers, raise the men, and clothe, arm, and equip them, in a soldier-
like manner, at the expense of the united states; and the officers and
men so clothed, armed, and equipped, shall march to the place ap-
pointed, and within the time agreed on by the united states, in con-
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444 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
gress assembled; but if the united states, in congress assembled, shall,
on consideration of circumstances, judge proper that any state should
not raise men, or should raise a smaller number than its quota, and
that any other state should raise a greater number of men than the
quota thereof, such extra number shall be raised, officered, clothed,
armed, and equipped in the same manner as the quota of such state,
unless the legislature of such state shall judge that such extra number
cannot be safely spared out of the same, in which case they shall raise,
officer, clothe, arm, and equip, as many of such extra number as they
judge can be safely spared. And the officers and men so clothed,
armed, and equipped, shall march to the place appointed, and within
the time agreed on by the united states in congress assembled.
The Constitution differs considerably from the Articles of Confed-
eration on this point. Whereas the Articles required the state to provide
officers and men to the Continental Army, the Constitution provides
that “[t]he Congress shall have Power . . . To raise and support Armies,
but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term
than two Years.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
[6] The united states, in congress assembled, shall never engage in
a war, nor grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of peace, nor
enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the
value thereof nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the
defence and welfare of the united states, or any of them, nor emit
bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the united states, nor appro-
priate money, nor agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built
or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor
appoint a commander in chief of the army or navy, unless nine states
assent to the same,
The Constitution provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . To
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules
concerning Captures on Land and Water” without requiring a
supermajority of the states to approve.
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
nor shall a question on any other point, except for adjourning
from day to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of
the united states in congress assembled.
“[A] Majority of each [House] shall constitute a Quorum to do
Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day . . . .”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
[7] The congress of the united states shall have power to adjourn
to any time within the year, and to any place within the united states,
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so that no period of adjournment be for a longer duration than the
space of six Months,
“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any
other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.”
U.S.
C
ONST
.
art. I, § 5, cl. 4.
and shall publish the Journal of their proceedings monthly, except
such parts thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations,
as in their judgement require secrecy;
“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their
Judgment require Secrecy.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
and the yeas and nays of the delegates of each State, on any ques-
tion, shall be entered on the Journal, when it is desired by any dele-
gate; and the delegates of a State, or any of them, at his or their
request, shall be furnished with a transcript of the said Journal, except
such parts as are above excepted, to lay before the legislatures of the
several states.
“[A]nd the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any
question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on
the Journal.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
X. The committee of the states, or any nine of them, shall be au-
thorized to execute, in the recess of congress, such of the powers of
congress as the united states, in congress assembled, by the consent of
nine states, shall, from time to time, think expedient to vest them with;
provided that no power be delegated to the said committee, for the
exercise of which, by the articles of confederation, the voice of nine
states, in the congress of the united states assembled, is requisite.
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution.
XI. Canada acceding to this confederation, and joining in the
measures of the united states, shall be admitted into, and entitled to
all the advantages of this union;
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution.
but no other colony shall be admitted into the same, unless such
admission be agreed to by nine states.
“New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
XII. All bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed, and debts con-
tracted by or under the authority of congress, before the assembling of
the united states, in pursuance of the present confederation, shall be
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446 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
deemed and considered as a charge against the united States, for pay-
ment and satisfaction whereof the said united states and the public
faith are hereby solemnly pledged.
“All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the
Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States
under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art.
VI, § 1.
XIII. [1] Every State shall abide by the determinations of the
united states, in congress assembled, on all questions which by this
confederation are submitted to them.
“[T]he Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursu-
ance [of the Constitution]; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary not-
withstanding.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. VI, § 2.
And the Articles of this confederation shall be inviolably ob-
served by every state,
“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Con-
stitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.”
U.S.
C
ONST
.
art. VI, § 2.
and the union shall be perpetual;
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution.
nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of
them, unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the united
states, and be afterwards con-firmed by the legislatures of every state.
“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case,
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States,
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other
Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that
no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand
eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, with-
out its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. V.
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[2] And Whereas it hath pleased the Great Governor of the
World to incline the hearts of the legislatures we respectively re-
present in congress, to approve of, and to authorize us to ratify the
said articles of confederation and perpetual union,
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution.
Know Ye, that we, the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the
power and authority to us given for that purpose, do, by these
presents, in the name and in behalf of our respective constituents,
fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said articles
of confederation and perpetual union, and all and singular the matters
and things therein contained.
“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be suffi-
cient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so
ratifying the Same.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
art. VII.
And we do further solemnly plight and engage the faith of our
respective constituents, that they shall abide by the determinations of
the united states in congress assembled, on all questions, which by the
said confederation are submitted to them. And that the articles
thereof shall be inviolably observed by the states we respectively re-
present, and that the union shall be perpetual.
No comparable provision in the text of the Constitution.
In Witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands, in Congress.
Done at Philadelphia, in the State of Pennsylvania, the ninth Day of
July, in the Year of our Lord one Thousand seven Hundred and Sev-
enty eight, and in the third year of the Independence of America.
“[D]one in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States
present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of
the United States of America the Twelfth. In witness whereof We have
hereunto subscribed our Names.”
U.S. C
ONST
.
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A
PPENDIX
B: T
ABLE OF
C
ONSTITUTIONAL
P
ROVISIONS AND
R
ELATED
P
ROVISIONS IN THE
A
RTICLES OF
C
ONFEDERATION
The following table lists all of the provisions of the Constitution
(up to the Twelfth Amendment) in Roman type on the left and related
provisions in the Articles of Confederation in italics on the right. See
Appendix A for the text of the Articles of Confederation.
Preamble: Art. I; Art. III.
Art. I, § 1: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 2, cl. 1: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 2, cl. 2: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 2, cl. 3: Art. V, para. 2.
Art. I, § 2, cl. 4: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 2, cl. 5: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 3, cl. 1: Art. V, paras. 1, 2, 4.
Art. I, § 3, cl. 2: Art. V, para. 1.
Art. I, § 3, cl. 3: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 3, cl. 4: Art. IX, para. 5.
Art. I, § 3, cl. 5: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 3, cl. 6: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 3, cl. 7: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 4, cl. 1: Art. V, para. 1.
Art. I, § 4, cl. 2: Art. V, para. 1.
Art. I, § 5, cl. 1: Art. IX, para. 5.
Art. I, § 5, cl. 2: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 5, cl. 3: Art. IX, para. 7.
Art. I, § 5, cl. 4: Art. IX, para. 7.
Art. I, § 6, cl. 1: Art. V, paras. 3, 5.
Art. I, § 6, cl. 2: Art. V, para. 2; Art. IX, para. 1.
Art. I, § 7, cl. 1: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 7, cl. 2: Art. IX, para. 6.
Art. I, § 7, cl. 3: Art. IX, para. 6.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 1: Art. IX, paras. 1, 5.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 2: Art. IX, paras. 5, 6.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 3: Art. IX, paras. 1, 4.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 4: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 5: Art. IX, para. 4.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 6: Art. IX, para. 4.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 7: Art. IX, para. 4.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 8: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 9: Art. IX, paras. 1, 2.
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Art. I, § 8, cl. 10: Art. IX, para. 1.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 11: Art. IX, paras. 1, 6.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 12: Art. IX, paras. 5, 6.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 13: Art. IX, paras. 5, 6.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 14: Art. IX, para. 4.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 15: Art. III; Art. XI, para. 5.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 16: Art. VI, para. 4; Art. VII; Art. XI, para. 5.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 17: Art. XI, para. 7.
Art. I, § 8, cl. 18: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 9, cl. 1: Art. IX, para. 1.
Art. I, § 9, cl. 2: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 9, cl. 3: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 9, cl. 4: Art. VIII.
Art. I, § 9, cl. 5: No comparable provision.
Art. I, § 9, cl. 6: Art. IV, para. 1.
Art. I, § 9, cl. 7: Art. VIII; Art. IX, para. 5.
Art. I, § 9, cl. 8: Art. VI, para. 1.
Art. I, § 10, cl. 1: Art. VI, paras. 1, 5; Art. IX, para. 4.
Art. I, § 10, cl. 2: Art. VI, para. 3.
Art. I, § 10, cl. 3: Art. VI, paras. 2, 4, 5.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 1: Art. IX, para. 5; Art. X.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 2: Art. IX, para. 5.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 3: Art. IX, para. 5.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 4: No comparable provision.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 5: No comparable provision.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 6: No comparable provision.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 7: No comparable provision.
Art. II, § 1, cl. 8: No comparable provision.
Art. II, § 2, cl. 1: Art. IX, para. 6.
Art. II, § 2, cl. 2: Art. IX, paras. 1, 4.
Art. II, § 2, cl. 3: Art. X.
Art. II, § 3: No comparable provision.
Art. III, § 1: No comparable provision.
Art. III, § 2, cl. 1: Art. IX, paras. 1, 2.
Art. III, § 2, cl. 2: Art. IX, para. 2.
Art. III, § 2, cl. 3: No comparable provision.
Art. III, § 3, cl. 1: No comparable provision.
Art. III, § 3, cl. 2: No comparable provision.
Art. IV, § 1: Art. IV, para. 3.
Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1: Art. IV, para. 1.
Art. IV, § 2, cl. 2: Art. IV, paras. 1, 2.
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450 THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:397
Art. IV, § 2, cl. 3: Art. IV, para. 1.
Art. IV, § 3, cl. 1: Art. XI.
Art. IV, § 3, cl. 2: Art. IX, para. 2.
Art. IV, § 4: No comparable provision.
Art. V: Art. XIII, para. 1.
Art. VI, cl. 1: Art. XII.
Art. VI, cl. 2: Art. XIII, para. 1.
Art. VI, cl. 3: No comparable provision.
Art. VII: Art. XIII, para. 2.
Amend. I: No comparable provision.
Amend. II: Art. VI, para. 3.
Amend. III: No comparable provision.
Amend. IV: No comparable provision.
Amend. V: No comparable provision.
Amend. VI: No comparable provision.
Amend. VII: No comparable provision.
Amend. VIII: No comparable provision.
Amend. IX: No comparable provision.
Amend. X: Art. II.
Amend. XI: No comparable provision.
Amend. XII: Art. IX, para. 5.